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Foreword 
 
An employment relationship is always two-sided – it is between an employer and an 
employee. In a small company it is relatively straightforward as the employer and 
employee communicate with each other daily. In a bigger enterprise, however, the 
employee may sometimes even be unaware of who is his/her ultimate employer. Yet, 
regardless of whether the company is big or small, close or distant, employment is 
always connected to communication. One may think that it is sufficient to explain an 
employee his/her work tasks and give orders, but nowadays we talk increasingly more of 
the necessity to inform employees of the company’s wellbeing as a whole and to give 
them right of say. Is it beneficial or detrimental to a company to involve employees in the 
company’s management process? Just as the below study concludes – there is no single 
right answer to this question. Enterprises differ along with their practices. There is, 
however, something that is crystal clear – communication with employees, or employees’ 
information and consultation as the European terminology puts it, is an important point of 
thought for any bigger enterprise. 
 
Have an enjoyable read! 
 
Tarmo Kriis 
Director of Estonian Employers’ Confederation 
Information and consultation of employees' representatives forms an inseparable part of 
the current social model applied in Europe. It derives from the principle that the parties 
of an employment relationship are equal and co-operate with a common goal. This idea, 
however, is relatively novel to Estonia as in our labour relations the employer still tries to 
manage by making one-sided decisions. 
The prerequisite of achieving the common goal – stable development and increasing 
well-being – is the coordinated and responsible efforts of the state, employers and 
employees. Every enterprise stands for much more than just the owner’s profit or loss. 
For a worker, it is primarily a job that enables the person to apply his/her knowledge and 
skills whilst having the guarantee of a continuous income. This makes the employee 
interested in the well-being and future of the company. The current labour market 
requires adaptability and readiness for change from people as well as companies. If we 
want to have a stable economic development and to keep the current levels of employment, employees must 
have early information on what they can expect from their own company and what are the prospects of their 
profession in general. If the future is gloomy, there must be early possibilities provided for re- or further training, 
for a change of job or a place of living, and so on. All this takes place successfully and smoothly in companies 
where problems are discussed with employees timely and openly. This is the reason why in Estonia we need to 
involve employees' representatives in decision-making to a much greater extent than we have done so far. 
 
Harri Taliga 
Head of the Confederation of Estonian Trade Unions 
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Summary 
According to European Union directive 2002/14/EC, all EU Member States had to complete the 
framework for employees’ information and consultation through employees’ representatives by the 
beginning of 2005. Estonia is yet to adopt this directive. In addition, the subject of employee 
participation in company’s decision-making is very little studied in Estonia and there is no overview of 
how much are employee’s representatives involved in this. The aim of the current study is to take first 
steps towards studying this area in Estonia. More specifically, the aim is to provide the reader with an 
overview of other countries’ experiences in the field of employee participation and to analyse 
employee participation process within different representation forms found in Estonia. Other countries 
were analysed on the basis of earlier studies in the field and the Estonian analysis is based on case 
studies carried out in eight Estonian companies during the spring-summer period of 2005. The case 
studies included interviews with managers and employees' representatives, and a survey of randomly 
sampled employees. The case study method was preferred for its exploratory nature and because its 
outcomes are based on, or advance, theory and can later be checked against other methods. In 
reading and interpreting the outcomes of the present case study, it should be born in mind that the 
outcomes should not be generalised over Estonian companies as a whole. 
The purpose of the current case study was to analyse participation processes in different forms of 
employee representation within the historic and sector-specific context of the companies involved. In 
Estonia, employees may be represented by a trade union representative, a trustee elected by non-
unionised workers, or both of them together. The current study does not cover health and safety 
representatives.  
The paper consists of four parts. Chapter one gives an overview of employee participation related 
concepts and outcomes of studies looking at the impact of employee participation in different 
countries. Chapter two focuses on employee participation forms used in different countries. Chapter 
three provides an overview of employee participation related legislation in Estonia and of relevant 
regulations in the European Union. Chapter four presents the outcomes of the completed case study. 
Definition and Concept of Employee Participation 
Employee participation refers to his/her opportunity to participate in company’s decision-making 
regardless of his/her position. The different forms of participation are information (prior to or after 
making decisions), asking for employees’ opinion (consultation) and giving the employees the right to 
make decisions (co-determination). The more the employees have the right to speak, the more 
influence they can have on decisions. It is also important what kind of decisions employees are 
allowed to have their input in. The participation is more intensive when employees are included in 
making higher level decisions (strategic v operational decisions). Thus, employee participation 
depends on two dimensions: employees’ influence and the importance of the decisions. 
Employee participation can be either direct: all employees have an equal opportunity to participate; or 
indirect: through an employees' representative. The latter means that the employees have elected 
among themselves a person who would represent them in the employer’s decision-making. Direct 
participation of employees is restricted by the company’s size because the bigger the company, the 
more complicated it becomes to involve every single employee. Co-determination without an 
employees' representative is only possible in very small enterprises. 
On the basis of research carried out in other countries, we can claim that employee participation 
increases employees’ satisfaction with work and their motivation. This can result in several positive 
secondary effects on the quality of production and company’s productivity. Research confirms that 
employee participation improves company’s stability (less conflicts and decreased labour turnover) 
and it becomes more innovative. At the same time, the previous studies do not allow us to conclude 
with certainty that employee participation has a definite positive effect on company’s profitability – 
some studies confirm the growth of profitability and others do not find evidence to support it. 
The ideal form of employee participation that is most likely to increase social welfare is direct 
participation. As this, however, is impossible in many cases, the research has also looked at positive 
and negative aspects of indirect participation. Even though indirect participation enables to involve 
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more employees in the decision-making process and it is an efficient way for an employer to organise 
participation, it has been noted that participation through a representative does not increase 
employees’ satisfaction. An employees' representative has to appear competent and trustworthy to 
both the employer and the employees and, thus, is not easy to find. The experience of several 
countries, however, shows that employee participation through a representative and direct 
participation go hand in hand, i.e. employees' representatives themselves are interested in information 
and consultation at the level of an individual. 
Forms of Employee Participation in Different Countries 
Despite the fact that the European Union has existed for a long time and is increasingly intervening in 
regulating employee participation in companies, the practices of employee participation differ 
considerably from country to country. Every country’s employee participation practices are shaped by 
its historical, cultural and political background. Some of the differences are, for example, how many 
employees belong to trade unions; to what extent are industrial relations in the country regulated by 
legislation and to what extent by collective agreements; what forms of representation exist and what 
are their rights; and how do forms of representation relate to each other. 
In general, there are three forms of employee representation at enterprise level in European Union 
countries: trade unions, works councils and employees’ participation in company’s boards 
(management). In some countries, where trade unions are very widely spread and cover most of the 
workforce, trade unions organise the whole information and consultation process (e.g. Sweden). In 
other countries, trade unions co-exist with works councils (e.g. Germany). If employee participation is 
conducted only through trade unions, the system is called the single channel system. If employee 
participation has an alternative channel in the form of works councils, it is called the dual channel 
system. The dual channel system is more frequent in old EU Member States and nearly all these 
countries have provided for the establishment of works councils or works council type of bodies in 
enterprises. In details, works council institutions differ greatly by countries (e.g. does it consist only of 
employees' representatives or also of employer’s representatives, who are appointed as candidates, 
etc.). The new EU countries have diversified the forms with their developing systems. Many of the new 
Member States provide two alternative channels for employee participation, but the second channel is 
utilised only in the cases where companies do not have trade unions (e.g. Czech Republic). As a 
general rule, trade unions conduct collective bargaining and works councils deal with information and 
consultation without concluding any collective agreements. There are, however, some exceptions and 
in some cases works councils also conclude collective agreements at company level. Estonian (and 
Latvian) system is exceptional among the European countries as it provides for the parallel existence 
of both trade union and non-unionised representatives in a company, with both of them having the 
right to conclude collective agreements. 
European Union Regulations and Estonian Legislation 
The main EU directives regulating employee participation concern employees’ information and 
consultation in the cases of collective redundancies and transfers of undertakings; establishment of 
participation in Community-scale undertakings and European Companies; and employee participation 
framework in companies with over 50 employees. All these directives, with the exception of the last 
one, have been adopted in Estonian legislation. The directive on the general participation framework 
provides that all EU Member States should provide employees’ through employees' representatives 
with procedures for information on work-life related matters, and consultation on various issues prior to 
decision-making. Estonian legislation provides for this through trade unions. However, trade union 
membership in Estonia is very small and declining (less than 10% in 2004), which means that, in 
reality, only a very small portion of employees can participate in organising their work-life in such a 
manner. Estonia has to make a decision on how to adopt this framework directive in Estonian 
legislation in the near future, as the deadline for the implementation has already passed. 
Employee Participation in Estonian Companies on the Basis of the Case Study 
Case studies were carried out in eight companies. In four of these, employees were represented by a 
trade union; in two companies, both a trade union representative and a non-unionised trustee existed; 
and in the last two there were no employee-elected representatives. The chosen companies had to 
have over 50 employees and could not be exceptional in Estonian context (e.g. very big). Half of the 
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cases were nominated by Estonian Employers’ Confederation and half by the Confederation of 
Estonian Trade Unions. In addition, the companies had to express their readiness to participating in 
the study. 
Employees’ questionnaires and managers’ and representatives’ interviews revealed that, in general, 
participation was considered important. Information was considered important by all managers, and 
they also emphasised spreading the information beforehand. Only the information on strategic issues 
was considered less important, and could be spread afterwards. Consultation was considered 
important in case of certain issues (operational matters, renewal of technology) but, in general, the 
views differed greatly – some favoured frequent and comprehensive consultation, some did not. 
Technology renewal was the only area within strategic issues where managers seemed to benefit from 
consultation. The employees’ assessment on their opportunities to participate in the economic 
activities of the company expressed clearly the views of the managers, as it was rated very modest in 
nearly all companies. The managers had a shared view also on co-determination issue – it was 
considered unnecessary and impossible. Decision-making was seen as the right and responsibility of 
the manager. 
The cases revealed that employee participation was more intensive in companies where managers 
paid more attention to it. The analysed cases do not suggest any clear relation between the above and 
the existence of employee representation or different forms of representation. Neither is there a clear 
relation between participation intensity and the nature of the work in the company or its size, or 
between the intensity and employees’ level of education. The only clear determinant to participation 
intensity was found to be the manager’s view on the necessity of employee participation. The more 
positive were the manager’s views on this, the more informed were the employees and the higher they 
rated their opportunities to participate in organising their work-life. The companies where managers 
favoured participation had a larger portion of employees who had proposed improvements to the 
organisation of their work; the employees also felt that their suggestions were taken into account more 
often or that at least rejections were justified. 
The fact that employee participation intensity did not depend on the existence of employees' 
representatives, but on the manager’s interest in participation, shows that interest from both parties is 
essential for a successful participation. 
The present case study revealed that both trade unions and non-unionised trustees are insignificant in 
their role as a channel for information and consultation. The managers consider collective bargaining 
as the main role for employees' representatives, whereas employees’ questionnaires reveal that 
representatives have two main roles: mediating information and proposals between management and 
employees; and collective bargaining. This shows that even though the role of employees' 
representatives is not as big as that of other communication channels, they still have their own niche 
in communication. This becomes visible, for example, in the case where an employee has a problem 
that he/she does not dare or want to take to his/her manager. 
The main channel of participation is the company’s official hierarchy, i.e. employee’s direct manager. 
After that, the most frequently named channels were meetings and colleagues, followed by notice 
boards and electronic channels. As to the movement of information in comparison with other CEE 
countries: in Estonia it happens more often unofficially. Employee participation through their direct 
manager cannot be considered indirect participation as there is no employee-elected representative, 
and the direct manager cannot be considered as one. 
There were two cases in the study where the institution of non-unionised trustee was initiated by 
management with an aim to include wider workforce outside the trade union into discussions over the 
conditions of the collective agreement (in both companies trade union members were in minority 
among the employees). In both cases, the idea of a non-unionised trustee was suggested by the 
manager, but elected by employees. Also, in both cases, the trustee was often a lower-level manager. 
In all the studied companies, collective agreements covered all the employees, regardless of who 
signed it on behalf of employees or how it was stated in the text of the agreement. 
The managers saw employees' representatives (both trade union ones and non-unionised ones) as a 
formality and they were not considered as serious discussion partners. Trade unions had a bad 
reputation in the eyes of the interviewed managers, as they did not represent the significant part of the 
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workforce, and their demands had often not considered the interests of the company. Negative 
attitudes were also enhanced by an understanding that a trade union is established only in the case of 
a problem or a confrontation between the employer and employees. The managers did not consider 
non-unionised representatives very influential and saw them as incompetent. Thus, we can say that 
neither of the representation forms is effective in providing employee participation. 
An important outcome of the current study on analysing employee participation is the hypothesis that, 
in general, employee participation (information) is considered important in Estonia even though, the 
benefits of indirect participation are not very well recognised. More in-depth and comprehensive 
analysis should be made for the development of legislation – especially, if it is used to advance a 
single form of employee representation – in order to understand the role of employees' representatives 
(incl. also health and safety representatives) and the reasons for their establishment. It is also 
important to generally expand the analysis of relations between participation and other indicators with 
more representative samples. 
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Introduction 
Employee participation is a two-sided concept. On the one hand, it aims at increasing company’s 
productivity. Taking into account employees’ opinions may improve the quality of decision-making, 
reduce the time used for their implementation, improve employees’ attitudes towards innovation and 
increase their interest towards the well-being of the company. Thus, employee participation may 
improve the use of company’s resources and therefore, productivity. On the other hand, employee 
participation is clearly related to the redistribution of resources and power in company’s decision-
making (Pichot 2001, p. 1). This means giving employees more decision-making power, which can 
potentially lead to prioritising employees’ interests over these of the company as a whole. It is 
complicated to bear both of these two sides in mind at the same time and there is no universal 
employee participation formula that would suit all countries and companies. 
In the current study, employee participation or involvement means applying the following practices for 
employees in management issues: 
1. Information – employer provides information to employees prior to decision-making; 
2. Consultation (i.e. hearing employees’ voice) – employer asks for employees’ opinions; 
3. Co-determination (or co-decision) – employees are given decision-making power along with 
the employer or delegative participation is used. 
Consultation, i.e. asking for employees’ opinion, presupposes information, and co-determination in 
turn presupposes consultation, but participation as such may also be limited to information only. In 
order to give an employee an opportunity to have a say in his/her work-life organisation, as a 
minimum, consultation has to take place. Employee participation in decision-making may take place 
directly with all employees, in which case it is called direct participation, or through representatives 
elected by employees, in which case it is called indirect participation. The latter is also called the 
representative form of participation.  
The European Union is paying increasingly more attention to employee participation process in 
companies and to improving social dialogue at company level. There are many directives passed in 
the EU, which are aimed at encouraging employee participation both in single issues, such as 
collective redundancies or transfers of companies, and in the general framework of employees’ 
information and consultation. In Estonia, social dialogue is barely 15 years old. This means that 
employee participation issue is at its earliest stage and it will take time to adjust EU directives and 
regulations, which are based on traditions reaching back several decades, in Estonian labour 
relations. At the same time, Estonia has to make clear decisions on whether and how to develop 
social dialogue. Estonia would have had to adopt directive 2002/14/EC on the framework of 
employees’ information and consultation by March 2005. This directive provides principles for 
informing and consulting employees' representatives and provides for the establishment of information 
and consultation through employees' representatives in all companies with at least 50 employees. 
Estonia has to decide whether and how to adopt the named directive in the legislation in the near 
future. 
Employee participation through representatives is possible in Estonia if there is a will from both the 
employees’ and the employer’s side. Estonian workforce, however, is characterised by a very small 
representation in trade unions or other employees’ representation organisations. This means that 
significant participation through representatives is currently not possible. Estonia differs from other EU 
countries in this respect. On the one hand, Estonia does not have a traditional information and 
consultation body – works councils – that exists in most other European countries. On the other hand, 
Estonia has two channels with equal rights for collective bargaining: trade unions and representatives 
elected by the general meeting of non-unionised workers. 
The aim of the current paper is to give an overview of employee participation through representatives 
in other countries and to analyse participation processes in Estonian companies within different forms 
of employee representation. In this study, employees' representatives include board members of the 
trade union in a company, including the chief representative, and/or representatives elected at the 
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general meeting of non-unionised employees. Health and safety representatives are considered only 
very briefly and the main attention is on representatives on general issues. Thus, employee 
participation is analysed within three types of employee representation: no employee representation 
exists; only trade union representative exists; and, trade union representative and the representative 
elected at the general meeting of non-unionised employees work side-by-side in the company. As 
there were no cases found were there was only the representative elected at the general meeting of 
employees, this form of representation is excluded from the study. 
As the aim of the study was to analyse participation process, and this is greatly a context-specific 
phenomenon, the case study method was preferred. One case equals one company in this paper. In 
total, eight companies were studied and, thus, it is a multiple case study. When choosing the 
companies, the aim was to find examples for all forms of employee representation and to find 
companies that other companies could learn from. For this reason, the authors did not include 
companies who expressed their interest in participating but were somewhat exceptional in Estonian 
context (companies employing large number of employees, monopolistic enterprises, etc.). In order to 
guarantee inclusion of opinions from all sides, in every company there were interviews conducted with 
the manager and employees' representatives (if they existed) and a survey was carried out among 
randomly sampled employees. The employee survey took place in May and June 2005, and the 
interviews in summer 2005. 
In order to carry out the case studies in companies, but also for getting a better picture of employee 
participation background, the study includes also overviews of previous research outcomes, 
experiences of other countries and relevant legislation both in Estonia and the EU. The case study 
method was preferred for its exploratory nature and because its outcomes are based on, or advance, 
theory. As employee participation is previously very little studied in Estonia, this paper can be treated 
as the first step towards it. The results of the current case study can only be discussed within theory 
and should not be generalised over Estonian companies as a whole. The formulated hypotheses need 
to be proven by other methods. 
The current study consists of four chapters which cover the following areas. 
Chapter one gives a comprehensive explanation of relevant concepts and an overview of research 
conducted in other countries. The following topics are looked at more closely: different effects of direct 
and indirect participation; impact of participation on employees and company’s productivity; and, the 
relation of works councils and trade unions in participation. 
Chapter two gives an overview of different forms of participation through employee representation 
existing in other EU countries. The main emphasis is on works councils and employees’ involvement 
in company boards. 
Chapter three is about current legislation, concentrating, first, on EU regulations in the field of 
employee participation and then on the content of main relevant acts in Estonia. 
Chapter four describes the case study method and presents study results. It was not considered 
necessary to present every case separately; mainly due to volume limitations of this paper, but also 
because of the need to protect the anonymity of the people involved in the cases. 
The current paper can be an interesting reading for employers and for people working in trade unions 
and in employee representation, who would like to learn more about employee participation practices 
and its factors in Estonia and other countries. It contains some appealing nuances on how to improve 
company’s performance. The paper is also aimed at policy formulators by providing ideas for the 
development of the structure of employees’ information and consultation system and relevant laws. 
Finally, the paper can be an important source of information for people studying labour relations and 
working conditions and for people who are otherwise interested in the topic. 
We would like to thank Gabriel Tavits, Kaia Philips, Raivo Valk, Auni Tamm, Sten Anspal and Reelika 
Leetmaa for their valuable comments and suggestions, and Sten Anspal and Anne Jürgenson for their 
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1. The Concept of Employee Information and Consultation 
1.1. Definitions and Evidence from Previous Studies 
1.1.1. The Concept of Employee Participation: Information, 
Consultation and Co-determination 
Employee participation refers to his/her ability to influence organisational decisions, regardless of 
his/her position in an organisational hierarchy. In the current study we follow Knudsen’s (1995) two-
dimensional approach to employee participation. We look at the degree of employee influence and the 
range and relevance of subjects to be influenced. Most of the theoretical and empirical literature on 
employee participation is related to the first dimension, i.e. the degree of influence that is assigned to 
employees at the workplace. The influence can be expressed as the following continuum (Dachler, 
Wilpert 1978) of information, consultation and co-determination: 
1) No information is given to employees prior to decisions. 
2) Employees are informed in advance about the decision. Employees’ right to information 
means that providing it or not is not at the discretion of management: there are certain topics 
(e.g. transfer of undertaking) together with specific time-frames when information is to be 
given. 
3) Employees can give an opinion about the decision. This phase is known as consultation, 
although formally, employers are not obliged to discuss these opinions.  
4) Employees’ opinions may be taken into account when making a decision. In practice, even 
though employers maintain the right to reject employees’ proposals, they are required to 
provide their arguments for doing so.  
5) Employees can veto a decision, i.e. a decision can only be taken if the two parties agree and 
is therefore known as co-determination. 
6) Decision is in the hands of employees: there is no distinction between managers and 
subordinates. 
It is more common in the literature to denote all six phases as participation, consisting of information 
as in (1) and (2), consultation as in (3) and (4) and co-determination as in (5) and at an extreme (6)1.
We consider participation in its broader sense, including employees’ right to decide as the strongest 
form and mere information dissemination as a weak form of participation. Co-determination and co-
decision are often used as synonyms, although Knudsen (1995, p. 10) distinguishes between the 
terms on the basis of the parity principle of a decision-making body (50-50 in case of co-
determination). In this paper, no distinction is made between co-decision and co-determination.
The multitude of approaches stems from different value-orientations in societies; variety of forms for 
consultation and co-determination across companies, industries and countries; and above all, different 
terminology used in the literature for describing identical processes. 
Another dimension of participation is the range and importance of subjects covered by the 
participatory decisions. One way of dividing the decisions is into social, personnel and financial 
 
1 Some authors consider participation only in the sense of co-determination (Addison et al 1996, Worker 
Representation... 2002). On the other hand, it has been argued whether employees’ independent right to decide 
is participation at all, because the interplay between the two parties is missing here (Knudsen 1995, p. 10). There 
is a difference between consultation and negotiation or bargaining (Bonner, Gollan 2005, Terry 1999). The latter 
implies that employers cannot make a decision without employees’ consent. Consultation is also referred to as 
problem-solving by Terry (1999). 
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matters. However, in the context of our study it is useful to adopt Knudsen’s (1995, p. 11) suggestion 
with the following types of management decisions: 
a) strategic (goals, structure, investments, activities, mergers, closures); 
b) tactical (technology, job-design principles, operation hours, health and safety, etc.); 
c) operational (decisions taken at departmental or workshop level regarding specific measures 
about how the work is conducted); 
d) welfare (canteen, housing, sports, culture, scholarships, etc.). 
Participation intensity is a combination of employee influence and the relevance of issues influenced 
(see Figure 1.1). 
Participation 
intensity 
Strategic
Tactical
Operational
Welfare
Information Consultation Co-determination
Employee 
influence 
Relevance of    
subjects 
Figure 1.1. The concept of participation intensity 
Source: Based on Knudsen (1995), modified by authors 
The concave curves on Figure 1.1 denote the widespread practice of participatory arrangements in 
companies. In the case of operational and welfare issues (for example, lunch-hour timing, taking a 
paid holiday or choosing the colour of office walls) the consultation of employees is a commonplace 
practice, even some form of co-determination might be applied. With regard to strategic and tactical 
decisions, in contrast, employee participation is often limited to information. The described 
arrangement corresponds largely to our understanding of organisational functioning and the very tasks 
of management. Yet, the more influential is the employees’ voice in decision-making and the more 
strategic are these decisions to an organisation, the more intensive is employee participation deemed 
to be in the organisation.  
1.1.2. Employee Representation: Precondition for Intensive 
Participation 
The forms of participation are divided into two: 
1. direct – i.e. involving employees themselves and sometimes also called individual 
participation, and; 
2. indirect – i.e. involving employees’ representative bodies and therefore referred to as 
collective or representative participation.  
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In theory, direct participation is more efficient – it is associated with higher employee satisfaction, 
commitment, motivation, and productivity. It is considered as an ideal form of participation on an 
information-consultation scale: employees give their opinions and advice directly to and get the 
information and (counter)arguments from management. Direct participation can be, to some extent, 
pursued by small companies, but becomes increasingly difficult and resource-consuming for bigger 
organisations. Moreover, it is almost impossible to apply co-determination with direct participation, 
regardless of the company size. 
There might be areas where employees are given autonomous control over methods and pace of work 
and they make decisions that substantively affect the production process – this kind of participation is 
called delegative participation (EPOC Survey2). However, when it comes to strategic decisions 
within the organisation, the viability of maintaining direct participation system is rather weak, to say the 
least. This is why the ‘second best’ participation system (i.e. indirect participation) has gained more 
importance. Knudsen (1995, p. 12) states: “Indirect participation ... contains potentials for influence on 
a much wider range of decisions...”. On Figure 1.1 indirect participation makes it possible to shift the 
curve to the right.  
Indirect employee participation, i.e. participation which is delegated to employees’ representative(s), is 
the prevailing concept of employee participation in practice. Legal regulations and collective 
agreements refer mainly to indirect participation and the latter is also the focus of the current study.  
Terry (1999) proposes to look at the activities of indirect participation in line with the information-
consultation-co-determination concept. Namely, he distinguishes between problem-solving and 
bargaining activities, depending on the objectives of employees and management (see Figure 1.2). 
 
Figure 1.2. Indirect participation activities  
Source: Terry (1999) 
In European countries it is common that these functions, i.e. problem solving and bargaining, are 
assigned to different employee representation bodies (see Chapter 2). Historically, trade unions have 
 
2The project on Employee Participation in Organisational Change (EPOC) was carried out by the European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions between 1993-1998, covering more than 5,700 
organisations in ten European Union countries. Research project studied developments in the area of work 
organisation. The focus of the investigation was to show the extent of direct employee participation and to 
illustrate the role played by such participation in the modernisation of work organisation. 
Indirect representative participation 
Problem solving 
Shared objectives 
Co-operation rights: 
to information 
to protest 
to suggest 
to be consulted 
Bargaining 
Divergent objectives 
Co-determination rights:
to veto 
to co-decision 
to decision 
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been the most widespread employee representation institutions. Although union membership varies 
greatly from country to country, the decline of union membership during the last decades has been a 
common trend due to decline in employment in traditionally high-unionisation manufacturing industry, 
the growth of lower-unionisation services employment, and the increasing levels of ‘atypical’ 
employment (Industrial Relations... 2002)3. Owing to that, the employee representation outside unions 
has gained more importance and new forms of employee involvement and participation, such as 
consultative committees, works councils, representation in supervisory board, etc., have emerged. 
Some of the participation systems are induced by law, whereas the information and consultation rights 
are thereby typically covered, but co-determination rights, as a rule, are not. 
The reason for regulating employee participation via European-wide legislation is a theoretical 
argument stating that although participation increases social welfare, neither employees nor 
employers have an incentive to create institutions for employee representation. These should, 
therefore, be mandatory (Freeman and Lazear 1994, p. 8). It is argued that works councils can 
increase the joint surplus (i.e. surplus or value added that is shared between employees and 
employers) of an enterprise as a result of information exchange, consultation, and co-determination. 
At the same time, firm’s profit can still decrease, because the share of the workers’ surplus rises at the 
expense of employer’s surplus. As a result of this profit effect, management would resist the 
introduction of works councils or give them too little power. This is the reason why works councils (or 
similar bodies) have to be imposed by law.  
The argument is supported by empirical evidence. A recent survey of European companies 
demonstrates that all works councils where members are formed only of employees4 are established 
due to statutory regulations in national law (EIRO5... 2004, p. 13). In Greece, the resistance to 
employee representation is high from both sides – from employees and employers R despite the 
legislation which provides for the creation of works councils. In Austria and Germany, for example, 
employers in retail, the fast-food industry and the ‘new economy’ are particularly known for their 
opposition to works councils (ibid., p. 31). The next section discusses the effects of workers’ 
participation in more detail. 
 
3 In Estonia, the fall has been especially dramatic: from 88% in 1992 to 13% in 2002 (Statistical Office Labour 
Force Survey database, authors’ calculations). The causes of the decline in Estonia have been somewhat 
different from these of Western countries. The main cause has been the change of the economic system and the 
change in the role of the Soviet Union trade unions, accordingly. 
4 Works councils may consist of workers only, or also employers’ representatives. In France, for instance, works 
councils are chaired by employers, although they have a minority vote (Worker Representation... 2002, p. 29) 
(see also Ch. 2).   
5 European Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO) 
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1.2. The Impact of Information and Consultation Practices 
on Employees’ and Companies’ Performance: Evidence 
from Previous Research 
1.2.1. Participation Effects on Employees – Direct versus Indirect 
Participation 
The gains of participation on the level of an individual stem mainly from two streams of theories: 
human growth and development theory, and productivity and efficiency theory (Dachler, Wilpert 1978). 
Both theories rely on basic beliefs about human nature. It is assumed that people are strived towards 
self-actualisation, which requires independence, awareness of one’s potential, having self-control, 
long-range perspectives and being involved in a variety of activities. Organisation of work typically 
entails task-specialisation, hierarchical decision-making and control. As such, it is in direct conflict with 
employee’s self-actualisation needs and may cause frustration, boredom and sense of futility. 
Participation could reduce these negative effects and make one’s job more meaningful, increase the 
sense of responsibility for one’s actions, self-fulfilment and self-respect (Alexander 1984, pp. 198-
199). From this point of view, participation in the workplace is a ‘natural’ need for employees and the 
more so with a higher education level and the fulfilment of lower-level needs (physiological, security, 
etc.).  
Efficiency and productivity theory is based on an assumption that employee satisfaction, effort and 
commitment improve his/her efficiency and productivity, which, in turn, can be increased by employee 
participation in decision-making. There is plenty of evidence to support this hypothesis (Batt, 
Appelbaum 1995, Bartlett et al 1992, Rubenowitz et al 1983, EPOC Survey 1998, Latham et al 1994, 
Maree 2000, Wagner 1994, Cotton et al 1988; Frohlich et al 1998). However, these specific results of 
different studies vary, showing positive as well as negligible effect of participation on satisfaction and 
especially productivity. The studies discussed in the current paper are chosen to reflect the results of 
different countries, methods and periods of research conduct. The studies are not replications of each 
other and are therefore not directly comparable.  
The main concern of the possible relationship between employee participation and satisfaction, 
commitment and performance is that effects are associated with direct participation rather than indirect 
participation. For instance, evidence from Japan shows that although employees’ representation 
outside the unions strengthens employees’ voice, it does not lead to improvements in reported 
satisfaction with the company (Kaufman, Taras 1999). The same is concluded on the basis of Swedish 
data: no increased satisfaction and commitment occurs when decisions are made by employee 
representatives (Rubenowitz et al 1983). Halaby and Weakliem (1989) discuss pros and cons of 
worker control and reach the conclusion that the positive effects (the feeling of attachment to the firm) 
are counterbalanced by the negative effects, such as rent seeking. Cotton et al (1988) argue on the 
basis of a meta-study that representative participation, while not having any effect on productivity, 
results in higher satisfaction at least for the representatives themselves. Frohlich et al (1998) played a 
game of different types of enterprises with Canadian students in a laboratory setting. Those students 
who ended up in employee-owned companies reported significantly higher individual productivity than 
their peers in conventionally-owned firms. Although the task in both types of companies was similar, 
students in employee-owned companies felt the task they were doing was much more interesting. 
Latham et al (1994) showed that participation, in particular the possibility to set goals, increases self-
efficacy via commitment to these goals but does not improve performance. Maree (2000) conducted a 
case study of introducing participation and showed that both the perceived satisfaction by employees 
and the actual performance increased. A meta-analytic study by Wagner (1994) suggested that the 
positive influence of employee participation on satisfaction and performance is in place, but the 
average size of these effects is too small to have a practical significance. Wagner’s work has later 
been criticised (Sagie 1995, Cotton 1995) and the shared view has been that participative decision-
making can yield large positive effects if other relevant factors are controlled. Some examples of 
previous research on participation effects on employees’ satisfaction and performance are presented 
in Table 1.1.  
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Table 1.1. Previous studies on workplace participation effects on the level of an individual 
Author (year) Country Type of study and data 
Type of 
participation Results 
Halaby, Weakliem 
(1989)  Theoretical 
Worker control: 
direct and indirect Attachment to the firm (0) 
Wagner (1994) Several Meta-analysis of 52 articles 
Several forms of 
direct and indirect 
Participation via employee 
ownership: 
Performance (0), satisfaction 
(+)  
Participation through 
representative: 
Performance (0), satisfaction (0) 
Direct participation: 
Performance (+), satisfaction 
(+)  
Cotton, Vollrath, 
Froggatt, Lengnick-Hall, 
Jennings (1988) 
Several Meta-study of 91 articles 
Several forms of 
direct and indirect 
Participation via employee 
ownership: performance (+) and 
satisfaction (+).  
Representation: performance 
(0), satisfaction (+).  
Direct participation: 
performance (+), satisfaction (+) 
Latham, Winters, Locke 
(1994) Canada 
Experimental, 53 
students Direct  Commitment to goals (+) 
Frohlich, Godard, 
Oppenheimer, Starke 
(1998) 
Canada Experimental, 210 students Indirect 
Individual productivity (+), 
interest in task (+) 
Rubenowitz, Norrgren, 
Tannenbaum (1983) Sweden 
Field data of 10 
companies, food 
and metal 
industry 
Direct and indirect 
Direct participation: general 
commitment and job satisfaction 
(+)  
Indirect participation: general 
commitment and job satisfaction 
(0)  
Batt, Applebaum (1995) USA 
Data of 3 
companies from 
tele-communica-
tions and clothing 
Direct 
On-line participation: 
commitment (+), job satisfaction 
(+), perceived quality (+). 
No effect in case of off-line 
participation  
Maree (2000) South-Africa 
Case study of a 
fishing company  Indirect  
Satisfaction (+) and 
performance (+) 
Source: compiled by the authors 
Note: (+) denotes positive and significant relationship between participation and given variable, (0) denotes no or 
insignificant relationship between participation and given variable  
Thus, we can conclude that, in the case of direct form of participation, participation is positively and, at 
least in some cases, significantly related to job satisfaction. However, there is less convincing 
evidence about the same effect on performance and when it comes to the representative form of 
participation even the increase of satisfaction may be doubtful.  
In comparing countries on the basis of direct participation, it must be noted that the only good-quality 
comparable data on a European level comes from the above cited EPOC project. The studies are 
scarce and difficult to compare as many practices of direct participation have an informal character 
and are difficult to analyse. Moreover, different terms are used to describe the same phenomena 
(Knudsen 1995, p. 7). Cabrera et al (2003), using data from EPOC project, found that direct 
participation is the highest in the Netherlands and Sweden. Lowest scores are reported in Spain, 
Portugal and Italy (p. 52), which is put down to cultural factors. In the UK, the participation system is 
not so well established as a rule, yet, the trend has been towards arrangements for direct information 
disclosure and consultation. The forms include formally designated team-work, regular team briefings, 
staff attitude surveys, problem solving groups, etc. (Beaumont, Hunter 2003, p. 3). Japan is famous for 
direct employee participation – quality circles, as a form of participation, originates from there - but the 
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participation is limited to information and consultation. Marsh (1992, p. 255) showed in his study of 48 
Japanese manufacturing plants that despite the existence of quality circles, delegative participation is 
almost non-existent and claimed that direct participation has not led to workplace democracy. It was 
only the routine and pre-programmed issues that lower level employees were allowed to make 
decisions about. This result is in line with the theory: direct participation does not go much beyond 
information and consultation. If we are to look for more intensive forms of participation, we have to turn 
to indirect systems, and yet, something of a reciprocal relationship seems to exist between the two. 
Although indirect and direct participation are distinct concepts, the evidence shows that at the 
workplace they tend to exist in parallel. Cabrera et al (2003) noted that a higher level of indirect 
participation induced by law or management practice brought along more direct participation in 
consultative form. The EPOC survey allows concluding that although Sweden, Germany and the 
Netherlands are known for extensive use of indirect participation, all three countries also have above-
average scores in direct participation. Gill and Krieger (2000)6 also found that employee 
representatives in Europe play an active role in introducing direct participation into the workplace. 
Authors were convinced that even if the initiative to introduce direct participation is usually taken by 
managers, once the system is in place, employee representatives actively try to ensure the greatest 
range of participation possible. Thus, employee representatives are found to be interested in 
introducing direct systems in parallel to indirect one, which is somewhat counterintuitive. This may 
have something to do with the elections of representatives: a representative’s attempt to monopolise 
employee participation reduces his or her chances to become re-elected next time as the electorate is 
left with only little involvement. On the other hand, it may be speculated that in case of controversial 
issues management is looking for a second opinion and direct participation mechanisms may be 
introduced in parallel to employee representation. 
Hence, from the viewpoint of employees the question of direct or indirect participation is not entirely 
adequate. Although direct systems embody such virtues as increased job-satisfaction, commitment, 
possibly higher productivity and is preferred by employees themselves (Beaumont, Hunter 2003, p. 9), 
employees’ perception of fair management decisions emerging from participation is rather achieved by 
indirect representation. Indirect participation also ensures that direct arrangement is not a one-off 
measure and makes the system more viable. Since direct employee involvement is, in practice, limited 
to information disclosure, some form of representative structure becomes a precondition for 
consultation, let alone co-determination. Consequently, the combination of direct and indirect form of 
participation provides the most effective outcomes. 
1.2.2. Employee Participation Effects on Companies 
Organisational and societal outcomes of employee participation are the core of democratic theory. It 
assumes that people tend to be responsible, rational, cooperative and interested in progress also 
outside their immediate environment (Dachler, Wilpert 1978). Democratic processes, whether at 
home, at school, in politics or in economic organisations, develop and educate these capacities and 
are perceived favourably by actors in the process. In this vein, participation at working environment 
conveys appreciation for democracy, as opposed to autocracy and dictatorship, and is known as 
‘workplace democracy’. There is a view that facilitating workplace democracy is morally ‘right’ and 
should be valued for its own sake (Collins 1997).  
The evidence on the positive relationship between the scope of direct employee participation and 
economic performance of the organisation comes from empirics and theory. For instance, Sisson 
(2000, p. 6) discussed the main results of the European-wide EPOC project and showed many virtues 
of extensive direct participation for company performance, including higher production quality, cost 
reductions and the reduction of throughput time. Theoretical basis comes from Steinherr (1977), who 
demonstrated Pareto improvements of employee participation regardless of specific firm objective 
function. But as noted above, European regulation is mainly concerned with indirect participation; 
while the main idea is to protect employee interests, it is believed to be also advantageous to 
businesses and society as a whole. This has motivated many researchers to analyse potential benefits 
of representative form of participation to the company functioning. Freeman and Lazear (1994) 
 
6 referred through Cabrera et al (2003) 
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conducted an economic analysis of works councils. In addition to the above mentioned mandatory 
preference for works councils, their conclusions were the following:  
• Councils’ access to information can reduce economic inefficiencies by moderating employees’ 
demands during tough times (p. 12). This result was empirically found earlier by Morishima 
(1991, p. 482) on Japanese data, where sharing information was associated with lower 
wages. Still, the same exercise with U.S. data by Kleiner and Bouillon (1988)7, confronted the 
idea: sharing information seemed to increase employees’ bargaining power in U.S. 
• Employees can provide new solutions to the problem, thus, participation facilitates innovation. 
On the basis of German data, Addison et al (1996) found a strong and positive correlation 
between product innovation and presence of works councils. Of course, there is a trade off 
with the cost of delay, because participatory structures inhibit the flexibility and quickness of 
decisions (pointed out also in Schank et al 2004, Levinson 2001). 
• Works councils’ co-determination rights that increase job-security should lead employees to 
invest more in job-specific skills and thus, increase firm’s performance. Given the commitment 
and satisfaction argument given above, companies might also enjoy lower cost of monitoring, 
lower turnover of employees and thus, lower the cost of work-force seeking and training. In his 
study, Levinson (2001) asks: Is co-determination a burden or resource to the Swedish 
companies? Analysing the responses from managing directors and chairpersons he finds that 
employee representation is a benefit to the company. Generally positive attitude is reported by 
managing directors and chairpersons and the bigger the company, the more positive the view. 
The main reasons for that are healthy co-operation climate and the belief among managers 
that joint decisions become deeper rooted among employees. On the negative side, in line 
with the argument above, it takes too long to get things done, it is costly, and the risk from 
information leakage is also mentioned. 
• Participation in decision-making has a stabilising effect on a company by potentially 
preventing a conflict (Knudsen 1995, p. 21). Or in other words, lack of participation is likely to 
increase instability (Mizrahi 2002). 
These arguments have been challenged by numerous authors. Findings on efficiency and productivity 
are the most controversial. In the study by Schank et al (2004), which empirically covered several 
thousand German establishments for several years, it was found that works councils did not exhibit 
significant differences in efficiency. Most likely, negative rent-seeking effects and positive voice effects 
balanced each other. Craig et al (1995) also found that employee participation had neither major 
efficiency gains nor losses in U.S. plywood industry. Over several decades, they analysed a panel of 
different categories: mills with co-ownership of employees (cooperative mills), mills with trade-unions 
as partners to management (unionised mills) and classical mills with no trade-unions and no 
ownership sharing. A very similar idea was tested earlier on Italian organisations by Bartlett et al 
(1992). Authors compared several indicators of two organisational types: labour-managed 
cooperatives (associated with participation in decision-making) and private firms. They concluded that 
as far as efficiency was concerned, cooperatives demonstrated higher labour and capital productivity.  
The relationship between works councils, or some form of consultative committee, and company 
profitability has also been the focus of various analyses. Morishima (1991) and Maree (2000) found 
joint consultation committee effectiveness to be associated with higher profitability in companies. The 
finding by Addison et al (1996) on the basis of German companies, however, showed negative and 
strongly significant effect of works council presence on profitability. The mixed results may be caused 
by several factors. It is suggested, for instance, that union coverage affects the demands put forward 
by works councils (FitzRoy, Kraft 1990)8: the more powerful is the union, the more demanding is the 
works council and potential positive effects of participation are eliminated for a company. Hübler and 
Jirjahn (2003) do not agree with this: they show that if union is powerful enough to act as a bargaining 
body on industry level, then works councils are concerned about company profitability. Context 
 
7 referred through Morishima (1991) 
8 referred through Addisson et al (1996) 
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specific matters may play a role: councils that are called to life in conflict situations are likely to adopt 
systematic rent-seeking behaviour, whereas councils that have stood for company development from 
the start do not jeopardise company profitability.  
With respect to stability, Bartlett et al (1992) brought out significantly greater stability of employment in 
labour-managed cooperatives, measured by the use of temporary layoffs and voluntary quit rates. 
Also, in cooperatives, there are only few or no strikes, compared to privately owned counterparts. 
Reduced employee turnover was also the result by Craig et al (1995): when output price fell, 
cooperative, i.e. participative companies, kept employment and output stable but reduced wages; 
classical companies, in contrast, kept wages but reduced employment and output. In the works of 
Addison et al (1996) it appeared that works councils resulted in higher wages and lower employee 
turnover. The summary of results is given in Table 1.2. 
Table 1.2. Previous studies on workplace participation effects on company level 
Author (year) Country Type of study and data 
Type of 
participation Results 
Freeman, Lazear (1994)  Theoretical Indirect: works councils 
Efficiency (+), innovation (+), 
performance (+), stability (+) 
Steinherr (1977)  Theoretical 
Direct and indirect: 
decision-making and 
profit sharing 
Net productivity (+) 
Sisson (2000) European wide 
EPOC survey: 
more than 5,700 
companies 
Direct Production quality (+), costs (-), throughput time (-) 
Morishima (1991) Japan 97 union interviews 
Indirect: consultative 
committees and union Wages (-), profitability (+) 
Kleiner and Bouillon 
(1988) U.S. 
106 union 
interviews 
Indirect: consultative 
committees and union Wages (+) 
Craig, Pencavel, Farber, 
Krueger (1995) U.S.  
Longitudinal data 
of 34 companies 
in plywood 
industry 
Indirect: cooperatives 
and unions 
Co-operatives: efficiency (+), 
wages (-), stability (+)  
Unions: efficiency (0),  
wages (-), stability (+)  
Addisson, Schnabel, 
Wagner (1996) Germany 
Data on 1,025 
companies 
Indirect: works 
councils 
Product innovation (+), wages 
(+), stability (+), profitability (-) 
Schank, Schnabel, 
Wagner (2004) Germany 
Longitudinal data 
on 2,301 
companies 
(unbalanced 
sample) and 74 
companies 
(balanced 
sample)  
Indirect: works 
councils Efficiency (0) 
Bartlett, Cable, Estrin, 
Jones, Smith (1992) Italy 
Longitudinal data 
of 84 companies Indirect: cooperatives 
Labour productivity (+), 
capital productivity (+), 
stability (+) 
Maree (2000) South-Africa 
Case study, fish 
company 
Indirect: consultative 
committee Wages (-), profitability (+) 
Source: compiled by the authors 
Note: (+) denotes positive and significant relationship between participation and given variable, (0) denotes no or 
insignificant relationship between participation and given variable, (-) denotes negative relationship between 
participation and given variable 
The above overview does not allow making firm conclusions about participation effects on company 
level: the studies reflect different methods, different cultural and industrial relations context. It can, 
nevertheless, be seen that empirical results about company effects of participation vary, including 
lower and higher profitability as well as lower and higher wages. Reduced employment fluctuation and 
positive effects on innovation seem to hold true in different contexts, but evidence on efficiency is 
inconclusive. 
Some authors also question the very basic idea of participation. They argue, firstly, that democracy is 
not a sufficient argument for developing organisational systems in the same spirit as political 
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democracy (Kerr 2004) because economic organisations differ from political organisations in several 
fundamental aspects (lack of direct accountability of managers, manipulation of employee participation 
arrangements etc). 
Secondly, employee participation incentive does not have to be efficiency or company’s prosperity. 
Job satisfaction may not always lead to gains in efficiency: high level of employee involvement may 
encourage rent-seeking behaviour and maximise their self-interests rather than those of the firm. 
Therefore, every company has its own optimal level of participation in decision-making depending on 
the company’s characteristics (Mizrahi 2002, p. 703), and is therefore not uniquely definable. It is also 
feared that employees wish to participate „outside their scope“, i.e. on issues where they lack the skills 
and knowledge and where there is no gains for immediate efficiency (Alexander 1984, pp. 201-202). 
While this is, indeed, plausible in theory, evidence suggests the opposite: the more active is the 
participation of representatives the more likely they possess relevant skills and knowledge (Knudsen 
1995, Levinson 2001). In Sweden, where employee representatives belong to the company board, 
representatives’ passive rather than active attitude towards strategic issues has been a concern. 
Thirdly, there are hesitations about the effectiveness of indirect representation as such. The mediating 
role of works councils is likely to lead to professionalisation of such roles, creating vested interests for 
mediators to keep their functions, and often leading to estrangement and conflict between 
representatives and their constituencies (Dachler, Wilpert 1978, p. 14). This is partly the reason for 
imposing limits to the release time for the council work. What we see in practice, is that French 
employers sometimes call for a reduction in the number of hours for which representatives are freed 
from their work to carry out their duties and Spanish employers are also in favour of a reduction of 
paid time off for employee representatives (EIRO… 2004, p. 30). 
Finally, there is a tendency to form works councils on the grounds of descriptive representation (part-
time employees, disabled, young people), which, again, is problematic in terms of effectiveness 
(Engelen 2004). Freeman and Lazear (1994) in their economic analysis of works councils addressed 
the issue from the opposite side: even proportional representation may ignore minority views 
becoming heard (part-time young employees and part-time older employees may have diverging 
interests) and therefore random selection should be applied when choosing representatives (p. 20). 
However, authors acknowledge the potentially lesser effort and problems with accountability of 
representatives when they are randomly selected.  
All in all, if we are to believe in the economic potential of employee participation on company level, we 
have to acknowledge the possible threats and some general principles should be fulfilled. Firstly, both 
employee representatives and management are expected to recognise each other with their legitimate 
but diverging interests, and secondly, view the co-operation as a plus-sum, rather than a zero-sum 
game. Finally, both parties need to have trust in and goodwill towards each other. 
1.2.3. Representation: Works Councils or Unions? 
Employee representation typically takes the form of a trade union or works councils, or both of them 
simultaneously. In case there are several unions in the workplace, as it is common, for example, in 
Finland, Norway, Denmark, Italy and Belgium, the works councils may consist of representatives of 
these different unions. Theoretically, there is no ground to prefer unions to works councils or vice 
versa. Both are indirect forms with their advantages and disadvantages, as discussed above. An 
overview of empirical studies concerned with their interaction in a company is given below.  
Based on a panel sample of more than 700 German companies, observed for a four–year period, 
Hübler and Jirjahn (2003) described the interaction between unions and works council. The authors 
reported works councils’ positive effect on productivity in unionised companies, in particular, when 
union took care of bargaining over collective agreement on industry level. In non-unionised companies 
the works councils were more concerned with wage-negotiations.  
In contrast, Addison et al (2000) reported that employee involvement had a positive effect on 
productivity in Britain and in non-unionised settings only, whereas no such effect was observed in 
Germany. But the UK may be an exceptional case, because the employers’ dislike of trade unions 
may lead to different pattern of behaviour from management. It has been found that approximately 
twice as many British employers consult with employees during the process of organisational change 
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if there is no trade union, compared to when union is present (64% and 36%, respectively) (Beaumont, 
Hunter 2003, p. 12).  
Apart from the union/works council effect, a few articles have dealt with the issue of substituting one 
for another. In this context, works councils should be interpreted broadly as an alternative form of 
participation to the union. An empirical study by Machin and Wood (2005) on union representation and 
human resource management (HRM) practices for employee consultation and involvement in the UK 
revealed that unions and HRM practices were not substitutes. HRM practices were used as much in 
unionised as in non-unionised companies. HRM practices included both direct and indirect 
participation mechanisms.9 Unions and HRM practices should be viewed more as complements to 
each other. The European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions reached 
the same conclusion about the UK: “Consultative committees and union representation go hand-in-
hand rather than being substitutes for one another” (EIRO… 2004, p. 29). Beaumont and Hunter 
(2003, p. 14) showed with their 16 case studies of UK companies that management perceived best 
results for the company when indirect representative mechanisms were combined with direct 
measures. A similar result was reached when mandatory health and safety committees in U.S. 
companies were studied (Weil 1999). It appeared that such committees were much more enforced 
and successful in their activity in unionised companies. 
Some research suggests that non-union representation (such as works councils or joint consultation 
committees) is less effective as it is often criticised by employees it is supposed to represent and not 
taken seriously by management (Bonner, Gollan 2005, Dundon et al 2005, Terry 1999, Worker... 
2002). The reasons behind it may be representatives’ lack of training and lack of sanctions 
(possessed by unions). They also have no backing structure for getting guidance and know-how for 
dealing with managerial decisions and to actually enforce action and outcomes, if needed (Bonner, 
Gollan 2005). Some case studies indicate that, in the absence of legal underpinnings (e.g. in the UK), 
non-union representation is effective at good times, but comes under strain and even collapses at the 
times of economic downturn or company crisis (Terry 1999, p. 28). Works councils’ problems may also 
stem from the lack of autonomy: these structures are often ‘employer-sponsored’ and, thus, controlled 
by management, having minimal power and assigned to discuss only trivial matters (Butler 2005, 
Dundon et al 2005). As it happens, this is no secret for potential representatives and such a situation 
makes it difficult to find able and willing employee representatives in the first place. However, once 
they start working in the described circumstances, they soon adopt managerial interpretation of subtle 
issues and, as a consequence, they do not fulfil the initial aim of representing employees (ibid. 2005). 
When this is the case, such representation structures have been found to deserve as starting-points 
for union recognition (Terry 1999, Bonner, Gollan 2005).  
In principle, though, a non-union representative can be as effective, but it needs full support by 
management, i.e. to avoid victimisation, as well as to receive recognition by employees themselves in 
order to create a meaningful discussion. It has been shown (Bryson 2004) that non-union 
representatives are least effective when they are appointed rather than elected, hence, bottom-up 
approach is essential. In the old EU member states, works council members generally have legal 
guarantees against dismissal on grounds of their representative duties, and they have certain 
prerogatives concerning job security in companies facing a reduction of the workforce (EIRO... 2004, 
p. 9). Also, back-up by a set of sanctions, in case of non-compliance, is needed. 
The connection between employee representatives themselves and the union is another focus of such 
analyses. This differs by countries, but in general, the connection tends to be strong rather than weak. 
For instance, employee representatives in Sweden are elected by the union. In Austria, 85% to 90% of 
all works council members are union members and works councils are considered as a basic unit of 
union structures. In France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain trade unions have a specified 
role in nominating candidates for works council elections, with the majority of members thus being 
union members. In Germany, 79% of works council members are also union members (EIRO…2004, 
pp. 28-29).  
 
9 The studied HRM practices were: profit-sharing of share ownership, presence of a Joint Consultative 
Committee, presence of problem solving groups, occurrence of team-briefings, regular meetings with managers 
and entire work-force present, management chain for communication, suggestion scheme in presence, personnel 
specialist in place. 
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It has been noted that in countries where employee influence is principally through unions and 
collective bargaining, management-employee relations on restructuring issues tend to be more 
adversarial, and the ability of employees to influence restructuring varies considerably from sector to 
sector and firm to firm according to union strength (Industrial Relations... 2002). This is the result of 
unions’ inclination to negotiate over wage and employment under the existing industrial relations 
framework. Mizrahi (2002) holds a view that the nature of bargaining between employers and 
employees, either as a union or works councils, should be over the participatory rules of decision-
making rather than over wages or working conditions within the status quo (ibid., p. 705). 
In conclusion, much like direct participation gives better results together with indirect participation in an 
organisation, representative committees in the form of works councils are complements rather than 
substitutes for trade unions. Studies show that even if competition between the two representative 
forms is present in the early phases of functioning (for instance, trade unions may fear that their 
members are merely manipulated by participatory arrangements) it soon turns to cooperation because 
of the same constituency and common interests.  
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2. Employee Representation Forms and Involvement in 
Decision Making in Other EU Countries 
2.1. Employee Representation in the EU Countries 
Even though the European Union and the European level social dialogue play a growing role in 
developing national systems of social dialogue and industrial relations, in the current situation different 
EU countries apply vastly different systems. The systems that have developed in specific historical, 
cultural and political situations are persistent and diverse. The basic differences emerge already from 
variations in union membership, build-up of collective bargaining system and coverage that also 
influences the forms and systems of employee representation. The unions cover from 9.7% of 
employees in France to nearly all the workforce in Nordic countries (see Table 2.1). This is why unions 
have bigger role in the Nordic countries and there are no alternative institutions for employee 
information and consultation created in Sweden and Finland, as it is in continental Europe.  
At the same time, union density itself does not indicate to which extent the industrial relations are 
based on collective agreements. For example, in France, where union density is very low, collective 
agreements still cover almost all workforces. Also, the level (company, sector or national) of 
bargaining and extension procedures of concluded agreements are very important in determining the 
industrial relations. For example, in Germany and Austria, where sector level bargaining is the most 
important level, there is division of roles for works councils that operate as information and 
consultation partners on company level and unions that bargain collective agreements on sector level.  
Table 2.1. Unionisation and collective agreements coverage in the EU countries  
Union 
membership 
Collective 
agreements 
coverage 
Main level of bargaining 
Austria 35.4 91-100 Sector 
Slovenia 41.0 91-100 National/sector 
France 9.7 91-100 Company 
Belgium 55.8 91-100 National 
Sweden 78 91-100 Sector 
Finland 71.2 81-90 National 
Netherlands 22.1 81-90 Sector 
Spain 14.9 81-90 Sector/company 
Denmark 73.8 81-90 Sector 
Luxembourg 33.5 71-80 Sector/company 
Ireland 35.9 51-60 National 
Portugal 24.3 71-80 Sector 
Germany 23.2 61-70 Sector 
Greece 26.7 61-70 National/sector 
Cyprus 70.0 61-70 Sector 
Malta 62.8 51-60 Company 
Italy 34.0 61-70 Sector 
Slovakia 35.4 41-50 Sector/company 
Poland 14.7 41-50 Company 
UK 30.4 31-40 Company 
Hungary 19.9 31-40 Company 
Czech Rep. 25.1 21-30 Company 
Estonia 16.6 21-30 Company 
Latvia 20.0 11-20 Company 
Lithuania 16.0 11-20 Company 
Source: Industrial Relations in Europe 2004, p. 19, 31, 39. 
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It is evident that the systems for information and consultation of employees are dependent on the 
industrial relations system prevalent in the country. In some countries the sole role of employee 
information and consultation is attributed to trade unions (e.g. Sweden), however, in the majority of 
countries there is a secondary channel for representation of employees created additionally to trade 
unions. It is based on the idea that the right to information and consultation is conferred to individual 
workers irrespective of union presence in the workplace (Industrial Relations… 2004, p. 21). This is 
done in order to provide an opportunity for information and consultation also for non-unionised 
workers. 
In the European countries, there are three main forms of employee representation at company level 
(Pichot 2001, p. 10): 
• trade union representation, 
• general representation, such as works councils,
• participation in supervisory boards or boards of directors.
The different representation forms may exist in parallel and in many cases they do. The system where 
trade unions and works councils exist in parallel is called the dual channel system and where the 
information and consultation rights are conferred to the unions is called the single channel system.
In addition to single or dual channel systems there may be employee representatives (elected from 
works councils, unions or separately) on the board of the company (see Table 2.2). Single channel 
systems are adopted in Finland, Sweden and Ireland. The dual channel system is present in Norway, 
Denmark, Italy (Pichot 2001, p. 11).  
In the case of the dual channel system, unions are mainly in the role of negotiating collective 
agreements and works council type of bodies are created for information and consultation at company 
level. They do not usually have the right to bargain a collective agreement or call a strike (Industrial 
Relations… 2004, p. 23), which creates the division of work between the two institutions. At the same 
time, there are several cases where works councils engage in collective bargaining over working time 
and pay. In Germany, for example, works councils may bargain over working time and pay, in Hungary 
and Austria works councils may engage in bargaining if unions are missing or industry level 
agreement permits it.  
Trade unions in general support the institution of works councils and similar arrangements. In most 
countries, their focus is now on improving details of current systems and they have often called, 
sometimes successfully, for changes to the regulations and in many cases continue to do so. In 
Austria and the Netherlands, even if the dual system of employee representation institutionalises a 
formal separation between works councils and trade unions, de facto about 60% to 90% of the works 
council members are also members of the unions. In such an environment, the works councils act as a 
link between the union and the workforce. Hence, the works councils are of paramount importance to 
the union (EIRO 2004, p. 31). 
Several new EU countries are somewhat different from single or dual channel systems and have a 
mixed system for representation. Estonia, for example, is different in this respect as the two channels 
that are provided for by the law and implemented in practice (see Chapter 3 and Section 4.4) have 
essentially the same functions. Thus, the system is more like a single channel system. The analysis of 
other new EU Member States’ involvement systems adds some new forms of representation: a single 
channel system where a supplementary representative to the unions can be elected by non-unionised 
employees (e.g. Estonia and Latvia), and a single channel system where works councils can be 
formed if there is no union representative (e.g. Czech Republic, Lithuania, Malta) (Tóth and Ghellab 
2003, p. 24).  
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Table 2.2. Workers’ representation forms in the EU countries 
Single/dual/mixed system Representation in boards of company 
Sweden Single Yes 
Finland Single Yes 
Poland Single Yes 
Cyprus Single No 
Ireland Single Yes 
UK Single (some voluntary joint committees) No 
Lithuania Mixed No 
Malta Mixed Yes 
Czech Rep. Mixed Yes 
Estonia Mixed No 
Latvia Mixed No 
Denmark Dual Yes 
Germany Dual Yes 
Italy Dual No 
Netherlands Dual Yes 
Austria Dual Yes 
Slovenia Dual Yes 
Hungary Dual Yes 
Slovakia Dual Yes 
Spain Dual Yes 
France Dual No 
Belgium Dual No 
Luxembourg Dual Yes 
Greece Dual Yes 
Portugal Dual Yes 
Sources: The form of system: old EU Member States - EIRO 2004, new EU Member States – Tóth and Ghellab 
2003; Presentation in boards: old EU Member States – Schulten, Zagelmeyer 1998, new EU Member States – 
Kluge, Stollt 2004. 
In the following sections we will explain in more detail the institution of works councils and the 
participation in company management. Before continuing with this, however, we will bring some 
interesting examples of the historical development of workers’ representation systems in some 
countries. This is to illustrate the history-dependence of the systems10.
2.2. Some Examples from the History of Different Regulations 
The regulations on information and consultation differ by countries both in their scope and aptitude. 
The practices are different due to different legal acts or agreements between labour market 
participants. The practices depend foremost on the historical and cultural background of the country. 
An essential role in this is also played by political powers and division of power. Nowadays, the EU 
has also intervened in the issue of employee involvement and this in turn is shaping the systems in the 
EU countries. In the following we will describe the development of participation in Germany, the UK 
and Denmark in order to illustrate how the development has taken place and what have been the 
driving forces behind it. The first one is an example of a wide legislative regulation, the second one is 
an example of a voluntary system of participation (if it does exist at all) and the third one is an example 
of a system which is based on collective agreements at central level. The examples are mainly drawn 
from the book by Knudsen (1995).  
 
10 For more details about legal backgrounds of representation systems in European countries, please read the 
compendium Pichot, E. (2001) „Employee representatives in Europe and their prerogatives”. As to contemporary 
developments, an annual overview is given by the European Commissions’ publication „Industrial Relations in 
Europe”.   
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In Germany, the companies apply the widest system of information and consultation in the EU 
countries. Essentially, the system is based on sector level union bargaining, enterprise level 
consultation through works councils, as well as participation in management boards of the company. 
The history of works councils in Germany dates back to the end of the 19th century when this format 
was proposed by liberal employers and reformist bourgeois politicians. At the time, councils were 
greatly opposed by trade unions as they feared that this institution might take away their work as 
unions. Despite that a legal act was adopted, first for the voluntary establishment of works council type 
of bodies and then for the obligatory establishment of these in the mining industry in the wake of a 
major strike in 1905. During the First World War this was extended as an obligation to all factors 
employing more than 50 workers. In 1922, a law was passed granting employees minority 
representation in company supervisory boards (Knudsen 1995).  
The disrupted system was revitalised after the Second World War. It was decided that the big trusts 
should never again dominate German economy and, therefore, the unions made an agreement with 
the British military government (1947) stating that the trade unions have a parity representation on the 
supervisory boards of iron and steel producing companies, as well as the right to appoint a labour 
director into the management. After the Second World War the development of works councils was 
primarily promoted by trade unions, which had been opposing the works council system before that 
(Knudsen 1995; Pichot 2001). 
The cultural background of the UK is totally different from that of Germany. The participation of 
employees and employers is largely voluntary from either party. There is only little legal background 
for employee participation and a lot of the employment relations, including participation rights, are 
determined by collective bargaining. As a result, each company makes its own decisions on 
participation. As an exception, the health and safety committees are regulated by law. At the same 
time, neither employees nor employers have shown an interest in regulating the participation legally. 
Employers are afraid of restrictions to their management prerogatives and employees of becoming 
responsible for company’s decisions; they have preferred to remain an independent actor in collective 
bargaining. The attempts to regulate participation have been initiated by the Government in order to 
socially integrate labour in critical situations (Knudsen 1995). 
The attempts by the Government were made during the First and Second World War, when major 
strikes occurred. The Government tried to establish joint committees of employees and employers in 
companies in order to make the workers more concerned with the company’s productivity and 
efficiency. The attempts failed because of the resistance from both social partners. In the 1970s, a 
new attempt was made when Labour Party was in power. This time the Employees’ Confederation 
(Trades Union Congress) was in favour of extending participation through legal provisions. The 
attempt failed again because of the opposition from employers, but also some unions. The main 
cause, however, was the handover of power to the Conservative Party, who opposed the whole union 
movement. At the same time, some other attempts, such as establishing health and safety committees 
and employers’ obligation to disclose of information to trade unions, were passed during the 1970s 
Labour Government. (Knudsen 1995).  
The Danish system is not based on legislative regulation either, but on collective bargaining. 
However, it is different from the British system as the rules and regulations for employment relations 
are reached through negotiations and central agreements between national level social partners (bi- or 
tri-partite). The most important channel for representing employees’ interests is shop stewards. They 
are participants in more structured participatory institutions: cooperation committees, representation 
on company boards and safety committees. The system of workplace participation is based on union 
movement (Knudsen 1995). 
The issue of establishing works councils in line with some other European countries (e.g. Germany) 
was raised by unions and Social Democrats after the First World War. It was rejected as a legal 
regulation and collective bargaining on this issue was not successful either. The adoption of legislation 
for works councils was raised for the second time after the Second World War, but it still did not 
become a law as the employers and employees had made prior collective agreements on cooperation 
committees (1947). The employees’ right to elect two members of the company board was established 
through legislation (1973). Later, the employees’ quota of seats on the company board was extended 
to one-third, with a minimum of two members. Health and safety committees, which include both 
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employee and management representatives, are also established by legislation. 
In Denmark, the driving force for the advancement of participation has been an active trade union 
movement after the Second World War. In addition, the parliamentary majority has most of the time 
consisted of parties who have had relatively favourable attitudes to workplace participation. 
Employers’ unions have therefore been under pressure to conclude respective collective agreements 
or to allow the issue to be regulated through legislation (Knudsen 1995). 
Thus, it can be seen from the above that the prevailing political attitude, culture of industrial relations, 
and the power and role of unions have played an essential part in the development of current 
employee information and consultation systems in these countries.  
2.3. Works Councils in the European Countries 
Works councils are a dominating form of employee representation in Europe. There are works council 
type of organisations present in almost every European Union Member State (see Appendix 1), where 
it supplements the unions. Some of the exceptions among the old Member States are Finland, 
Sweden, the UK and Ireland. In the new Member States they exist in Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia, 
whereas Slovakia introduced works councils alongside the unions only in 2003. The law provides that 
the unions can be replaced by works councils or works council type of body if the union does not exist 
in Czech Republic, Lithuania and Malta. In Poland, works councils are present only in public 
companies. The Swedish system is extraordinary in the sense that neither the agreements or law 
provide for the institution of works councils, but the information and consultation rights are given 
through law and agreements to trade unions, which are present in nearly all companies. 
Specific details of works councils differ by country but, in general, works councils are defined as 
“permanent elected bodies of workforce representatives (or occasionally joint committees with 
employers’ representatives), set-up on the basis of law or collective agreements with the overall task 
of promoting cooperation within the enterprise for the benefit of enterprise itself and employees by 
creating and maintaining good and stable employment conditions, increasing welfare and security of 
employees and their understanding of enterprise operations, finance and competitiveness.” (EIRO 
2004, p. 9) 
The rights and duties of works councils or works council type of bodies include as a rule the following 
(EIRO 2004, p. 4): 
• Monitor the implementation of labour laws, social security, employment and health and safety 
regulations, as well as conditions of work established by agreements, customs or practice; 
• Take appropriate steps (legal or otherwise) in cases where regulation mentioned above is not 
respected by the employer; 
• Be informed regularly on the progress of the establishment, including employment issues and 
developments within the sector and affecting them; 
• The right of co-determination, i.e. participation in the management of the enterprise;  
• In a few cases, when works councils dispose of budgetary prerogatives, their role is extended 
to participation in welfare measures for workers and their families, organised by the company. 
The details of works councils vary in size and composition, as well as election procedures and 
information and consultation rights. The number of employee representatives in works councils is 
generally based on the company size and varies considerably between countries. In Denmark, for 
example, it varies from four members, in companies employing 35 to 50 workers, to 12 members in 
larger companies (over 500 employees). In the Netherlands, the size of works councils is between 
three and 25 members. In Greece, the number varies from three to seven (EIRO 2004, p. 13). The 
procedure for the appointment of members and the role of unions in this procedure varies by countries 
(see Appendix 1 for general description of the works council type of bodies in the EU Member States). 
Works councils are usually prescribed for bigger companies, whereas small and medium sized 
companies are exempt from it. 
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Irrespective of whether the works councils’ exist, how big they are, or how the members are elected, 
only few of them are guaranteed co-determination rights. Freeman and Lazear (1994, p. 26) show that 
co-determination is more useful when relevant experiences and knowledge differ between employees 
and management. This implies that co-determination could, but does not necessarily have to be 
beneficial to a company. Indeed, countries have taken different approaches: in the UK and 
Mediterranean countries there are hardly any co-determination practices, whereas examples of deeply 
rooted co-determination rights are given to German and Austrian works councils. For instance, areas 
in which a German works council has a joint decision-making authority with management are (Schank 
et al. 2004): 
• commencement and termination of working hours,  
• principles of remuneration,  
• introduction of new payment methods,  
• pay arrangements to include the fixation of job and bonus rates and other types of 
performance related pay,  
• regulation of overtime and reduced working hours,  
• introduction and operation of technical devices to monitor worker performance,  
• health and safety measures.  
Specific matters, e.g. employee selection tests, cannot be introduced without a prior consent from 
employee representatives. Due to legal similarity, this also applies to Austria. 
It is difficult to compare works councils’ operations in practice across countries as the regulations are 
different. The highest number of works councils are created in Germany (113 000) and the least 
among the old EU Member States in Greece (126). In Greece, where works councils are a 
requirement in companies with over 50 employees, only 2% of these companies have complied. In 
Denmark and the Netherlands, over 70% of the companies were works councils are required by law 
have complied (EIRO 2004, p. 22-27). Among the new EU Members States, Slovenia has the widest 
network of operating works councils. In Hungary, 51% of the companies in private sector have neither 
works councils nor unions, 45% of the companies have them in place, and in 4% of the companies 
there are only works councils (Tóth and Ghellab 2003, p. 45).  
Even though first trade unions opposed works councils, as described in the case of Germany, today 
the institutions have defined their roles and work successfully together. The relations between works 
councils and trade unions are different in countries. In some countries, trade unions are working at 
sector level by doing collective bargaining and works councils are representing workers’ interest at 
enterprise level. In Germany, for example, there is a clear difference in this respect. However, it 
appears that more active trade union members are also more active in works councils. In some 
countries works councils form a part of the trade union at in enterprise level (e.g. Italy). In many 
countries, trade unions have a specific role in appointing candidates to works councils (e.g. France, 
Luxembourg, Spain) (EIRO 2004). 
In the new EU Member States the establishment of a works council type of body, if it is still does not 
exist, is a delicate matter. In most of the new EU Member States union coverage is low, the sectoral 
level bargaining and a gap in workers’ representation is filled with detailed labour laws on different 
aspects of industrial relations. In most of the new EU Member States, unions and employers’ 
organisations have together opposed the creation of works councils, for different reasons. Unions are 
afraid of losing their prerogative to represent at company level, which in many cases (including 
Estonia) is their main level of operation in collective bargaining. This should be taken into account 
when directing the system towards a dual channel model. The questions regarding the division of 
rights and responsibilities between the two channels must be considered. While in most of the old EU 
countries the division is neatly set as sectoral collective bargaining being a function of unions and 
company level representation as a function of works councils, it is not transferable to the new EU 
countries. Both in Slovenia and Hungary, the trade unions saw the works councils as their opportunity 
to enforce their role in non-unionised settings and to reinforce their role in unionised settings. Thus, 
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the unions should have a long term strategy towards the works councils; this requires unions to 
develop sectoral and regional level programmes and higher union structures (Tóth and Ghellab 2003, 
pp. 48-49). 
Some modifications in the systems of old EU Member states are made to achieve compliance with the 
EU directive for the framework of employees’ information and consultation through representatives 
(2002/14/EC, see Section 3.1). Some major changes are expected in the UK and Ireland (EIRO 2004, 
p. 33) and in some new EU countries (including Estonia), where only a small number of employees 
are represented through unions and alternative channels for employees’ representation are virtually 
missing. 
2.4. Employee Participation in Management and Supervisory 
Boards in the European Countries 
Employee participation in company boards is aimed at getting employees’ input into the company’s 
general strategy. When works councils are mainly targeted to information and consultation on day-to-
day matters, the board level participation is for strategic decision-making (Schulten, Zagelmeyer 
1998). 
Employee participation in supervisory board or board of directors, if the former does not exist, is fairly 
common in European countries. Depending on the corporate governance system, the companies in 
different countries have only one board of directors or additionally a supervisory board, which is the 
representation of shareholders and has a right to appoint and dismiss management, review 
management performance, etc. If a supervisory board is established then employees are usually also 
represented on this board. Where supervisory boards do not exist (e.g. Luxembourg or Sweden), 
employees are represented in the board of directors. At the same time, there are examples where 
employees are represented in both the supervisory board and the board of directors, as in coal, steel 
and iron industry in Germany. The summary of the board level representation for each country in the 
EU is presented in Appendix 2. 
Only seven EU countries out of 25, plus Norway, lack a statutory legislation or a similar system based 
on collective agreements for employees’ representation in company boards. These seven countries 
include three Baltic states, the UK, Belgium, Cyprus and Italy. Additionally, in Portugal, there is a legal 
base for employees’ representation in public sector company supervisory boards, but it is not 
implemented in practice. In five countries the board level representation is just for public sector 
companies and in Poland the representation is for state-owned or privatised (i.e. formerly state owned) 
companies (see Appendix 2).  
Employees have usually a minority representation in boards. The employees’ representatives are 
normally entitled to full participation in the board meetings and to voting in decision-making. In some 
cases, however (e.g. France), employees’ representatives in the board are just attending the meeting 
without further rights in decision-making. In general, it is stated that the employees’ representatives 
who participate in the work of the board must act in their decisions as if they were on the side of the 
employer, i.e. they have the same rights and duties as other board members (Schulten, Zagelmeyer 
1998). This means that the board level representative must work in favour of the company and give 
employees’ input into the best performance of the company. At the same time, he/she must spread the 
background knowledge of the decisions to other employees as widely as possible. The idea is that the 
good operation of the company favours both employers and employees.  
Even though employees in most European countries are represented in company boards, the topic is 
being widely discussed, especially in the light of establishing European Companies. The opponents to 
board-level participation of employees argue that it inhibits management prerogatives to decide and 
rule the company. It is also argued that the presence of an employees’ representative in a supervisory 
board might result in preference for conservative corporatist strategies, shielding management from 
control by shareholders and capital market and therefore leading to technological immobility, 
excessive emphasis on personnel and employment-related activities and excessive consensus-
oriented management. The argument against it proposes that corporate strategies associated with 
board level representation enable to take account of possible problems in the early stages of decision-
making. The proponents of board-level representation argue also that it brings about productive 
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effects through consensus and cooperation, a corporate culture based on trust and a greater 
understanding among the workforce of the needs and interests of the company (Schulten, Zagelmeyer 
1998).  
However, Levinson (2001, p. 268) shows with his study of employee representatives in 660 Swedish 
company boards that in large majority of companies (83%) representatives of employees never 
participate in the early stages of decision-making, i.e. formulating the problems, determining the board 
agenda, initiating solutions, etc. This trend is also recognised by Knudsen (1995, p. 13): employee 
participation occurs less in the planning phase than in the implementation phase. Representatives’ 
activity is seen passive rather than active in most companies, apart from specific topics – personnel, 
reorganisation, production and work environment, i.e. operational and welfare issues. More than half 
of representatives feel they have a negligible possibility to influence board work. In this context, the 
importance of an adequate representative training has been stressed (Levinson 2001, p. 272, 
Knudsen 1995, p. 14).  
Despite the relevant employees’ rights, in practice, most countries have companies that do not have 
employee representatives in the board. Most remarkable is Portugal, where there are almost no cases 
of employee representation in company boards. Schulten and Zagelmeyer (1998) bring out that in 
Denmark, for example, employees in 1 400 companies out of 4 500 have used their right to board-
level representation.  
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3. Legislation and Regulations on Employees’ 
Information and Consultation Rights 
3.1. European Union Regulations 
The EU level intervention in regulating employee information and consultation dates back to the 
1970s. Several essential directives in this field were adopted in the 1990s. In 1994, the directive for 
the creation of European Works Councils (EWC) or information and consultation framework in 
Community-scale undertakings (94/45/EC) and European companies (2001/86/EC) was adopted. Two 
other directives regulating information and consultation rights of workers in the case of collective 
redundancies and transfers of undertakings (respectively: 98/59/EC and 2001/23/EC) were revised 
and adopted. The consultation on the general framework for information and consultation of 
employees in companies was launched already in 1997, but the agreement was reached only in 2002 
(2002/14/EC) (see also Box 3.1).  
At company level, the information and consultation rights in Estonia are most influenced by directive 
2002/14/EC, which had to be ratified by Member States by 23 March 2005, at the latest11. The 
directive provides that all EU countries must have general, permanent arrangements for information 
and consultation of employees on a range of issues (Industrial relations… 2004, p. 109). This general 
arrangement presupposes indirect involvement of workers, meaning that some form of employee 
representation for information and consultation purposes should be in place. 
The directive applies to companies with at least 50 employees or establishments with at least 20 
employees, according to the choice of the Member State. According to Article 4, information and 
consultation must cover: 
• information on the recent and probable development of the undertaking’s activities and 
economic situation; 
• information and consultation on the probable development of employment within the 
undertaking or establishment and on any anticipatory measures envisaged, especially if there 
is threat to employment; 
• information and consultation on decisions likely to lead to substantial changes in work 
organisation or in contractual relations. 
Information must be given with such content, in such a time and fashion that employees’ 
representatives will be able to conduct adequate study and prepare for consultation. Consultations 
must be carried out so that the timing, method and content of thereof are appropriate. It must take 
place at the relevant level of management and representation, depending on the subject. 
Consultations must give employees’ representatives an opportunity to meet the employer and obtain 
responses, and reasons for the responses, to any opinion they formulate.  
The directive also provides that there must be regulations for such obligations as guarding confidential 
information, guarantees to representatives, administrative and judicial procedures, and adequate 
sanctions against breaching these obligations.  
 
11 The countries might choose to phase in the system for smaller companies by 2008. 
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Box 3.1.
EU directives for regulating information and consultation of employees 
European Works Councils:
Official title: COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 94/45/EC of 22 September 1994 on the establishment of a 
European Works Council or a procedure in Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale 
groups undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting employees. 
Aim: to give employees access to information and consultation at transnational level at which key 
decisions affecting transnational companies are increasingly taken.  
Status for Estonia: adopted with a separate law in 2004: The Act on Involvement of Employees in 
Community-Scale Undertakings, Community-Scale Groups of Undertakings or European Companies 
(RTI 2005, 6, 21). 
General framework for information and consultation 
Official title: DIRECTIVE 2002/14/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
of 11 March 2002 establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees in the 
European Community. 
Aim: to establish general and permanent procedures for employees’ information and consultation 
through employees’ representatives in companies with over 50 employees or establishments with at 
least 20 employees. 
Status for Estonia: the directive is not ratified, but employees have general and permanent 
information and consultation rights if there is a union at the workplace according to the Trade Unions 
Act (RTI 2000, 57,372, last amended RTI 2002, 63,387). 
Information and consultation in the case of transfers of undertakings 
Official title: COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of 
the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of 
undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses. 
Aim: to provide workers with adequate information and possibility to express their standpoints in case 
of transfer of undertaking. 
Status for Estonia: adopted within the Employment Contracts Act (§63). 
Information and consultation in the case of transfers of collective redundancies 
Official title: COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the 
Member States relating to collective redundancies. 
Aim: to provide workers with adequate information and possibility to express their standpoints in case 
of collective redundancies. 
Status for Estonia: adopted within the Employment Contracts Act (§892). 
Information and consultation in European companies 
Official title: COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2001/86/EC of 8 October 2001 supplementing the Statute for a 
European company with regard to the involvement of employees. 
Aim: to establish the system of information and consultation in companies, which operate under 
European Company Statute (Societas Europaea).
Status for Estonia: adopted with a separate law in 2004: The Act on Involvement of Employees in 
Community-Scale Undertakings, Community-Scale Groups of Undertakings or European Companies 
(RTI 2005, 6, 21). 
Information and consultation in European Cooperative Society 
Official title: COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2003/72/EC of 22 July 2003 supplementing the Statute for a 
European Cooperative Society with regard to the involvement of employees 
Aim: to establish the system of information and consultation in cooperatives, which operate under 
European cooperative society. The cooperatives that operate in more than one member state can 
acquire single legal identity for operation in the whole European Union and the directive sets the 
information and consultation requirements for such cooperatives. 
Status for Estonia: the time for ratification is set to August 2006. 
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Carley (2005, p. 90) suggests that in implementing the directive the flexibility and minimum standards 
could be combined by: 
• establishing a general duty on employers to carry out the necessary information and 
consultation procedures as required by the directive, where requested by employees; 
• allowing employers and employees to determine the practical arrangements for information 
and consultation via negotiated agreements; 
• in the absence of agreed information and consultation arrangements, enabling employees to 
seek the establishment of the necessary arrangements via some form of a trigger mechanism 
(i.e. some mechanism through which employees can force the employer to inform and consult 
them); 
• making provision for a statutory fallback framework to be enforced on employers who are 
unwilling to introduce the necessary information and consultation arrangements by agreement. 
Most of the EU countries have some arrangements in place for information and consultation. The 
exceptions are Ireland, the UK, and some new EU Member States, which have to introduce 
considerable changes to their industrial relations systems, as there is no permanent mechanism for 
consulting and informing employees, nor a statutory general entitlement for a stable employee 
representation at the workplace (Industrial Relations… 2004, p. 109). It does not mean that in the UK 
there have not been any legal requirements for information and consultation. Regulations are in place 
for information and consultation in certain subject areas, e.g. collective redundancies, transfers of 
undertakings, health and safety. The challenge, however, lies in the creation of a general employee 
representative system, whereas the recent trend has been towards a direct involvement system 
(Beaumont, Hunter 2003). It is also expected that the directive setting up the general mechanism for 
employees’ information and consultation will promote gradual change of attitude among employers 
and employees’ representatives towards a more participatory and constructive relationship (Industrial 
Relations… 2004, p. 109). 
As the date for the implementation of the directive has only recently passed, there is no analysis on 
the effectiveness of the implementation. The European Commission has planned such an analysis for 
2007.  
The second very important piece of legislation at the EU level is directive 94/45/EC on the 
establishment of works councils in the Community-scale undertakings. The aim of the directive is to 
give workers access to information and consultation at trans-national level at which multi-national 
companies take their key decisions. The arrangement for information and consultation may be in the 
form of European Works Council (EWC), which is the body consisting of employees’ representatives 
from the different countries where the company is active. The directive applies to undertakings or 
groups of undertakings with at least 1,000 employees and at least 150 employees in two Member 
States. The responsibility for setting up the arrangement lies with the central management of the 
undertaking or if this is impossible, with the management in the Member State where the largest 
number of workers are from. It is also responsible for financing the meetings and work of the EWC.  
The central management and the EWC have annual meetings where following themes are discussed: 
economic and financial situation, probable development of the business and production and sales, 
situation and developments of employment, investments, substantial changes concerning the 
organisation, introduction of new working methods or production processes, transfers of production, 
mergers, cut-backs or closures of undertakings, establishment of important parts thereof and collective 
redundancies. If there are important changes taking place, the EWC has the right to be informed and 
to meet and consult central management at their request.  
As the directive was adopted a while ago the analysis of the EWC is numerous. In total, there was 
expected to be 1,865 companies, totalling at 17 million employees, in the scope of the directive. Out of 
these, 639 companies with 11 million employees had the EWC by 2004. More than half of the 
agreements were concluded by 1996; since then an average of 40 agreements have been concluded 
a year. In 2002, 547 companies or groups falling into the scope of the directive had a subsidiary in the 
New Member States - 323 of those had the EWC (Industrial Relations… 2004, p. 144). In Estonia, 
about 20-25 companies are expected to fall in the scope of the directive (Seletuskiri… 2004).  
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On the background of these major directives there are some information and consultation rights 
touched upon in other directives. These include, for example, the directive which sets basic rules for 
information and consultation in European companies and cooperatives. These are companies with a 
specific legal format. There are also specific regulations for information and consultation for certain 
situations. Employees’ information and consultation in the case of collective redundancies is regulated 
in directive 98/59/EC and in the case of transfers of undertakings in directive 2001/23/EC.  
In the case of collective redundancies, the employer is obliged to begin consultations with the workers’ 
representatives in good time with a view of reaching an agreement. The consultations must cover the 
ways and means for avoiding the redundancy or reducing it and mitigating consequences (incl. 
redeploying or retraining). There are provisions which oblige the employer to give employees` 
representative all relevant information in time and specifically in writing the reasons of redundancies, 
number of categories of workers made redundant, period of redundancies, criteria for selection of 
workers and method for calculating redundancy payment. The employer must give this information in 
such time that representative of employees can formulate opinion and give adequate alternatives. In 
the case of transfers of company the representative of employees or employees concerned (in the 
case there is no representative and it is not the fault of employees) must be informed timely of the 
date of transfer, reasons, implications and measures envisaged for the employees. It is not a valid 
excuse for the employer, if they fail to inform and consult by saying that they do not possess such 
information (e.g. the decision is made by undertaking). 
The directives concerning EWC and information and consultation in European companies have 
already been transferred into Estonian law. The directives concerning information and consultation in 
the case of collective redundancies and transfers of companies are in principle transferred with some 
small amendments. However, the directive setting up a general framework for information and 
consultation (2002/14/EC) is not transferred and there is no clear expression from policy makers on 
whether, how and when the ratification will be done.  
3.2. Estonian Legislation 
3.2.1. Employees’ Representatives 
Estonian legislation gives different rights and obligations to employees and employers for information 
and consultation in the case of different employees’ representatives. According to Estonian laws, 
employees’ representative can be elected (Employees’ Representatives Act §3, see also Box 3.2 for 
official data on legal acts): 
1. by the members of trade union, 
2. by the non-unionised employees in the general meeting of workers. 
Based on Trade Unions Act, trade unions have the right to represent workers in collective matters also 
without a separate election for a trustee, but also trade union trustee election is envisaged. 
Additionally, there are representatives in the health and safety issues, based on the Workplace Health 
and Safety Act.  
Thus, in Estonia, there can be two types of formal workers’ representatives on general issues and they 
may exist in parallel. Also, there can be more than one employees’ representative chosen by general 
meeting or by union in one company. If there is more than one, the number must be agreed upon with 
the employer. If there is more than one representative, they may form a joint committee to co-ordinate 
their work. The union and the general meeting can choose, by a joint decision, the chief representative 
among the representatives. 
There is no specific set of rules for employees’ general meeting, i.e. neither the calling of meeting, 
place, time nor the voting rules are set by law. The only regulation is that the rules for election are set 
by the general meeting. This may result in cases where the representative does not really represent 
employees but is appointed by the employer and the general meeting as a formality. The rules for 
setting up a labour union are regulated much more precisely. The union must have the foundation 
meeting (the personal identification numbers of founders are included in the memorandum of 
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association). The union must have statutes - the basic information for the statutes is provided by law. 
The role and rights of the union management and general assembly (incl. minimum voting 
requirements) are provided by law.  
In companies with 10 or more workers, the employees must choose a working environment 
representative in the general meeting of employees. If the company has several structural units or 
shifts, each unit or shift which consists of 10 or more workers must have their own working 
environment representative. If the company is bigger (over 50 employees) the workplace health and 
safety council must be formed. This consists of representatives of employees and employers in equal 
numbers. The employer must organise the election of the working environment representative in the 
general meeting of workers. At least half of all workers must participate in the elections. The working 
environment representatives are also made known to the Labour Inspectorate.  
All the above mentioned representatives have the right to do their work for a specified time during the 
work hours and they have special guarantees against lay-off.  
Since the beginning of 2005, there are also provisions for European works councils or some other 
information and consultation arrangements in Community-scale undertakings or groups of 
undertakings or European companies. In the companies which do not fall into these categories the 
works council type of representation, except for the working environment council, is not foreseen. 
There are no provisions for the participation of employees’ representatives in management boards or 
executive boards.  
3.2.2. Rights for Information and Consultation 
The specific rights for information and consultation for employees’ representatives are different 
according to the type of their representation. There are also some provisions for information and 
consultation of workers in the absence of representatives (see Box 3.2 for a short description of 
relevant legal acts). 
The representative who is appointed by the union or by the general meeting of unorganised workers 
has the right (Employees’ Representatives Act §6): 
• to get information from the employer for performing his/her tasks; 
• to suspend the collective redundancy (up to 30 days) in accordance with the Employment 
Contracts Act; 
• to examine working conditions and organisation at all workplaces; 
• to get information on the points of dispute arising from labour relations; 
• disseminate freely information pertaining to work and the activities of the union of employees; 
• notify the owner of the enterprise, government agencies, unions and federations of employees 
of violations of labour laws, collective agreements, employment contracts or other agreements 
pertaining to work committed by the employer. 
The union representative has additionally the right for timely information on (Trade Union Act §22): 
• the company’s figures of financial year, expenses incurred on labour force, essential 
investments; 
• changes in work organisation, technology, principal directions in economic activities; fixed-
term and part-time employment contracts that are concluded; 
• merger, division, transformation or dissolution of the company, upon transfer of the enterprise 
or an organisationally independent part thereof, of changes in the structure or form of 
administration, of reasons and consequences of such transfer for the employees, and of 
devised methods; 
• other issues pertaining to employees and work. 
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Box 3.2.
Legal acts concerning information and consultation rights of workers
The main acts providing for the information and consultation of employees in Estonia are:
• Employment Contracts Act (RT 1992, 16/16, 241, last amended RTI2004, 86, 584) – main 
articles concerning employees’ information and consultation are: paragraph §63 on 
information and consultation in case of transfers of undertakings, §42 on information and 
consultation on internal rules of work organisation, §892 on the information and consultation 
in the case of collective redundancies  
• Workplace Health and Safety Act (RTI 1999, 60, 616, last amended RTI 2004, 89, 612) – 
establishment of employees’ health and safety representatives, health and safety 
committees and their prerogatives 
• The Act on Involvement of Employees in Community-Scale Undertakings, Community-Scale 
Groups of Undertakings or European Companies (RTI 2005, 6, 21) – establishes information 
and consultation rights of workers in the case of companies above certain size and that are 
operating in several member states at the same time, also establishes information and 
consultation system in the companies that are operating under European Company Statute  
The following acts are important for organising indirect participation systems: 
• Trade Unions Act (RTI 2000, 57,372, last red. RTI 2002, 63,387) – establishes the creation 
and operation of trade unions and also trade union representatives’ rights for information and 
consultation  
• Employees’ Representatives Act (RTI 1993, 40, 595, last red. RTI 2002, 111, 663) – 
establishes the election of trade union representatives and non-trade union representatives 
and also their rights for information and consultation 
• Collective Agreements Act (RTI 1993, 20, 353, last red. RTI 2002, 61, 375) – defines and 
establishes the conclusion of collective agreements, its content and extension procedures 
Specific stipulations for consulting union representatives concern (Trade Union Act §22):  
• termination of employment contracts on economic reasons, including reasons for collective 
redundancies, workers who will be laid off, other relevant issues connected to collective 
redundancies and mitigating the results of redundancies in line with the provisions of labour 
laws; 
• changes or implementation of working time and regime, pay conditions, principles of payment, 
vacation schedule, internal rules of work organisation and other important working conditions; 
• further- and re-training of workers, qualifications, workplace health and safety; 
• other questions agreed upon. 
In the case of consultation unions have 10 days to present their opinion to employers, if longer time is 
not agreed upon. During this time employer must not take the decision. The specific rules for 
information and consultation are agreed upon between the parties. In the case of infringement of the 
obligations of information and consultation, the employer is obliged to pay a fine, which is up to 6,000 
EEK in 2005. The union is fined the same fee if they fail to keep commercial, production or 
professional secrets. 
Both representatives (union representative and representative of non-unionised workers) can conduct 
collective bargaining with the employer and conclude collective agreements. In the collective 
agreement additional information and consultation arrangements can be fixed. In both cases, workers 
are entitled to strike in the case of disagreement, after fulfilling necessary procedures to reach an 
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agreement. The decision to strike must be made by the general meeting of the employees or by the 
employees’ union. There are no specific provisions for the general meeting of employees (neither for 
calling it nor its timing or voting requirements). 
Thus, in the case of unions the rights and obligations of information and consultation are more specific 
and there are specific fines in the case of infringement. If employees have only a representative 
without a union, the regulations are more general and do not foresee any fines or punishment.  
In addition to the above mentioned information and consultation regulations, specific rules apply 
(Employment Contracts Act §63 and §892, respectively): 
• in the case of transfer, merger or division of a company or part of it,  
• in the case of collective redundancies.  
In the case of transfer of undertaking, the previous and the future employer must present to the 
workers’ representative or, if it is missing, to the workers all relevant information concerning the 
transformation. As a minimum, it must include the date, reasons, legal, economic and social 
consequences to workers and the planned measures in regards to the workers. If there are any 
changes planned in regards to the workers, the employer has to consult the workers’ representative 
first. If there is no representative, the employer is not obliged to consult. During the consultations, the 
employees have the right to meet the employer’s representative and members of the board. They can 
present written proposals during 15 days from the date of receiving the announcement of transfer. The 
employer must justify their decision if they reject employees’ proposals. Although in general, the law is 
in conformity with directive 2001/23/EC, some of its aspects are not included. For example, there is no 
provision stating that even if the transfer is decided at the group level of the undertaking, it is not an 
excuse for failing to inform and consult at the undertaking level.  
In the case of collective redundancies, the law is in line with directive 98/59/EC. The law provides that 
the employer must give timely written information to employees’ representatives or, if these are 
missing, to employees concerned. The information must include at least the reasons of lay-offs, 
numbers, names and selection criteria for workers who are laid off, the number of employees in the 
company, time of lay-offs, and the principles for calculating and paying redundancy payments. 
Employees’ representatives must be consulted in these issues and they have at least 15 days to 
present their opinion. The employer must justify their rejection of the employees’ proposal. Also, 
employees’ representatives can make proposals to the Labour Inspectorate, who must also agree with 
the collective redundancy. Additionally, the employees’ representative has a right to postpone 
collective redundancy by a maximum of 30 days if the problems accompanying lay-offs are not solved. 
In the case of infringement of obligations, the Labour Inspectorate has the right to issue an injunction 
to the company and if the employer still does not fulfil the obligations, the penalty can be imposed. 
All employees have the right to see the draft of internal procedure rules and make proposals to it. The 
employer must forward it to consultation a week before presenting it to the Labour Inspector. However, 
the employer has the freedom to take workers’ proposals into account or to discard them without 
further explanation (Employment Contracts Act §42).  
In conclusion, Estonia has two channels for collective bargaining: one for unionised workers and 
another for non-unionised workers who have chosen a representative to themselves. In regards to the 
right for collective bargaining, the two channels have an equal standing. The situation with 
participation, however, is different. As seen from the above, employees have greater legal guarantees 
to express their opinion if there is a representative and especially, a union representative in place. As 
the unions have greater demands regarding their organisation and management of the organisation 
(statute, accounting etc), there is a greater probability that the employers’ information and consultation 
reaches the workers. However, this conclusion cannot be made without further empirical investigation 
of different schemes of representation in practice. 
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4. Employee Participation: Evidence from Estonia 
4.1. Employee Representation and Participation in Estonia on the 
Basis of Previous Studies 
As seen from previous chapters, there can be different types of employees' representatives in Estonia: 
trade union representatives, representatives of non-unionised employees and health and safety 
representatives. In comparison with other new and old EU Member States, trade union membership is 
relatively small in Estonia and the importance of collective agreements in regulating labour relations is 
minimal (see Section 2.1). Further more, the union membership has been declining yearly. In 2004, 
the membership was less than 10% according to Estonian Labour Force Survey (see Figure 4.1). 
Thus, there is a very small number of employees who are partners to employers through 
representation. Unfortunately, there is no data on the existence of non-unionised representatives. It is 
probable that pursuant to law there are more health and safety representatives than employees who 
are represented by trade unions.  
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Figure 4.1. Share of unionised workers among all salaried workers (percentage) 
Source: Estonian Labour Force Survey databases 1998-2004, authors’ calculations 
Notes: Years 2000 and 2001 express an unweighted average of four quarters 
The small share of unionised employees determines the minor role of collective agreements in the 
regulation of labour relations. There are, however, some extended branch-level collective agreements 
(e.g. for medical personnel and passenger transportation companies) and collective agreements have 
also been concluded in many companies. According to the Working Life Barometer survey in 2002, 
there was a collective agreement at the workplace of 22% of the surveyed employees (Antila, Ylöstalo 
2003, p. 79).  
There is very little data on participation practices specifically. Working life issues in Estonia have been 
analysed mainly in two studies: Working Life Barometer (Antila, Ylöstalo 1999 and 2003) and Working 
Conditions in the Acceding and Candidate Countries12 (2003). The sample in both of the studies 
conducted in Estonia was 1,000 working people. Even though these studies did not focus specifically 
on employee participation, they covered issues that could shed some light on employees’ involvement 
opportunities and concerns. 
Only relatively few salaried workers could influence their work tasks. Working Life Barometer shows 
that in 2002, only 9% of salaried workers said that they could influence their work tasks to a great 
extent and 30% said that they could do it to some extent (Antila, Ylöstalo 2003, p. 172). 
 
12 As the study began when Central and Eastern European countries had not yet joined the EU, the study title 
refers to the new Member States as Candidate Countries. 
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The workers gave a relatively positive assessment to their opportunities to make a statement or 
express dissatisfaction with their working conditions. 72% of workers found that they had such an 
opportunity (Antila, Ylöstalo 2003, p. 192). This share was slightly bigger in the study carried out by 
the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions: 77% of workers 
claimed to have an opportunity to discuss their working conditions. Estonia stands out with this figure, 
as it is better than in ex-Candidate Countries and even in old Member States (see Figure 4.2). 
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Figure 4.2. Consultations on working conditions and work organisation 
Source: Working Conditions... 2003, p. 59 and the authors’ calculations from the Working Conditions database 
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Figure 4.3. Discussion channels for working conditions 
Source: Working Conditions... 2003, p. 60 and the authors’ calculations from the Working Conditions database 
At the same time, we can say that Estonia’s communication channels and consultation opportunities 
do not differ drastically from other ex-Candidate Countries. Compared to the average of new Member 
States, however, Estonia is notable for its managers play a larger role as a channel than employees' 
representatives (see Table 4.3). In addition, consultation in Estonia is more often of informal nature. 
When in new Member States 40% of employees claim that they discuss working conditions formally, in 
Estonia the figure is only 12% (see Table 4.1).  
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Table 4.1. Form of consultation for working conditions (% of respondents) 
Form of Consultation  Candidate 
Countries 
European 
Union 
Estonia 
Consultation on working 
conditions is regular 45 50 43 
Consultation on working 
conditions is formal  40 - 12 
Source: Working Conditions..., 2003, p. 61 and the authors’ calculations from the Working Conditions database 
Oxenbridge and Brown (2002) have found that informal partnership is more effective than formal 
partnership in forwarding and considering employees’ opinions, but only so in a situation were a 
representative (e.g. trade union) has a wide base. Their study revealed that informal partnership was 
more common in small and medium-sized production enterprises. The structure of Estonian business, 
however, does not give us reason to believe that there is more informal consultation due to size. There 
are relatively fewer micro-businesses in Estonia and, therefore, more small and medium-sized 
enterprises (see Table 4.2).  
Table 4.2. Comparison of business structures in Estonia and other EU countries (% of 
companies) 
Estonia (2003) EU 15 (2003) 
Candidate 
Countries 
(2001) 
Micro-businesses (0-9 employees) 79.48 92.37 95.13 
Small businesses (10-49 employees) 16.66 6.48 3.86 
Medium-sized businesses (50-249 employees) 3.17 0.94 0.84 
Large businesses (500 and more employees) 0.41 0.21 0.17 
Source: Estonia – Tax and Customs Board; EU 15 and Candidate Countries – Observatory of European SMEs 
2003, No. 8, Highlights from the 2003 Observatory 2003/8, p. 13 
Note: In the case of Estonia, only active business units who had declared their turnover at least once 
during the last year were taken into account 
According to the Working Life Barometer, the employees themselves claimed that during the previous 
year they had relatively actively made suggestions to improve working conditions, methods or quality. 
54% of employees had made one or several suggestions for improvement. There was a clear 
connection between suggestions and the employees’ level of education. Only 23% of employees with 
basic education and as many as 67% with higher education had made suggestions (Antila, Ylöstalo 
2003, pp. 216-217). 
The Working Life Barometer also studied the image of trade union activities. First, there are very few 
trade union members among workers and relatively little is known of their activities (14% know well or 
very well about trade union activities). Second, 38% stated that the reputation of trade unions was bad 
or very bad (37% considered the reputation positive). 37% saw no benefit in belonging to a trade 
union (19% thought it was beneficial). Antila and Ylöstalo concluded that trade unions had not 
managed to adapt to a changed environment and had not been successful in earning the trust of the 
public as defenders of salaried workers’ interests (Antila, Ylöstalo 2003, pp. 68-79). Based on these 
results we can conclude that trade union representatives do not play a significant role in employee 
participation today, which is also supported by the analysis of participation channels in Section 4.5.3 
below. The same conclusion was reached in personnel management survey Cranet report on Estonia 
in 2004 – trade unions do not have a considerable coverage as employees’ representation body and 
are, thus, not a considerable channel of communication between employers and employees. Cranet 
survey is based on interviews with personnel managers (Personalijuhtimise… 2004, p. 11). 
However, the coverage and popularity of trade unions in the country does not express, as a whole, 
how well are employees' representatives working in each company, and whether and what kind of role 
do representatives play in the companies where they exist. In order to get a better understand of these 
aspects, we conducted case studies in several companies. In the following sections we will explain our 
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case study methodology and look at the study result in detail. 
4.2. The Aim and Method of the Current Study 
4.2.1. Idea and Hypothesis 
The idea behind conducting the case studies was to investigate the participation process (more 
precisely, the information and consultation of employees) and people’s satisfaction with it in the case 
of different representational structures.  
The theme is topical due to the necessity to adopt respective EU directive, but also from the lack of 
research in this field in Estonia. Trade unions and other types of employee representation are not very 
common in Estonia. Less than 10% of employees belong to trade unions (see previous chapter). 
Other forms of representation are probably even scarcer13. As the European Commission Directive on 
the framework of employees’ information and consultation is not been adopted, it is expected that 
participation will grow in the near future. However, there are currently no trends as to which forms of 
participation and representation will grow the most. There is a clear disagreement between trade 
unions and employers’ associations on which forms should be favoured by the law. The unions 
suggest that information and consultation through unions should be favoured, while employers are in 
favour of minimum regulation for different kinds of representation on an equal standing with trade 
unions.  
Currently, there are two main types of representation for general information and consultation 
procedures in Estonia (see Chapter 3). These are union representatives and representatives elected 
by the general meeting of non-unionised employees. As the election and rights of these 
representatives are dissimilar it is expected that the information and consultation procedures with 
these representatives differ. More particularly we expect that the non-union representative who is 
elected by the general meeting of non-unionised employees would work less efficiently in bringing 
workers’ ideas to the management. The hypothesis is based on the idea that as the elections of non-
union representatives are less regulated and less transparent, their mandate from the employees is 
not clear and this might result in less efficient information and consultation. Also, if the non-union 
representative of workers is appointed by management in order to pretend participation and to force 
through favourable collective agreements, the information and consultation of employees is not a real 
practice. At the same time there is a possibility that if the employees have not unionised themselves 
and the employer wants to have a partner among the employees, he/she is the initiator of the non-
union representation. And, as such, it might result in more efficient information and consultation 
practices than in the case of a resisting employer being confronted with a unionised workforce, eager 
to participate in company’s decision-making.  
4.2.2. Method of Study 
As the information and consultation process of employees, and satisfaction with it, is a very context 
specific issue, the chosen method was to conduct case studies in companies with different 
representational structures. Case study method is an appropriate tool for exploratory studies, such as 
the current issue: little is known about the phenomenon is Estonia. It enables to explore how? and 
why? employee participation is pursued in practice, as well as to reach cross-case conclusions. The 
method, however, is not appropriate for determining variables that influence participation or for the 
analysis of general participation effects in Estonia. The results from the case studies can be 
interpreted and discussed in theoretical framework but cannot be generalised over the whole 
population (Estonian companies or employees). 
Eight companies were chosen for case studies: this number enables to study the conditions of 
participation, as well as to compare alternative approaches. For the selection of companies, the 
Confederation of Estonian Trade Unions and the Estonian Employers’ Confederation were both asked 
 
13 There is no overview of the extent of different representational structures in Estonia. No research has been 
done in this field. 
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to put forward four companies in order to guarantee researchers access into them. First, they both 
appointed three or four companies in excess, so that the researchers could make the final choice 
themselves. The most important selection criterion was to find an interesting case to study from the 
point of view of the representational form and information and consultation process.  
With regard to representation, it was borne in mind that the different types of representation could be 
compared within the context. Therefore, the aim was to have some cases with union representation, 
some with non-union representation, some with union and non-union representation simultaneously 
and also, some with no employee representation at all. As the trade unions only suggested companies 
with union representation, the employers’ organisation suggested companies with varying structures. 
During the research it was revealed that some instances of representation did not correspond to the 
previously reported situation. In one case, the company was supposed to have only a non-union 
representative, but it also appeared to have a union. In another case, the company was supposed to 
be without any representation, but it also appeared to have a union. Yet another company was 
supposed to have a non-union representative, but it turned out to have no elected representatives at 
all. This resulted in a slightly different sample than initially planned.  
Some of the suggested companies were excluded on the grounds that in some aspects they were not 
typical enough for Estonia. The reasoning for this being that the lessons learned from the case studies 
should, to some extent, be transferable to other companies. Thus, for example, companies of atypical 
size for Estonia, companies with monopoly power, a company with four unions, etc., were omitted. 
In order to compare the companies at a later stage, their economic sector and size were also born in 
mind. In this respect, we did not always succeed as we could not find a comparable retail company 
with a different representation structure willing to participate in the study. Regional aspect of the 
company’s location was not a selection criterion, but among the eight cases there were four 
companies operating mainly outside Tallinn, two companies based in Tallinn and two with branches in 
Tallinn and elsewhere in Estonia. On the whole, we have a fairly interesting set of companies, which 
are briefly described in Table 4.3, and which allow us to look at all the different representation 
structures and information and consultation within their context. 
Table 4.3. Description of companies participating in the case studies 
Case ID 
(denote the 
companies 
hereafter) 
Number of 
employees Economic activity Representation Ownership 
1 (union+non-
union rep.) 
(TU+non-TU 
rep) 
100-200 Manufacturing  
Trustee without 
a union and a 
union 
Private (foreign) 
2 (TU+non-TU 
rep) 100-200 
Currier and 
dispatch services 
Trustee without 
a union and a 
union 
Private (foreign) 
3 (TU) 200-300 Manufacturing Union Private (foreign) 
4 (TU) 400-500 Wholesale and resale of goods Union 
Private (Estonian 
and foreign) 
5 (TU) 200-300 Infrastructure Union Private (foreign) 
6 (TU) 200-300 Public transport Union Municipality and private (Estonian) 
7 400-500 Manufacturing None Private (Estonian) 
8 100-200 Manufacturing None Private (Estonian) 
Source: compiled by the authors 
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In order to study the process and outcomes of information and consultation, the case studies in all the 
companies consisted of the following parts14:
1. an interview with one person from management (in most cases, executive director), 
2. an interview with the employees’ representative(s), 
3. survey among random sample of workers. 
Additionally, we had economic reports and description of information and consultation procedures for 
each company, based on the documents delivered by the company (e.g. collective agreement, internal 
procedure rules, etc.). Thus, multiple sources of evidence were used in order to get a balanced view of 
the actual situation of information and consultation in the company. 
The interviews with company managers and employees’ representatives were semi-structured (see 
Appendix 3 for the interview structure), containing only general questions about information and 
consultation, whereas the order of the questions was adjusted according to the topics brought up by 
the interviewee. The interviews lasted up to one and half hours, depending on how much the 
interviewee had to say. The interviews were taped and a transcript was made afterwards. The aim of 
the interviews was to get a general picture of the company’s employee participation process so that 
the employees’ questionnaires could be compared to the views of the employees’ representatives and 
employers. Also, context specific issues, such as the history of representation in the company and 
related critical events, became evident from the interviews.  
The sample of workers was made on the basis of the electronic lists of personnel supplied by the 
companies. The sample was formed by random choice from the personnel list. The size of the sample 
in the companies, as a percentage of the total number of employees, was different. In total, however, 
around 20% of employees were covered by the survey (see Table 4.4 for samples and response 
rates).  
Table 4.4. Employee survey design 
Company Sample size Number of respondents 
Response rate 
(%) 
Respondents / 
total number 
of employees 
(%) 
1 (TU+non-TU 
rep) 74 54 73 27 
2 (TU+non-TU 
rep) 67 42 63 20 
3 (TU) 94 48 51 24 
4 (TU) 158 80 51 15 
5 (TU) 87 46 53 16 
6 (TU) 94 71 76 20 
7 119 68 57 15 
8 66 51 77 37 
Source: compiled by the authors  
The questionnaire was distributed and collected after one week by the personnel department of each 
company (see Appendix 4 for the questionnaire). The questionnaires were self-filled by respondents 
and returned in sealed envelopes with a special safety closure so that they could not be tampered with 
by management.  
14 Data collection process was assisted by social and market research company Saar Poll. 
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4.3. The Importance of Employee Participation in Companies  
In this section we will look at the general attitudes towards employee participation among the 
managers, employees' representatives and employees in the eight surveyed companies. We will 
consider the expressed advantages and disadvantages of information, consultation and co-
determination, and possible factors that shape these viewpoints. 
Regardless of the existence of an employees' representative, both the managers and employees 
attached importance to information. The percentage of employees who considered information and 
consultation important or very important is shown in Table 4.5. It appears that only a few employees in 
each company did not attach much importance to employee participation. There was one company 
manager in whose view employees were not interested in being involved in managerial issues and 
consultation, as they are mainly interested in being paid for their work and not as much in the well-
being of the company. This view, however, was exceptional among other managers and employees. 
Table 4.5. Share of employees who considered information and consultation important or very 
important 
Company Share
6 (TU) 92 
2 (TU+non-TU rep) 95 
3 (TU) 96 
7 97 
8 98 
1 (TU+non-TU rep) 98 
4 (TU) 99 
5 (TU) 100 
Source: Employees’ survey, compiled by the authors 
In comparison with information there was no clear unity on the subject of employees’ consultation and 
co-determination (the summary of advantages and disadvantages of participation, based on 
interviews, is shown in Box 4.1). In general, asking for employees’ opinions and suggestions was 
considered important by managers as well as employees' representatives in the majority of studied 
companies. Only one manager expressed the view: 
„There is no need for unskilled workers to contribute to organisation of their own working life”. 
In this particular company there was a standardised work (production line) with an automatic clocking-
in system, which made it more complicated to consider employees’ opinions. The head of another 
company where the work could also be described as very monotonous, standardised and requiring 
little qualification found that it would be very difficult for employees to make suggestions that could 
improve the workings of the company. Thus, the nature of the work is an important factor that 
determines employee participation opportunities. In contrast, the heads of two other companies where 
the work was relatively standardised considered participation important. In the latter two cases, 
employee participation was significantly more active. Thus, we can conclude that the nature of the 
work is an important but not a determining factor in participation. 
Employees’ level of education in the analysed companies was not related to their assessment on the 
importance of participation. Even though it is claimed that more educated employees demand more 
participation, in the case of our eight companies it was considered important both by people with 
higher and basic educations15. Even after analysing the average level of education there appeared to 
be no connection between the intensity of participation and employees’ level of education. 
 
15 Among the few employees who did not consider participation important there were also employees with higher, 
as well as basic education.  
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Many managers, as well as employees' representatives mentioned that it is complicated to ask for 
employees’ opinion in large companies because everybody has an opinion and it is not possible to 
take all of them into account. Thus, the size of the company limits direct participation of employees, 
whereas this view is also supported by the theory discussed in Chapter one. At the same time, the 
argument that there should be an employees' representative in companies from a certain size up, did 
not gain much support among the managers: only one manager thought that an employees' 
representative could be of help in doing the tedious work of synthesising the employees’ opinions. 
Managers mentioned also a precondition that the work of employees' representatives has to be 
effective and the representation has to be transparent to management. The managers of the eight 
analysed companies did not, however, consider that to be the case at the time (see Section 4.4). At 
the same time, the size of the company is not an absolute but a relative notion. One of the company 
heads with less than 200 employees stated that in his company it would be possible to practice direct 
employee participation and consultation. Most of the managers, however, claimed that their company 
was too big to consider everybody’s opinions, even though most of the analysed companies had 100 
to 300 employees. 
Managers’ views differed on the subject of consultation but, as a rule, they all believed that 
consultation on certain decisions was positive for the company. Co-determination, however, was 
excluded even in the case of slightly strategic decisions. The reasoning behind that was mainly that 
the workforce lacks the knowledge and skills necessary for strategic decisions and that management 
was responsible for decision-making. Therefore, in the case of strategic decisions (investments, 
changes in economic activities, etc.) information dissemination could only happen after the decision is 
made. The competence of employees' representatives has also been emphasised in the context of 
previous studies, but when these concluded that it could be solved by providing training, the 
interviewed managers found that the lack of know-how was the reason why not to include the 
employees, including their representatives, in strategic decisions. The way the Estonian managers 
from the analysed companies perceive the possible role of employees in strategic decision-making 
differs also from that of EU countries with strong participation traditions: the only determinant in 
mapping out the strategy is the owner’s right and responsibility to develop his/her enterprise in the 
direction of his/her choice. 
The analysis of the interviews revealed that the main factor that influences the employee participation 
culture in the company is the manager’s views on its necessity. It is difficult to compare this outcome 
with previous research as different methods were used for studying participation intensities and 
relations were found between company’s size, sector (production v service), competition, strategy, 
national culture, etc. (Cabrera et al 2003). Case studies have, however, mentioned that some leaders 
personally favour the idea of employee participation and this has a determinative effect on the 
participation practice (Dundon et al 2005; Oxenbridge, Brown 2002). The methodology of the current 
study does not enable us to confirm the participation relationships between the objective indicators 
listed above, but the interviews with managers clearly brought out the different attitudes towards 
participation and either prevalently positive or negative associations (see Box 4.1). 
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Box 4.1.
Advantages and Disadvantages of Participation based on the Case Studies
ADVANTAGES OF PARTICIPATION 
Managers’ Assessments (Interviews) 
• Direct information exchange between management and employees guarantees a proper 
dissemination of correct information, which reduces tensions among workforce; 
• Consultation with employees enables to make well-considered decisions, as employees may 
bring up aspects that management is not aware of; 
• If the employee thinks along, there is hope that something will come of it; 
• Employee participation results in employees also becoming liable and situations where ‘tools 
are downed when the bell rings’ no longer exist; motivation; 
• Information: creates a positive attitude and motivation; 
• Educational effect: provides employees with a clearer understanding of management 
Employees' Representatives’ Assessments (Interviews) 
• Better quality of decisions, i.e. making use of employees’ expertise; 
• Gives employees a chance to let out steam, less whining; 
• Information: enables the employees to do their work better; 
• Consultation: gives the employees a chance to speak their mind, improve working process; 
• Decisions are more objective at working process level; 
• Employees feel good about their opinion being important 
Employees’ Questionnaires 
• Employees’ motivation, they feel valued, increased self-confidence, more responsibility, 
commitment to work when they know what they work for, considering employees’ opinions 
increases their commitment to work, increased mutual satisfaction; 
• Employees understand their work; 
• Awareness of employees’ attitudes, managers have a chance to see the inside situation; 
• Learning about employees’ opinions, invaluable information for future decisions, helps to see 
the deficiencies that management cannot; 
• Trust towards employees; 
• Production quality, productivity, company’s success; 
• Mutual understanding between employees and management, more friendly working 
environment, better teamwork and improved atmosphere in the company, less conflicts, 
better working collective, micro-climate, sense of being in one team, better working 
environment, tensionless working environment; 
• Company’s prestige grows in parallel with the employees’ awareness, company’s image is 
mainly determined by the employees; increased satisfaction among clients, because 
employees praise the workplace; 
• Correct information, less rumours; 
• Quality of decisions, right decisions, more democratic decision-making; 
• Employees get a broader view of things, clarity about the future; 
• Improved work organisation (e.g. avoiding duplication), increased stability of working process, 
no idling, work organisation becomes more flexible; 
• Employees accept innovations better; 
• Saving up, decreased expenses; 
• Stable staff, readiness to cooperate with management, company can choose its employees, 
employees do not want to change job 
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DISADVANTAGES OF PARTICIPATION 
Managers’ Assessments (Interviews) 
• Takes time; 
• In bigger companies there are limited possibilities for consultation; 
• The interests of employees and management often differ; 
• Strategic decisions require a lot of specialised information (bigger picture), and lower level 
employees have no skills or interest in being involved in it; 
• Employees are not interested in having their say or consultation; 
• If strategic issues involved more than information after decisions, it could lead to employees 
mistrusting management in the cases where, e.g. decisions were modified later; 
• Information: information disappears in channels, wrong choice of channels; 
• Information: message for unskilled workers has to be very simple to avoid misinterpretation; 
• Information leak; 
• Co-determination: employees’ opinions are often contradicting and it is impossible to make a 
decision that would consider the opinion of all the employees; 
• Co-determination: in bigger companies there are limited possibilities for co-determination; 
• Co-determination: in the case of higher level decisions the circle of decision-makers cannot 
be very large 
Employees' Representatives’ Assessments (Interviews) 
• It is not always possible to take employees’ opinion into account, as different employees have 
different opinions; 
• In cases where decision changes because of the changing circumstances, employees are 
confused by the preliminary information; 
• Causes confusion in the context of strategic decisions 
In summary, advantages of participation expressed on all levels confirmed the points mentioned by 
earlier studies in this field, whereas among the disadvantages there were some new finds. For 
example, information distortion and interpretation problems were a serious consideration for the 
managers, which is also one of the reasons why they did not support indirect participation in 
information. This applies equally to employees' representatives and official managerial hierarchy. One 
of the common attitudes was that strategic decisions could not be discussed with employees because 
when plans change or are postponed, employees lose trust in their management. 
There are certain differences in the assessments of managers’ and employees' representatives. In the 
context of advantages the views were relatively similar, but in the context of disadvantages managers’ 
views were much more multifaceted than these of employees' representatives. Things that stood out 
were employees’ lack of interest towards participation, the time factor and the possibility of information 
leak.  
The comparison of direct and indirect participation reveals that company leaders value direct 
participation higher than indirect one; in this sense the analysed leaders did not differ from their 
colleagues from, for example, the United Kingdom (Beaumont, Hunter 2003). The advantages named 
in this context were the positive effect from communicating directly with the employees and 
guaranteed spreading of correct and accurate information (see Table 4.6). The main disadvantages of 
indirect participation for the managers were insufficient trustworthiness of indirect channels both in 
ensuring the spread of information and in standing up for the interests of the company. Indirect 
participation is primarily perceived as participation through representatives elected by employees, 
whereas participation through the official hierarchy was not perceived as participation at all. 
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Table 4.6. Advantages and disadvantages of direct and indirect employee participation (based 
on interviews) 
Advantages Disadvantages 
D
ire
ct
Pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n
Manager: 
Direct, immediate channel of information; 
correct and accurate information 
Employees' representative: 
Additional motivation for the employees; 
employees see management; 
In the case of specific work tasks, guarantees 
spreading of undistorted information  
 
Manager: 
Message must be clear and simple, as 
otherwise employees do not understand the 
content; 
Employees are not interested in wider 
managerial issues 
Employees' representative: 
Unrealistic in companies with a certain size;  
Does not allow management to do their job 
In
di
re
ct
Pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n
Manager: 
Protection of employees and solving their 
problems; an information filter for the 
employer; synthesised information 
Employees' representative: 
Possibility to cover wider workforce 
 
Manager: 
Distortion of information and wrong 
interpretations;  
Employees’ loss of interest in company’s 
future, replaced by standing up for their own 
interests only 
Employees' representative: 
Some issues are not solved when a 
representative has no time for it; 
Employees’ alienation from the company 
Source: Interviews with managers and employees' representatives, compiled by the authors 
According to employees' representatives, indirect participation of employees could be positive for the 
company, as it enables to include wider workforce in the decision-making process – as this is not 
possible with direct participation. In addition, indirect participation allows managers to concentrate on 
their work and reduces the time and effort put into communicating with employees. A logical 
prerequisite for this participation is that the manager believes the representative to be a true delegate 
of employees and to be competent, and that the representative’s interests can be trusted 
In conclusion we can say that, in general, the analysed companies consider employee participation 
important. Consultation is not considered as important as information, but it is found useful in certain 
issues. Co-determination is almost non-existent and neither managers nor employees' representatives 
considered it important. Strategic decisions are clearly set apart with no necessity for employee 
participation.  
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4.4. Employee Representation  
4.4.1. Presence and Creation of Trade Unions 
In the case of indirect participation there has to be a mediator between the company’s management 
and its employees. The traditional form of employee representation is trade union. Trade union is a 
body established through employees’ initiative, which collectively protects employees’ interests in their 
communication with the employer. Ideally, its activities as a company-level organisation could also 
include the exchange of information between workforce and management. For example, Swedish 
trade unions already have this role and in many CEE countries the information and consultation 
process is regulated by legislation in the way that if there is no trade union, a works council needs to 
be established for this purpose (e.g. Czech Republic and Lithuania, even though in the latter it is not 
common in practice). In Estonia, such a mediator can also be a representative elected by the general 
meeting of employees without the trade union institution (see Sections 2.1 and 3.2.1). 
Employee representation in the companies involved in the present study was as follows (see also 
Table 4.7): in two companies there was both a trade union and a non-unionised representative; in four 
companies there was only a trade union; in the last two companies there was no elected employees' 
representative (excl. working environment representatives). All the companies had working 
environment representatives and a working environment council. 
The companies that existed prior to Estonia regaining its independence, the trade unions were 
inherited from previous times. There were three of such companies. In two companies, trade unions 
were acquired with a takeover or reorganisation of another company. One company had a trade union 
created at the beginning of 1990s when employees experienced problems with management. The 
companies that did not have a union were relatively new companies, i.e. established after the 
independence from 1990s onwards. The leaders of two companies with no union stated that there was 
none because there had been no major problems or disagreements between the employees and 
management. Whether the trade union was there from the old days or it was acquired through another 
company, it did not determine the membership of unions in the eight analysed cases (see Table 4.7). 
According to the interviews, union membership numbers in the companies were going down. 
In the cases where there was a trade union, the union representative would in practice deal with the 
problems of all employees, regardless of whether they were union members or not. The main reason 
for leaving the union according to employee representatives was membership fee. As, in reality, the 
trade union protected all employees and collective agreements covered everybody, there was no 
reason to pay the membership fee.  
In the companies where unions existed the employees were generally aware of its existence. Only in 
one company less than half of the employees knew of its existence; most probably it was due to the 
management’s negative attitudes towards union activities. This opinion was expressed by both the 
union and non-union representatives, and admitted by the manager himself. In addition, in the latter 
company, as well as in another company with a small union (Cases 1 and 2), there was non-unionised 
representative created through management initiative. 
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Table 4.7. Characteristic indicators of trade unions (TU) 
Company 
Motives for 
creating trade-
union in the 
company 
Membership 
(according 
to 
interviews) 
Represented 
by TU 
(according to 
interviews) 
Share of 
employees 
aware of TU 
existence 
Share of 
employees 
satisfied with 
TU work* 
Existence 
of 
collective 
agreement 
1 (TU +non-
TU rep) 
Acquired through 
takeover of 
another company 
22% All employees 76% 47% Yes 
2 (TU +non-
TU rep) 
Two versions: 
created to protect 
employees’ rights; 
initiated by central 
organisation 
11% All employees 43% 62% Yes 
3 (TU) Acquired through 
takeover of 
another company 
50% All employees 69% 65% No 
4 (TU) Remnant from the 
old times 15-25% 
All employees, 
excl. 
management 
80% 59% Yes 
5 (TU) Remnant from the 
old times 
Approx. 60% 
In general all 
employees, but 
certain 
guarantees only 
to TU members 
85% 76% Yes 
6 (TU) Remnant from the 
old times 
Slightly over 
60% All employees Over 80% 74% Yes 
7 None - - - - No 
8 None - - - - No 
* Completely satisfied or satisfied 
Source: Interviews, surveys, compiled by the authors 
There was a certain link between the share of trade union members and the level of satisfaction with 
the union’s work, i.e. the larger was the share of unionised employees in the company, the larger 
share of employees was satisfied with its work. On the one hand, it can be a sign that a larger trade 
union is better equipped in looking after the employees’ rights because of its representation in the 
eyes of management and possibly a larger budget. This brings about employees’ greater satisfaction 
with the trade union’s work. On the other hand, it is logical to assume that the more effective the trade 
union, the more people would like to join it, thus, we cannot make any definite claims about the 
causality. However, the given outcome is in line with the conclusion reached by Oxenbridge and 
Brown (2002): the efficiency of employee representation is proportionate to the number of employees 
represented. 
In companies where there was only a very small share of unionised employees (Cases 4 and 1), it 
was the managers who claimed that the number of union members was too small to make any real 
demands. According to one trade union representative, however, the union could still point out certain 
nuances and help with legal issues. In two companies, trade union representatives stated that the 
management tries to avoid communication with the trade union and does not want to know of it. This 
was indirectly confirmed by the views of the heads of these companies. The bad relations did not 
appear to be based on personal conflicts, even though the literature refers to the importance of 
personalities (Oxenbridge, Brown 2002). Problems had arisen more on institutional level and had been 
especially acute at the creation stage of the union, whereas, in certain cases, the relations improved 
during the cooperation. This suggests that attitude towards trade unions is negative and even 
prejudiced. The majority of leaders perceived trade unions less as cooperation partners and more as a 
source of problems and wanted to avoid their creation or gaining power. 
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The leaders of analysed companies with small trade unions believed that the trade union did not have 
much power in their company. In companies where trade unions were bigger and more active the 
leaders believed that unions brought along mostly problems and made unrealistic demands without 
understanding how the company works:  
„For the company, the trade union is only the source of strikes and requests for money.” 
One of the managers said that trade unions had this image because of the incompetence of its 
members – its members were usually unskilled workers with a relatively low level of education (if the 
person had more potential, he/she would have already become a leader). Another company leader 
said that union representation and formulation of its demands were not transparent enough for him. 
This was because the union worked behind closed doors and nothing was documented. At the same 
time, there were companies where trade unions had both formal and informal communication, and 
minutes were taken on all important meetings. One of the managers said that the leader of the trade 
union himself actively looked for problems that employees could be protected against in order to raise 
an issue with the management. 
When we look at how many employees had turned to trade unions (see Table 4.8), we can see that 
almost a third of non-unionised employees had contacted a union representative. This confirms what 
union representatives said about taking up the problems of all employees, regardless of their 
membership status. Table 4.8 also shows us that there were no major differences in the assessments 
given to the work of trade union representatives by union members and non-members, bearing in 
mind that managers too belong to the latter group. Cases 3 and 5 are especially telling, as non-
unionised employees are just as satisfied or even more satisfied with the work of trade union 
representatives than the members themselves. 
Table 4.8. Share of employees who had turned to trade union (TU) representatives (Question 
Q15 in the questionnaire) and satisfaction with the work of the union representative (Q14 in the 
questionnaire) among union members and non-members 
Company Share of employees who had turned to TU representative  
Share of employees satisfied 
with the work of TU 
representative* 
Members Non-members Members 
Non-
members 
6 (TU) 51% 40% 86% 60% 
4 (TU) 69% 34% 81% 51% 
1 (TU+non-TU rep) 78% 33% 78% 45% 
3 (TU) 59% 29% 65% 69% 
5 (TU) 69% 40% 77% 76% 
2 (TU+non-TU rep) 100%** 46% 100%** 57% 
* Completely satisfied or satisfied 
** Only two TU members responded 
Source: Employees’ survey, compiled by the authors 
The heads of the two companies with no trade union felt strongly negatively about the possible 
creation of a trade union. Even in the company (Case 8) where the leader, in comparison with other 
leaders, was much in favour of employee participation and where much more attention was paid to 
employees’ information and consultation as compared to other companies, the leader’s attitude 
towards the institution of trade union was relatively negative. He reasoned that the trade union and its 
representative cause tensions with their activities and create problems that do not exist in reality. The 
following leader’s statement describes well the views of the leaders of the two companies without a 
trade union: 
„If management fulfils certain conditions, there is no function for a trade union.” 
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One of the leaders claimed that it is certainly necessary to have trade union activity at state level, as it 
can be a negotiation partner and represent workers’ interests for the Government of the Republic, but 
at enterprise level it can only cause problems. 
The main activity for the trade unions in the eyes of the managers was conclusion of collective 
agreements. At the same time, the managers of three companies out of the five with collective 
agreements found that everything stipulated in the collective agreement would have been in the 
company even without a trade union. Thus, trade unions have no substantial role in the eyes of 
managers. The employees in all the companies, regardless of their membership status, found that the 
main role of the trade union at the time was to exchange information between employees and 
management and after that collective bargaining (in some cases the order was reversed, e.g. Case 5). 
Both the union and non-union representatives claimed that the role of trade unions was joint protection 
of employees’ interests, solving work situations, monitoring observance of law and legal advice. The 
non-unionised representative of one company said that the advantages of trade union were their 
membership in the confederation and legal help. Many managers, at the same time, stated that the 
role of confederation at enterprise level was very negative. One of the managers, for example, 
described a situation where a worker who had been caught stealing several times was not only 
protected by the company’s trade union but, according to the manager, also by the union’s higher 
organisations (branch union and confederation); both stating that dismissal as a punishment would be 
too severe. In the court, the employer won and based on the above incident he described the actions 
of higher organisations as follows:  
„Trade union is not a just protector of employees. If an employee does not obey order or violates a 
law, then trade union must not protect him/her. If that thief had continued working, it would have sent a 
wrong signal to the rest of the staff. Steal! The trade union will protect you.” 
In addition, one of the managers feared that if a trade union was created in a company as a result of 
branch union activities, then it would be a very complicated and problematic situation, as it would feel 
as if an intruder is confronting employees with the employer. He did not mind, however, if employees 
themselves organised one. Another manager found that their trade union leader communicated and 
worked more with branch union and confederation than dealt with company’s issues. This was why he 
believed that the problems that arose were induced rather than actual problems of his company. Yet 
another manager believed that in his company the trade union was created because ‘somebody made 
a phone call’ and this was partly why the union representative was not a true representative of the 
employees in his eyes. 
A similar phenomenon has been observed in British companies (Bonner, Gollan 2005, Oxenbridge, 
Brown 2002). British managers also believed that intervention of a third party in company’s decision-
making process had a negative effect on employees, as well as on the company as a whole. At the 
same time, there were managers who actually preferred communicating with branch union 
representatives, as external people were less demanding and had a ‘big picture’ (Oxenbridge, Brown 
2002). In Estonian context, the managers as a rule, based on the case study results, saw branch 
unions and the confederation as an obstruction to effective operation of the company. It must be 
acknowledged that such circumstances do not favour social dialogue and branch unions and the 
confederation themselves should be interested in the change. 
There was one manager who stood out with his positive attitude towards the trade union and its 
necessity. This particular head of the company came from outside Estonia, from a country where the 
tradition of social dialogue was much stronger and trade unions were more powerful. According to this 
manager’s opinion, Estonian people, as well as trade unions, were extremely rational and made 
sensible demands. As a potential danger, he mentioned that trade unions could become too powerful 
and therefore start interfering with the operation of the company and economy, as is the case in his 
homeland. He believed that employees had the right to stand up for their interests. If union 
representative’s demands for the rights of the employees were rational and did not inhibit the 
development of the company, the trade union as a discussion partner would be necessary. Thus, we 
can see that the Estonian managers who participated in the study believed that trade unions only 
made demands and did not care of the well-being of the company, whereas the non-Estonian 
manager found that Estonian trade unions (at least in his own company) protected employees’ rights 
optimally. However, on the basis of the eight analysed companies we cannot say that the managers’ 
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views on employee participation differ clearly in foreign-owned companies and Estonian companies. 
According to the managers, it was mainly the employees who did not get on with their manager, who 
used trade union representation for solving their problems. Official hierarchy was generally used as 
the main channel for solving employees’ problems (see also Section 4.5.3). It was also used for 
building up companies’ information and consultation systems. This was confirmed by employees’ 
survey where it appeared that the main channel for two-directional information was management 
structure, i.e. official hierarchy of subordination relationships. However, it is also necessary to note 
here that employees' representatives were an important channel for those who, for some reason, did 
not want to communicate with managers directly. This happened obviously in case of a 
misunderstanding with the direct manager, and in these situations employees' representatives were 
useful.  
 
4.4.2. Presence and Creation of Non-Unionised Representatives 
The institution of non-unionised representatives was present in two of the studied companies. In both 
cases they existed parallel to the trade union. In one company, the non-unionised representative was 
created in order to include wider workforce than just members of the union in discussions over the 
conditions of the collective agreement. In the other company the representative was created because 
the law required the election of a working environment representative, as well as the wish to extend 
the coverage of the collective agreement. The election of both these non-unionised representatives 
was the initiative of respective managements. In both of the companies, the union membership was 
relatively small (11% and 22%, respectively). It is not exceptional that non-unionised representation is 
suggested by management. The motive of these managers, however, was not to avoid the creation of 
a trade union, since they were already present. They did it more to the effect of balancing the activity 
of the trade union with an alternative representation structure and extending the agreements reached 
with the trade union over the whole workforce with a wish to treat all employees equally. Neither the 
employees nor managers brought out major differences in the roles of non-unionised and unionised 
representatives. Neither were there major differences in the ways management communicated with 
both representatives.  
It was, however, likely that the existence of the institution of non-unionised representatives was going 
to inhibit the future enlargement of the trade union. In the companies with a significantly larger union 
membership and, thus, more powerful union, nobody had even thought of creating a non-unionised 
representative (Cases 5 and 6). A manager who had a trade union and a non-unionised representative 
in his company said the following:  
„I believe that a trade union is strong only when all the employees participate in it.” 
As this was not the case in that company and there was a will to conclude a collective agreement, a 
representative had to be elected for unrepresented employees. 
Even though non-unionised representatives were elected on the initiative of management, the 
managers did not view them considerably differently than union representatives, i.e. representatives 
were seen as inevitability rather than a resource in the company’s development. The roles and 
functions of unionised and non-unionised representatives do not differ either. Even though the 
candidates for non-unionised representation were appointed by employees themselves, in the studied 
companies they tended to be lower level managers. This puts the non-unionised representatives in a 
position where they are officially obliged to pass information and opinions between employees and 
management and, simultaneously, they have the same responsibility as a representative. In some 
cases it can lead to a role conflict, for example, in salary negotiations or when employees’ problems 
are related to manager’s tasks. The complexity of these situations has been studied by, for example, 
Butler (2005, p. 282), who quotes a personnel director as follows: being an employee rep is an 
absolutely no win situation. You get beaten up by the management; you get beaten up by the workers.  
In both companies, the employees were slightly more satisfied with the work of the non-unionised 
representative than the work of the trade union (see Table 4.9). This, however, can be due to the fact 
that more was expected from a union representative than a non-unionised one, for example, the role 
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of an ideal non-unionised representative did not involve employees’ problem-solving to the same 
extent as that of an ideal union representative. In the case of one company it was also clear that 
significantly fewer employees had turned to the non-unionised representative than to the union one. 
Middle managers viewed non-unionised representatives with more sympathy than they did trade 
unions, but it is also worth emphasising here that non-unionised representatives where often 
managers of subdivisions or services. According to one non-unionised representative, limited contact 
with the represented and lack of time for fulfilling representation tasks were the main problems he had 
to face. 
Table 4.9. Awareness of and satisfaction with non-unionised (non-TU) representatives and 
trade unions (TU) representatives, given that both forms were present in the company 
Satisfied with the work of 
non-TU rep (Q19) 
Satisfied with the work of 
TU rep (Q14) 
Company
Aware of 
existence 
of non-TU 
rep 
(Q9) 
Employees
Top or 
middle 
managers 
Aware of 
existence 
of TU 
(Q9) Employees 
Top or 
middle 
managers 
1 57% 80% 83% 76% 58% 0% 
2 52% 63% 33% 43% 62% No response 
Source: Employee’s survey, compiled by the authors 
On the basis of the two analysed cases we can formulate a hypothesis that the institution of non-
unionised representatives may be created in companies where the trade union is weak or has little 
coverage. It is created through the employer’s initiative and the main motive for creation is to extend 
the coverage of a collective agreement. The roles of non-unionised and unionised representatives are 
not considered significantly different and both of them have little influence in companies. The same 
criticism expressed towards the inefficiency of works councils (see Section 1.2.3) can be greatly 
transferred to the non-unionised representatives of the two analysed companies. It is positive that 
management did not seem to interfere with the election of non-unionised representatives (even though 
they have initiated the elections), but the representatives’ rights (or their assertion) do not play a 
significant role in the company’s participation process. The situation was well characterised by one 
manager: 
„I don’t think they are necessary at all. Why would a small company actually need representatives? 
They don’t have any influence or decision power. Nothing whatsoever. Nonsensical body, we worked 
before and work after, nothing has changed. These representatives, they are weak too – they don’t 
know how to do their work. Somebody would have to train them, but I don’t know what institution could 
do that.”  
4.4.3. Other Forms of Employee Representation 
In many cases official superiors were referred to as employees' representatives in companies where 
there was no employee representation. It was believed, in principle, that the direct manager of 
employees must be able to represent his/her workers’ concerns in higher management. This could 
classify them as representatives. At the same time, this approach is not properly correct, as the 
employee cannot really choose his/her superior and the latter is, thus, not a representative elected by 
employees, which is the precondition of indirect participation. However, a good superior can indeed 
solve employees’ problems and in all the studied companies it was the official hierarchy that worked 
as the main channel of two-directional information: from employees to management and vice versa 
(see Section 4.5). 
On the background of managers’ relatively negative attitudes towards trade unions and non-unionised 
representatives, it was a surprise to see their more positive attitudes towards works councils. There 
were works councils in each company.  
The duties of working environment representatives and working environment councils are determined 
by law and other legal acts. In addition to issues stipulated by law, the working environment council 
often discusses wider issues related to working conditions. As the working environment council could 
not make great demands or prepare strikes (e.g. in one company these representatives were mainly 
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management representatives) and instead, it helps to keep company’s activities in compliance with 
law and can directly find out employees’ opinions on specific issues, the working environment council 
was not seen as a threat. Except for one manager who believed that the working environment council 
does not have a substantial role, all other managers found that the working environment council was 
an efficient body. 
Similarly to international experience, the same people who are active in trade unions are, as a rule, 
also elected as working environment representatives. This is based on a simple fact that active 
employees express themselves in various areas. 
4.5. Participation Process: Intensity, Areas and Channels 
4.5.1. Participation Intensity 
Six out of eight leaders believed that their company had sufficient employee participation. Two of them 
believed that there are considerable shortcomings in participation and that more attention should be 
paid to it. The assessments of employees' representatives varied: some believed that participation 
was sufficient and some that there were shortcomings even at the level of basic employees’ 
information (see Table 4.10). 
On the basis of the eight studied companies, we can say that there is no clear relation between the 
existence of an employees' representative and employees’ opportunities to be involved and informed. 
The biggest number of employees who were informed about company’s activities and work 
organisation was in one of the companies with both the trade union and the non-unionised 
representative (Case 1), and in one of the companies without any employees' representative (Case 8). 
At the same time, the smallest number of informed employees was found, in turn, in the other 
company without an employees' representative. 
In companies where at least two-thirds of employees found that they were well or very well informed 
the employees' representatives also believed that employee participation is at a sufficient level. It was 
more likely that the heads of these companies would state that not enough work was done on the 
issue of employees’ information and consultation. In companies where employee participation was 
smaller the managers believed that the system was sufficient, whereas the employees' 
representatives, at the same time, mentioned shortcomings. In two companies where participation was 
smaller the managers did not consider it important generally (for reasons, see Section 4.3). 
The results from the eight companies point to the fact that better general information means better 
opportunities for being involved in organising one’s work. At the same time, opportunities to be 
involved in organisation of company’s economic activity were small in every one of these companies. 
As a result of comparing managers’ interviews and employees’ survey, we can claim that the main 
factor that determined the participation culture in the eight analysed companies was the manager’s 
attitude towards it. If the manager considers employees’ information and consultation important, 
regardless of their general reasons (improving performance, creating loyalty or motivation, etc.), 
attention is paid to it. If the leader does not consider employees’ information and consultation 
important, participation is small. Oxenbridge and Brown (2002) also conclude that ultimately it is up to 
management whether the voice of employees reaches management or not.  
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Table 4.10. Assessments on the sufficiency of employee participation in the company (listed 
according to the share of employees informed of company’s activities and work organisation)  
Share of employees who rated the following 
very high or high: 
Company 
Manager’s 
assessment 
on 
participation 
Employees' 
representative’
s
assessment on 
participation 
being 
informed 
about 
company’s 
activities and 
work 
organisation 
opportunities 
for 
involvement 
in work 
organisation 
involvement 
opportunities 
in organising 
company’s 
economic 
activities 
7 Sufficient, but not important  - 38.2% 14.7% 0.0% 
6 (TU) Sufficient Not sufficient 47.9% 28.2% 2.8% 
3 (TU) Sufficient Not sufficient 60.4% 31.2% 8.3% 
2
(TU+non-
TU rep)  
Sufficient, 
relatively 
important 
Shortcomings in 
information  73.8% 40.5% 4.8% 
4 (TU) 
Not sufficient, 
relatively 
important 
Sufficient 75.0% 37.5% 15.0% 
5 (TU) Sufficient and very important Sufficient 86.9% 65.2% 15.2% 
8
Not sufficient, 
but very 
important 
 - 92.2% 66.7% 4.0% 
1
(TU+non-
TU rep) 
Sufficient and 
very important Sufficient 92.6% 55.6% 11.1% 
Source: Interviews, surveys, compiled by the authors 
In the four companies where participation was more intensive, there was a larger share of employees 
who had made proposals for improving work organisation. There was also a larger share of those 
whose suggestions were taken into account or who had at least received an explanation as to why it 
was not possible (see Table 4.11).  
Table 4.11. Proposals made by employees and assessment of management’s feedback (presented in 
the same order as Table 4.10) (% of respondents) 
Company Share of 
employees who 
had made 
proposals (from 
respondents) 
(Q33) 
Proposals 
were taken 
into account 
or explained if 
not (Q34) 
Proposals were 
not taken into 
account nor 
explained  
(Q34) 
Share of those 
who did not 
respond or who 
chose ‘have not 
made proposals’ 
(Q34) 
7 50 46 3 51 
6 (TU) 62 44 14 42 
3 (TU) 65 46 15 39 
2 (TU+non-TU rep)  60 50 10 40 
4 (TU) 84 76 5 19 
5 (TU) 83 74 7 19 
8 67 57 4 39 
1 (TU+non-TU rep) 80 69 6 25 
Source: Employees’ survey, compiled by the authors 
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Thus it can be said that assessments of consultation opportunities reflect the actual activeness of 
making suggestions. One of the companies stood out (Case 7), as only half of the respondents had 
made suggestions for improving work organisation, which was considerably less than in other 
companies. The head of the mentioned company had a strong view that employees had not much to 
say about the organisation of their working life. In companies where employees were more involved in 
general the employees themselves had a bigger wish to improve work organisation. It is, naturally, 
difficult to analyse the cause and effect relationship here. In addition, we must bear in mind that the 
analysed companies were not that similar and the nature of production sets its own certain limits on 
participation. 
The reasons why employees should be involved in company’s activities were discussed mainly in 
Section 4.3: both the managers and employees mentioned employees’ commitment and motivation as 
the advantages of participation. This confirms the theory that participation increases satisfaction, as 
we covered in Chapter 1. Indeed, the share of satisfied employees varies significantly from company 
to company (see Figure 4.4). 
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Figure 4.4. Share of satisfied employees as an average in all work aspects and in aspects 
related only to pay16 (work remuneration and rewards) 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the employees’ survey 
The three cases with the biggest share of employees satisfied with different work aspects were the 
same that had most opportunities for employees’ information and consultation (see also Table 4.10). 
The smallest satisfaction was expressed in the companies where the smallest share of employees 
claimed to have sufficient information and consultation, and where managers themselves had doubted 
whether employee participation was at all necessary.  
However, we cannot claim that the greater satisfaction of employees in the companies with more 
employee participation is strictly due to participation. For example, the companies led by managers 
interested in participation may also apply different remuneration and recruitment principles. Thus, the 
direct link between participation and satisfaction is not clear. 
In summary, one of the employees' representatives said that asking for employees’ opinion is 
important for the following reason:  
 
16 As employees were asked to rate their satisfaction on several aspects, we have here presented the average 
satisfaction over all the aspects (question Q48).  
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„It is definitely useful to ask for employees’ opinions on day-to-day work, as the employees who are in 
direct contact with clients know how to improve work organisation.” 
In the context of strategic issues, the managers said that only informing takes place and there was no 
need to increase participation. Only one manager (Case 1) emphasised the importance of ‘convincing’ 
employees' representatives in the case of strategic decisions. According to the majority of managers, 
consultation took place in other issues, such as tactical, operational, i.e. at subdivision level, and 
welfare; two heads of companies believed that they also applied co-determination (see Figure 4.5).  
Strategic
Tactical
Operational
Welfare
Information Consultation Co-determination 
12
3
4
5
6
78
1
3
47 8
5
6
2
1
83
6
2
5
4
7
1
82
6
4
753 Employee                           
Influence 
Importance of 
Decisions 
 
Figure 4.5. Managers’ assessment of the intensity of employee participation in their company 
(figure presents case numbers with the extent of employees´ influence in each category of decisions) 
Source: Interviews, compiled by the authors 
On the above figure, the companies are placed, at large, according to the theory (see also Figure 1.1): 
the greater the importance of the decision for the company the less can employees influence it. Thus, 
companies that have employees' representatives do not probably have more intensive participation 
because of the latter, but more likely because their participation process is more formalised and 
clearer. We can say that the existence of an employees' representative does not reflect whether and 
to what extent the manager gives importance to participation and how can employees get involved in 
the company in reality. Bonner and Gollan (2005) have come to the same conclusion in a slightly 
different context. They claim that employees’ influence depends more on how employees and 
management communicate and less on whether there is a trade union present in the company. 
As a final note on participation intensity, managers assessed participation intensity in an average 
Estonian company similarly to their own company. 
4.5.2. Participation by Areas 
A logical pattern emerges from the above information: participation is more intensive at the level of 
operational decisions and less, if any, at the level of strategic decisions. A similar pattern can be 
observed in the responses of employees’ survey and employees' representatives’ interviews. To avoid 
the results from participation areas being too general, the interviews and the questionnaire contained 
specific managerial questions about decisions with different levels of significance (see Appendix 4, 
Q35). For example, in the case of strategic decisions we studied participation in issues related to 
company’s economic activities, bigger investments and purchasing new technology. 
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In all the companies the employees responded more actively about participation in the following 
decisions: 
• Changes in working hours, 
• Changes in work remuneration, 
• Holiday schedule, 
• Training plans 
Questions about other areas were frequently answered as ‘have not come across such decisions’ or 
were not answered altogether. This refers probably to the fact that it was difficult for the employees to 
differentiate between the decisions in such detail and to determine their own level of involvement. The 
same applied when employees had representative(s): it was unclear to the employees how much 
influence their representatives actually had on different decisions. 
When we look at Figures 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 we can see that according to employees they were most 
involved in the area of holiday schedules. As to remuneration and working hours, the employees rated 
their involvement opportunities significantly more modestly. On the one hand, the reason why 
employees believed to have small involvement in work remuneration decisions could be that the 
changes had probably been only upwards and the employees agreed to this employer’s decision by 
default. On the other hand, it can also reflect the general discontent with pay (see also Figure 4.4). It 
shows as well that in employees’ opinion the employees' representatives’ role as negotiators of pay 
rise in collective bargaining is relatively small.  
Figure 4.6. Employees’ assessment of their opportunity to have a say in holiday schedule decisions
(companies listed according to the extent of consultation) 
Source: Employees’ survey, compiled by the authors 
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not informed of the decision at all no response or have not come acrossFigure 4.7. Employees’ assessment of the opportunity to have a say in decisions on changing 
working hours (companies listed according to the extent of consultation)
Source: Employees’ survey, compiled by the authors Partnership in Enterprise 
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Figure 4.8. Employees’ assessment of their opportunity to have a say in decisions on changing 
work remuneration (companies listed according to the extent of consultation) 
Source: Employees’ survey, compiled by the authors 
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The order of companies varies on the above figures. If we consider that decisions on changing holiday 
schedules and working hours are greatly dependent on the nature of production, then it is once again 
interesting to observe that in the case of work remuneration changes the participation is greater in 
companies with different forms of representation present, including the lack of a representative. The 
same applied to least participation: there are companies with and without employee representation.  
In their responses to strategic issues, such as company’s economic activities and bigger investments, 
60% to 80% of employees in nearly all companies chose the option ‘have not come across’ or left it 
unanswered. Thus, we could not make any conclusions on the basis of employees’ questionnaires 
and had to limit it to interviews, where both managers and employees' representatives believed the 
participation to be minimal. Technology renewal, however, was one exceptional management issue, 
as even though the authors would classify it as a strategic decision, many managers considered it 
very important to consult employees in this beforehand. 
An interesting issue is how differently the parties perceive participation. One example of this could be 
collective redundancies in which case employers are by law required to consult employees' 
representatives. In one company where there had been extensive redundancies some time ago both 
the manager and employees felt that there was little employee participation involved. The opinion of 
the trade union representative, however, differed radically, as she believed that redundancy decision 
was made with the consent of the employees' representative (i.e. herself). 
4.5.3. Participation Channels  
All the analysed companies used the company’s official hierarchy as the main participation channel for 
two-directional information. This meant that the employee’s direct superior was the main channel of 
information from management and somebody to turn to with problems. The importance of the official 
hierarchy as a channel of information and consultation in this study could stem from the size of the 
chosen companies: the companies were big enough to exclude direct participation, but too small to 
appreciate the role of an employees' representative. 
The second important channel for information from management to employees was a colleague or a 
meeting (see Figure 4.9 for the use of 3-4 most important channels in companies). This applied also to 
the companies with an employees' representative or a trade union. In two companies, the first three 
channels included also electronic dissemination of information, but oral channels dominated as a rule. 
Despite the belief of several managers that information through meetings and direct superiors is 
important for guaranteeing correct and accurate information, in the majority of the companies a 
significantly large share of information was spread by colleagues.  
Consultation channels (see Figure 4.10 for the use of 3-4 most important channels in companies) 
differ somewhat from information channels. As before, the main channel in all the companies was the 
direct superior. As the second and third channel, the companies used meetings and passing of 
opinions through colleagues; additionally, the role of an employees' representative was mentioned in 
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Figure 4.9. Employees’ assessment of the main channels of information on management 
decisions (3 to 4 most important channels presented) (% of respondents) 
Source: Employees’ survey, compiled by the authors 
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Figure 4.10. Employees’ assessment on the main channels (3 to 4 most important channels presented) 
that management uses for asking for opinions (% of respondents) 
Source: Employees’ survey, compiled by the authors 
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There was no significant difference in participation channels that employees used for passing their 
opinions to management and that management used for consultation or disseminating information 
(see Figure 4.11). The main clearly dominating channel in all these cases was the direct superior. In 
two companies, the representative was named as the second or third channel. 
In conclusion, all the analysed companies used relatively uniform choice of channels for information 
and consultation, and the role of employees' representatives as a participation channel was marginal. 
Despite the fact that in the role descriptions for trade unions and employees' representatives their 
main task was considered to be information exchange between management and employees and 
collective bargaining as the second task, then in reality trade unions and representatives play an 
extremely modest role in all the information exchange within the company. They do, however, have a 
certain niche, as expressed by several managers: 
„Trade unions have a role when an employee does not get on with his/her manager.” 
Trade union representative has the right given by law to access various pieces of information and the 
employer is required to consult them in discussions of certain issues. According to the interviews, 
besides their main role in collective bargaining management gives the representatives at meetings 
with them (if they take place) information on the company’s financial year indicators and general state 
of the company. However, consultation as such is scarce. 
Figure 4.11. Employees’ assessment of the main channels (3 most important channels presented) 
that they use for passing on their opinions (% of respondents) 
Source: Employees’ survey, compiled by the authors 
Important information about each company can also be gathered from the responses of these 
employees who believed that they had no opportunity to make suggestions or that they would not go 
to anybody with their problems (see Table 4.12). Cases 7, 3 and 2 had the largest share of employees 
who responded that management does not ask for their opinion or who did not answer at all. The 
representation situation in these companies was respectively: no representation; trade union; and both 
trade union and the non-unionised representative. Once again we can see that the presence of 
employee representation does not seem to be related at all to whether employees are actually 
consulted or not. At large, the companies on this Figure are listed the same as on Figure 4.10 where 
cases were listed by employees’ assessment of how informed they were and what were their 
involvement opportunities. Thus, it appears that the main determinant to whether opinion is asked is 
the manager’s view on the necessity of participation. 
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Table 4.12. Share of employees who cannot give their opinion or who did not respond to which 
channel is used most frequently (% of respondents) 
Company Management asking for opinions 
(Q37) 
Employees giving their opinions 
(Q38) 
Opinion not 
asked 
No response Cannot give 
opinion 
No response 
8 6% 4% 2% 2% 
1 (TU+non-TU rep) 4% 7% 4% 5% 
4 (TU) 10% 2% 10% 2% 
5 (TU) 7% 15% 7% 11% 
6 (TU) 11% 13% 8% 13% 
2 (TU+non-TU rep) 14% 17% 7% 10% 
3 (TU) 15% 17% 12% 15% 
7 35% 1% 26% 1% 
Source: Employees’ survey, compiled by the authors 
The above table shows that in the analysed companies it was more likely that the employees could 
pass their opinion to management if it was their own initiative. It was less often that management 
turned to employees for opinions on specific issues. This relates well to what one of the managers 
said as to why he thinks employee participation is sufficient in his company:  
„…I always listen [to employees’ opinions and suggestions], if there are any.” 
4.5.4. Documents Related to Participation and the Role of a Collective 
Agreement 
As part of participation documents the interviews and the questionnaire asked about collective 
agreements and internal procedure rules. In addition, several interviewees mentioned quality manuals 
and job descriptions as documents that relate directly to the requirement of information and 
consultation relevant to each post. 
Five out of six companies with a trade union had a collective agreement (see Table 4.7). Two 
companies had elected permanent non-unionised representatives specifically for collective bargaining. 
The collective agreement in these companies was signed by both the trade union representative and 
the non-unionised representative. In one of the companies, there was a temporary body elected for 
the term of collective bargaining. This body represented all the employees despite their union 
membership and it was up to this body to decide whether the union should sign the collective 
agreement. The collective agreement with the employer was only signed by the union representative 
though. 
In two cases, the initiative for collective agreement came from management and in both cases the 
companies had a trade union, as well as a non-unionised representative17. This indicates that if the 
employer decides to be an initiator, then it is in his/her interest to have a partner who represents all the 
company’s employees. In other cases, the initiative came from employees. In many companies the 
collective agreement stated that it covered only the members of the trade union. Regardless of who 
initiated the collective agreement or how the agreement was worded in terms of coverage, in reality, it 
covered all employees. 
In cases where the agreement was initiated by employees, all managers, except for one, claimed that 
the collective agreement provisions were a formality and that all these conditions would have existed 
also without the document. One head of the company believed that his company followed all the 
 
17 However, according to the non-unionised representative of one of the companies, the employer’s initiative was   
due to being pressured by the trade union  
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conditions commonly included in a collective agreement (e.g. death and marriage grants18, bonus 
system), even though there was no collective agreement signed. There were, however, managers who 
believed that the company and management benefited from the collective agreement. Some of the 
mentioned advantages were that both management and employees can rely on the explicit rules of the 
agreement and it was no longer necessary to decide on the amount of a single death or marriage 
grant (see also Box 4.2). As a clear value for all the parties, the collective agreement provided 
employees with the security of knowing established rules and guarantees. 
Having a collective agreement as a guarantee against strikes was seen differently by managers. 
When the heads of companies with larger union membership believed that the collective agreement 
was important for keeping the obligation to refrain from striking, the manager with a smaller union 
membership believed the membership to be too small for making real demands. One manager also 
believed that it was unnecessary to have a collective agreement for the purpose of avoiding strikes as 
these should be avoided with conventional management work:  
“If we let things go as far as strikes, then we have simply failed to notice something very serious or not 
done our duty.” 
In many companies the collective agreement was the main document to provide the details or the 
principle of information between management and employees’ representative. The content and level 
of details regarding information and consultation differed greatly from agreement to agreement. For 
example, more comprehensive agreements stated specific issues that require information, 
consultation and co-determination. The issues varied, but covered the following aspects in different 
collective agreements: 
Information: 
• Termination of employment contract; 
• Working conditions that concern a larger share of employees; 
• Issues related to training and qualifications; 
• Occupational health and safety, causes of industrial accidents, measures taken; 
• Composition of management and subdivision managers; 
• Main indicators of financial year; 
• Development plans and investment plans, after they have been approved; 
• Company reorganisation 
Consultation: 
• Issues related to employee representation; 
• Social problems, employees’ interests and rights at subdivision level; 
• Internal procedure rules; 
• Wage conditions; 
• Organisation of safe and healthy working conditions; 
• Holiday schedules; 
• Collective redundancies, issues related to employees; 
• Occupational training programmes 
Co-determination: 
• Termination of representative’s employment contract during his/her authority or a year after 
that 
 
18 These were not determined by any document, but resembled more of an established custom.  
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Additionally, one of the agreements determined the time schedule for information and consultation and 
the employer’s obligation to give feedback. The agreement required the representative to keep 
production and business secrets. 
There were also collective agreements without any mention of information and consultation or that 
stated in a very few words that the employer’s responsibility was to give necessary information. If the 
trade union alone signs the collective agreement on behalf of employees, the law provides with 
relative detail how and in which issues company’s management has to inform and consult with 
employees. If, however, the partner is a non-unionised representative, the law is significantly more 
laconic, which means that the provisions of the agreement should be made more explicit. The analysis 
of agreements shows indeed that the two companies which had trade unions, as well as non-
unionised representatives had determined the issues of information and consultation relatively more 
precisely.  
Box 4.2.
Advantages and Disadvantages of Collective Agreements
ADVANTAGES OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 
Managers (Interviews) 
• Obligation to refrain from striking; 
• Clear rules that restrict manager’s decisions at the whim, e.g. in deciding grants; 
• Makes it easier and simpler for the employer to introduce new workers to the working life; 
• Branch level collective agreement: clear game rules for all the companies active in the branch 
Employees' Representatives (Interviews) 
• Obligation to refrain from striking – helps management to better fulfil their goals; 
• Security for employees that the agreement will last for a certain period; 
• Company’s image as a company who cares for its employees grows; 
• Rewards to employees 
DISADVANTAGES OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 
Managers (Interviews) 
• Formal paper to avoid strikes. Everything stipulated in the agreement would exist also without 
the document; 
• Loss of competitive strength if only one company in the branch concludes an agreement that 
favours employees 
The employees are, in general, aware of the existence of the collective agreement, as well as the 
internal procedure rules (see Table 4.13).  
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Table 4.13. Documents that provide for information and consultation (IC) and awareness of 
them 
Collective Agreements Internal Procedure Rules 
Stipulates IC 
procedure (Q24) 
Company 
% of 
employees 
aware of 
existence 
(Q21) 
% of 
employees, 
who know the 
content well or 
to some extent 
(Q22) 
% of 
employees 
who thought 
so 
In reality 
% of 
employees 
aware of 
existence 
(Q25) 
% of 
employees, 
who know 
the content 
well or to 
some extent 
(Q26) 
Stipulates 
IC 
procedure 
(% of 
employees) 
(Q27) 
1 (TU+non-
TU rep) 96 92 75 Yes 100 98 83 
2 (TU+non-
TU rep) 81 74 38 Yes 98 98 56 
3 (TU) 
48  
(Concluded 
long time 
ago*) 
70 35 Not known 90 95 53 
4 (TU) 94 91 43 Laconic 100 99 55 
5 (TU) 100 96 61 Yes 100 100 72 
6 (TU) 89 76 40 Yes 76 94 69 
7
51 (No 
agreement)  96 92 38 
8
4 (No 
agreement)  98 100 88 
* Company acquired it through a takeover along with the trade union. There were no new agreements 
concluded, which meant that the conditions of the previous collective agreement were continually in 
force. 
Source: Employees’ survey, compiled by the authors 
Awareness of collective agreements was somewhat lower than that of internal procedure rules, but still 
relatively high. The majority of employees were aware of the collective agreement. The reason for high 
awareness of this document was, according to managers and employees' representatives, to do with 
the fact that it provided for monetary grants and bonuses. We can also see that employees’ 
awareness of information and consultation procedures in the collective agreement was significantly 
lower than that of in the internal procedure rules. 
An exceptional case here is Case 7, where the company did not have a trade union or any other 
representative elected by the employees. However, according to the head of the company there was a 
so-called unwritten collective agreement as the company applied all the same conditions as included 
in a collective agreement. Thus, 51% of employees believed that the collective agreement existed in 
their company. 
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Conclusions 
The aim of the current paper was to give the reader an overview of employee participation in other 
countries and to analyse participation processes in Estonia within different forms of employee 
representation. The analysis of other countries was based on previous research and the Estonian 
analysis was built on case studies conducted in eight companies in spring and summer of 2005. The 
case studies consisted of interviews with managers and employee representatives and a survey of 
randomly sampled employees. The purpose of case studies was to study companies in the context of 
their particular sector and history with a view to analyse their participation processes with employees 
being represented by trade unions and by non-unionised representatives. For the purpose of 
comparison two companies with no employee representation were studied. The case study method 
was preferred for its exploratory nature and because its outcomes are based on, or advance, theory 
and can later be checked against other methods. The outcomes of this study should not be 
generalised over Estonian companies as a whole.  
What matters is the intensity of employee participation, not the fact that it takes place 
When talking about employee participation we should make clear whether we mean by this 
employees’ information, consultation or co-determination. In some cases participation consists only of 
giving employees information about their work tasks, in other cases it means an opportunity to decide 
on the design of the new production line. These are clearly illustrating different scales of information 
and different scales of participation intensity, even though they are both still considered participation. 
Employee participation is more intense with higher level decisions (strategic versus operational) and 
when employees have more say in matters. Employees’ influence is considered bigger if management 
has an obligation to consult them before decision-making: to ask, for example, their opinion on wage 
system changes and what they would propose. In the case of intensive participation, management is 
required also to give feedback to employees’ proposals and the consulted issues must go as far as 
company’s economic activity and strategy. There is usually some kind of information system present in 
every company and it is common that employees are consulted on certain welfare and work 
organisation issues. The employees have, however, commonly less say in strategic issues and this 
fact was also confirmed by the practices of the companies included in this study. It was believed 
uniformly that in strategic issues the employees should be informed only after decisions are made. 
The only exception was decisions related to purchasing new technology: both the interviewed 
managers and employees' representatives believed that in these issues it was important to consult 
employees beforehand and trust their competence. 
Purposes of employee participation  
From the point of view of the whole society, the broadest purpose of employee participation is 
increasing social welfare. On the one hand it is achieved through the increased satisfaction of 
employees, as companies’ resources and power are re-distributed in their favour, on the other hand, 
companies’ should also experience improved performance as workers are more motivated and 
productive and their innovative ideas reach management. However, employees’ satisfaction does not 
always bring about better results for the company, and finding and maintaining an optimum level of 
participation that would also benefit the company is not always easy. 
It is these relationships between employees’ satisfaction and company’s economic indicators that 
have been studied most so far. Theoretical and empirical studies have found different employee 
participation relations between employees’ satisfaction and company’s productivity indicators. Most 
frequently, these studies have noted increased satisfaction and commitment among employees, which 
in turn have increased satisfaction with work and sometimes improved labour productivity. The 
relations between company’s performance and participation are not that clear: both positive and 
negative relations have been found, but often there has been no relationship at all. It is agreed in 
general that involvement of employees improves the quality of decisions, innovation and company’s 
stability, i.e. there is less fluctuation in staff numbers, and there are less (if any) strikes. The 
associations are even more complicated with company’s profitability because both positive and 
negative relationships have been found and results depend on several company-specific factors. 
The objective of the current paper was not to discover or measure directly any participation relations 
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with any indicators at employee level or company level, as case study methodology is not suitable for 
that. The indirect results of the case study, however, enable us to formulate a hypothesis that in 
companies where more attention is paid to participation and more active feedback is given to 
employees’ opinions, the employees are more satisfied with different aspects of working life and make 
more actively suggestions about work organisation. The questionnaires and interviews revealed that 
there are many positive effects attributed to employee participation: growing commitment of 
employees; better cooperation and trust between management and staff; improved quality of work 
processes and production; cut down on expenses; ensuring company’s stability, etc. Negative aspects 
were mostly brought out by managers: participation is time-consuming; employees’ interests differ 
from company’s interests; problems with how employees interpret information; employees’ lack of 
interest to contributing to company’s wider issues; and danger of information leak. Thus, the challenge 
of employee participation in broad terms is how to keep the negative effects of participation, which are 
to a certain extent inevitable, from stopping the positive effects from taking place.  
Employee participation and employees' representatives 
Employee participation can take place directly by involving each and every employee (direct 
participation) or through representatives (indirect participation). Direct participation is ideal at 
information and consultation level by providing a direct channel between all employees and 
management. This, however, is practical only in companies of certain size. The bigger the company, 
the more complicated it becomes to involve employees directly. Co-determination without the 
mediation of employee representation is possible only in very small companies. 
Europe has developed two main forms of employee representation: trade unions and works councils 
or consultative committees. Both forms have their advantages and disadvantages, but an effective 
employee representation is prevalently associated with clearly mandated representatives (incl. the 
number of people represented) and with frequent communication between representatives and 
management, which is not limited only to formal negotiations. In some countries it is common to elect 
employees' representatives to company boards (or supervisory body). It has been found that active 
work of employees' representatives brings about more direct participation practices as well, because 
employees' representatives as a rule work towards facilitating as wide opportunities for employees’ 
involvement as possible. 
Being a representative within employee participation is not without problems: he/she has to be 
competent in wider company-related issues and, for example, a skilful negotiator. Little training that 
representatives get may become an obstacle in finding representatives among workers as well as in 
getting recognition from the employer. If the employer has given the representative consultation rights 
only in trivial issues, then knowing this, the employees may not wish to be seriously involved in 
participation process (no candidates, poor turnout at elections, etc.), in which case participation fails. 
If, however, the representative has been given lots of rights, the employer might be tempted to 
manipulate elections in favour of a representative they expect to have smoother cooperation with. The 
work of such representatives is less effective because of their restricted autonomy and, in the worst 
case, they are alienated from their electorate; which means that once again participation fails to fulfil 
its purpose. The precondition of a successful indirect participation is that both partners wish to have a 
dialogue: employees' representatives and management need to recognise each other and see that 
cooperation is beneficial to both sides. This, however, could not happen without mutual trust and good 
will. 
In the companies analysed in the current study the number of employees varied from 150 to 450, but 
the existence of employees' representatives was not related to the size of the company. 
Representatives existed in some of the smallest as well as in some of the biggest companies and, the 
same way, they did not exist in a relatively small company and the biggest company studied. Trade 
unions were often in the companies as a remnant from before Estonia’s regained independence. 
Thus, we can formulate a hypothesis that in Estonia the existence of employees' representatives is not 
related to the fact that in companies of certain size direct participation is no longer possible, but that 
there are other reasons behind the creation of the institution. One of the conclusions from the case 
studies was that the existence of an employees' representative does not guarantee higher 
participation intensity in the company. Among the companies that had relatively intensive participation 
there were companies with and without employees' representatives and the same applied to 
companies with low participation intensity. This illustrates that mutual goodwill and wish to involve and 
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be involved is very important – employee participation is impossible without it, regardless of whether 
representatives exist or not.  
EU directives and regulations are increasingly intervening in the organisation of employee 
participation at state level 
Since the middle of the 1990s, the EU has issued several directives to regulate employee 
participation. One of them concerns the establishment of employees’ information and consultation in 
Community-scale undertakings and another one deals with the establishment of employees’ 
information and consultation framework in all companies with over 50 employees. The latter directive 
was issued in 2002. The directive provides that all Member States must establish procedures for 
employees’ information and consultation through employees’ representatives in issues relating to 
organisation of working life. Estonia has failed to adopt this directive by the prescribed deadline. 
Company practices of employee participation vary greatly by Member States, depending on such 
factors as the strength of trade unions, tradition of collective agreements and general cultural-historical 
context of industrial relations. In Germany, for example, employees have the right by law to be 
represented through works councils (which deal with company-level information and consultation), 
through participation in company boards (which focus on strategic matters) and, naturally, through 
trade unions (which in general conduct wage negotiations at sector level). In United Kingdom, in 
contrast, participation-related laws are minimal and each company determines their own participation 
procedures. The countries that joined the EU most recently are characterised by small coverage of 
trade unions and detailed labour laws.  
Participation intensity in Estonia is limited to consultation in operational matters 
As a rule, the employees at surveyed companies consider participation important both at employee 
and company level. The majority of managers in these companies also believe in employee 
participation. All the managers believe that information, and specifically information beforehand, is 
important. Strategic issues are the only context where managers do not consider information important 
and employees are informed retrospectively. The reasoning behind it is that strategic decisions require 
a lot of background information that employees do not have, and understanding of such decisions and 
their interpretations may cause confusion. The managers fear also that if information about strategic 
issues is given before all circumstances are clear, the possible changes may reduce employees’ trust 
in management. Employees’ assessment of their level of information about company’s activities and 
work organisation differed by companies. This corresponded well with what employees' 
representatives (if there were any) said about the sufficiency of participation in the company, and did 
not correspond so well with the assessments of managers. 
Consultation opportunities in work organisation were less frequent than information according to 
employees, but the companies still differed greatly. It is understandable because, even though 
managers believed that consultation was important in certain issues (operational matters and 
technology innovations), their views differed in details: some favoured frequent consultation in a 
number of issues, other did not. In strategic issues, only technology innovation topic was worth 
consultation with employees in the eyes of managers. In all other issues, as mentioned before, 
information was considered sufficient. Employees’ assessment of their opportunities to have a say in 
company’s economic activities illustrated well the views of managers, as it was considered modest in 
nearly all companies. The managers shared their view on co-determination: as a rule, it was 
considered unnecessary and impossible. Decision-making is seen as the right and responsibility of the 
leader. 
Employee participation is more intensive in companies where the manager believes that 
employee participation is necessary 
Employee participation is more intensive in some companies and less in others. On the basis of our 
eight companies we have not been able to find a relationship between the intensity and the existence 
of employee representation or different forms of representation. Neither could we bring out a clear link 
between the intensity and the nature of the company’s work or its size. Further more, no link could be 
established between employee participation and employees’ level of education. The only clear 
determinant to the intensity was the company’s manager’s view on the necessity of employee 
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participation. The more positively the manager viewed it, the more informed were the employees and 
the better they considered their opportunities to have a say in the organisation of working life. The 
companies where managers favoured participation had a larger share of employees who had made 
proposals to improve work organisation and the employees responded more frequently that their 
proposals were taken into account or at least it was explained if not. 
Employees' representatives’ role in employee participation and their effectiveness 
As provided by Estonian legislation, in all the studied companies the employees were represented by 
trade union or a non-unionised representative elected by the general meeting of employees. Both 
representations can, according to law, conclude collective agreements and organise strikes in case of 
collective labour disputes. Our study did not, unfortunately, include any companies where the 
employees were only represented by the representative elected at the general meeting and therefore, 
we can discuss the roles of different types of representatives only in so far as they co-exist in a 
company. In the two cases where there was a non-unionised representative, the institution had been 
initiated by management with an aim to have also wider workforce represented in negotiations over 
collective agreement conditions than just the trade union (trade union members were not in majority 
among employees in either of the companies). In all the studied companies the collective agreements 
covered equally all the employees regardless of who signed it on behalf of them or how it was worded 
in the agreement. It is in the interests of the employer to treat all employees equally and therefore it is 
common that the agreement covers all the employees the same way. 
Even though the elections for non-unionised representatives were initiated by management, the 
electors were still employees and there were no signs to indicate that management had tried to 
influence the outcome in favour of a suitable candidate for them. At the same time, in both companies 
some of the elected representatives were heads of a subdivision, which means that employees were 
happy to elect their immediate superiors presuming, probably, that they would have more influence in 
management. Such a double role may, however, cause conflicts in representing employees in 
relations with the employer and jeopardise the effect of participation for both sides. According to the 
employees, the role of the non-unionised representative is to mediate information and conduct 
collective bargaining, which is not that different from the role of the trade union. Employees expressed 
slightly more satisfaction with the work of the non-unionised representative than with the union one, 
but this could be due to smaller expectations for the former (e.g. solving of employees’ problems was 
attributed more to the trade union). The employees' representatives themselves – both unionised and 
non-unionised – did not see considerable differences in their functions within one company. They 
admitted that their roles overlap but, nevertheless, cooperated surprisingly little. In one company, the 
roles had been informally divided so that the trade union was more involved with legal matters (partly 
because of the support of the central organisation) but there was still no synergy from the co-existence 
of the two forms of representation in either of the companies. 
Thus, based on the case studies we cannot claim that an alternative body of representation helps the 
trade union to do its work better or that different forms of representation supplement each other. We 
may, however, put forward a hypothesis that the creation of a non-unionised representative is unlikely 
in a situation where the company has no trade union or when the union membership in the company is 
big enough and the representative works effectively. As the creation of the non-unionised 
representative is managers’ initiative, they would see no need for it in the above two cases. This could 
bring forth another hypothesis: in normal conditions the employees have no interest in creating a 
representational body and in the case of problems the creation of a trade union is a more likely 
solution.  
Managers view employees' representatives as a formality 
The current case study concluded that as a channel of information and consultation the role of trade 
unions as well as non-unionised representatives is insignificant. According to company heads, the 
main role of employees' representatives is collective bargaining. The employees’ survey, however, 
revealed that the two roles of representatives are the mediation of opinions and information between 
management and employees and then collective bargaining. This shows that even though employees' 
representatives are not as important as other communication channels, they still have their niche in it. 
This becomes clear, for example, when an employee has a problem that he/she does not dare or want 
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to take to management himself/herself. 
It is somewhat surprising that the managers have equally negative views about union representatives 
as well as non-unionised ones, albeit for different reasons. In the eyes of managers, the trade unions 
have a bad reputation because they do not represent significant portion of employees and their 
demands often do not consider the interests of the company. Another reason for the negative attitude 
is the understanding that a trade union is created only if there is a problem in the company or a conflict 
between the employer and employees. This, in turn, has several consequences. First, management 
tries to pre-empt problems in an attempt to avoid trade unions. Second, once the trade union is 
created, it is primarily seen as an obstructer to company’s activities and not as a dialogue partner, 
thus making cooperation tense. The fact that it does not always have to be like this and that 
cooperation can be constructive was illustrated by one company in the study, where both the lack of 
prejudice from the manager and the efficient work of the trade union itself (thought highly of by the 
manager as well as employees) played a role in it. Provision of training for trade union representatives 
and the development of social dialogue in Estonia in general will probably have the best results in 
changing the views of employers in the long run. 
Non-unionised representatives, in turn, do not have much power in the eyes of managers and they do 
not know how to do their job. Therefore we can say that neither of the representation forms is effective 
in involving employees. At the same time, the hypothesis that non-unionised representatives are less 
effective than trade unions was not proved either. It must be borne in mind here that the poor 
preparation of representatives is not the only reason why participation does not work well: the 
expectations that management has for them, as well as the rights they are given are at large limited to 
collective bargaining only. Thus, we might instead put forward a hypothesis that the less rights the 
employees' representatives are given in involvement in managerial issues, the less effective is 
participation in the eyes of all parties.  
The main communication channel is the company’s management structure 
On the basis of the current case study we can say that the main communication channel for two-
directional information between management and employees is the company’s official management 
structure. Information comes usually through the direct superior and he/she is also turned to with 
proposals and opinions. Previous studies of Estonian companies confirm this conclusion and it does 
not differ significantly from other EU Member States. If anything, the role of the direct superior is even 
more important in Estonia than in other countries and the role of employees' representatives is that 
much lesser. The current case study provides the basis for concluding that the role of an employees' 
representative as an every-day channel of information and consultation is negligible. Other most 
frequent channels after direct superior are meetings and work colleagues, followed by notice boards 
and electronic channel. If we consider that one of the main benefits of employees’ direct information 
for managers was dissemination of correct and accurate information and avoiding rumours, then it 
should be alarming that work colleagues are used as the channel of information. In terms of 
information, there is more unofficial communication in Estonia than in other CEE countries. 
Thus, we can conclude that employee participation is direct rather than indirect and oral rather than 
written. It is another matter altogether whether information and consultation through the direct superior 
equals the participation through the employees’ representative. Direct superiors cannot be considered 
as employees' representatives as employees have not elected them to perform this function and the 
direct superiors’ role as a manager sets its own limits to their role as employees' representatives.  
Possible directions for further research 
The chosen method imposes several limitations on the interpretations of the current study, as case 
study method does not allow credible generalisations over Estonian companies. Instead it enables us 
to formalise hypotheses and to assess the validity of theoretical views in the context of the studied 
cases. In order to verify the hypotheses, the study could be developed further to test the relations 
between participation at large and different performance consequences, or to look at separate details, 
such as, for example, the analysis of motives behind the creation of different forms of representation 
and their roles. 
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The conclusions about the intensity of participation in the companies are based only on assessments 
given by managers and employees' representatives, and indirectly also on employees’ survey. In order 
to study it further, it would be necessary to determine objective indicators that characterise 
participation intensity more precisely. Measuring instruments could be questionnaires and secondary 
data (procedures, recorded decisions, etc.), but why not also (participatory) observations. It would be 
interesting to relate employee participation intensity in Estonian companies to companies’ indicators 
(size, field, manager’s attitude, employees’ level of education), as well as to compare it to what is 
happening in other countries and use studies with bigger samples for this. 
Another suggestion is to study the relations between participation intensity and satisfaction and 
commitment of Estonian employees in order to see whether and to what extent theory and studies 
based on data from other countries correspond to Estonian working life. It is just as important to 
analyse whether company’s productivity is related to participation and if yes, then how. Namely, these 
two above assumptions about positive relations have formed the basis of participation-related 
legislation and it would be an important input for improving the local legislative framework if we knew 
whether these assumptions were valid in Estonia. 
The current study puts forward a hypothesis that a non-unionised representative is created through 
management initiative only in companies with small union membership. It would be interesting to study 
the wider motives behind the creation of employee representation bodies from the viewpoint of 
employers, as well as employees, and their influence on the choice of representation form.  
Our study did not look in detail at the functions of health and safety representatives in practice. A few 
interviews revealed, however, that the function of work environment councils could be more extensive 
than provided by law. As this is the only obligatory employee representation form in Estonia so far, 
then it is very possible that in the long run the functions of the working environment council will start to 
resemble employees’ information and consultation and council representatives will become 
employees' representatives also in wider issues.  
This study concluded that the first channel for employees’ information and consultation is their 
immediate superior. The representatives elected by employees were often also subdivision managers. 
Being simultaneously an employee’s representative and an immediate manager may cause tensions 
for the representative himself/herself, as well as for the participation process in the company as a 
whole. An analysis of whether and how these two roles should be integrated and what are the 
advantages and disadvantages of organising such representation would be grateful material for middle 
managers in their every-day work, as well as for employees who formulate the rules for internal 
elections of non-unionised representatives. 
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APPENDIX 1. Works-councils
Table A.1. Works councils in EU Member States
Country Name Legal basis Composition
Automatic
or
triggered
Threshold size
of companies
(No. of
employees)
Election procedure
Austria Betriebsrat Law Employeesonly Automatic 5 Workforce election
Belgium Onderenemingsraad/Conseil d’Enterprise Law
Joint
committee Automatic 100
Elections based on the candidates
appointed by trade unions, employer
candidates appointed by employer
Czech
Republic
Law (only if trade
unions are missing in
the company19)
Employees’
committee Triggered 25
Elections
Cyprus No works council typeof body
Denmark Samarbejdsudvalg Collective agreement Jointcommittee Triggered 35
Elected by workforce / appointed by
management
Estonia No works council typeof body
Finland
Statutory information
and consultation rights
for
employees/employees’
representatives, no
specific works council
type of body
France Comités d’Enterprise Law Jointcommittee Automatic
50 (10 to elect
workforce
delegates)
Elections based on the lists provided by
trade unions or non-unionised groups of
workers
Germany Betriebsrat Law Employeesonly Triggered 5
Employees election, excluding
management
19 Employees’ committees have less extensive rights and entitlements than trade unions.
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Country Name Legal basis Composition
Automatic
or
triggered
Threshold size
of companies
(No. of
employees)
Election procedure
Greece Symvo´uliaErgazménon Law
Employees
only Triggered
50 (20 where
no trade union)
Elected by General Assembly of the
company
Hungary Law Employeesonly
15 for single
employees’
representative,
50 for works
council
Ireland
No general, permanent
or statutory system of
information and
consultation
Italy
Rappresentanze
Sindicali Aziendali,
Rappresentanze
Sindicali Unitarie
Collective agreement Jointcommittee Triggered
Varies by
sector
2/3 of seats elected by workforce, 1/3
allocated by trade unions
Latvia No works council typeof body
Lithuania
Law (if there is no
union and the rights for
representation are not
transferred to sectoral
union20)
Employees
only Elections (secret) in the general meeting
Luxem-
bourg
a) Délégation du
Personnel, b) Comités
Mixtes d’Enterprise
Law
a) Employees
only; b) Joint
committee
Automatic a) 15; b) 150
a) Elections based on the list of trade
union candidates: b) Appointed by the
members of employee committee
Netherland
s Ondernemingsraden Law
Employees
only Automatic
50 (10 for
personnel
delegation)
Elected by the workforce (at least 18
month of service) from the list of
candidates proposed by trade unions
Norway
a)
Arbeidsmiljøutvalget;
b) Works councils
Collective agreement Jointcommittee Triggered Elected by and from employees
20 Have also the right to conclude collective agreements.
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Country Name Legal basis Composition
Automatic
or
triggered
Threshold size
of companies
(No. of
employees)
Election procedure
Poland Law (only in publiccompanies)
Employees
only
Slovakia Law Employeesonly Triggered
50 (5-50 single
representative) Election
Slovenia Law Employeesonly
20 (smaller
companies’
representative)
Spain Comité de Enterpresa Law Employeesonly Triggered
6 to elect
workforce
delegates, 50
for works
councils
Elections based on the list of trade union
candidates
Sweden
Statutory information
and consultation rights
for trade unions, there
is no works council type
of body
UK
No general, permanent
or statutory system of
information and
consultation
Source: Old EU Member States - EIRO 2004; new EU Member States – Tóth and Ghellab 2003
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APPENDIX 2. Board-level employee representation
Table A.2. Board-level employee representation (BLR) in the EU countries
State
System of
corporate
governance
Is there statutory
provisions/ Type
of regulation for
BLR
Companies Onlypublic
Proportion of employees
representatives and
structures where
employees are
represented
Selection method of
employees
representatives
Austria D Yes/Legislation Companies with at least 40employees No 1/3 of supervisory boards
Appointed by works
council from its ranks
Belgium No
Czech Republic D Yes/Legislation
All state-owned companies
and joint stock companies
with more than 50 employees
No 1/3 of supervisory boards Employees’ vote
Cyprus No
Denmark D Yes/Legislation Companies with at least 35employees No
Two members and up to 1/3
of supervisory boards
Employees’ vote among
employees
Estonia D No
Finland Mixed Yes/Legislation Companies with more than150 employees No
Employees’ representative
may be anybody nominated
by management board,
supervisory board or
management group. Up to
1/5 of the membership of the
body and it is 1-4 members
(many details left to local
negotiation)
Employees vote for trade
union appointed
candidates, who are
employed in this
company
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State
System of
corporate
governance
Is there statutory
provisions/ Type
of regulation for
BLR
Companies Onlypublic
Proportion of employees
representatives and
structures where
employees are
represented
Selection method of
employees
representatives
France Mixed Yes/Legislationmainly
State-owned companies with
more than 200 employees,
the whole private sector
No
State-owned companies
employing 200-1000: two
members;
State-owned companies
employing over 1000: 1/3 of
members;
In private sector, 2-4 works
council members may attend
board meetings;
In ltd companies, which
have voluntarily reserved
seats for staff members: 4-5
members or up to 1/3 of
membership;
Representation in the board
of directors very rare.
In state-owned
enterprises and
companies where
voluntary board-level
participation is envisaged
employees elect the
representative from the
candidates appointed by
the five nationally
recognised unions.
Works council members
attending in board
meetings are appointed
by works councils.
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State
System of
corporate
governance
Is there statutory
provisions/ Type
of regulation for
BLR
Companies Onlypublic
Proportion of employees
representatives and
structures where
employees are
represented
Selection method of
employees
representatives
Germany D Yes/Legislation Companies with 500employees or more No
Coal, iron and steel industry
– parity representation of
labour and shareholders in
the supervisory board and
also one member in
management board “labour
director”.
Companies employing 500-
2000: 1/3 of supervisory
board.
More than 2000 workers: ½
of supervisory board
(chairman is the
shareholders’ representative
and has two votes if there is
a disagreement).
Generally by employees
vote (specific provisions
for companies with
different size and for
representation of different
workers groups).
In coal, steel and iron
industry candidates are
appointed by trade
unions and works
councils, shareholders
approve the candidate.
Labour director is
appointed by
shareholders and it
cannot be done against
the majority vote of the
employees’ side in
supervisory board.
Greece
D (in
socialised
sector)
Yes/Legislation
State run “socialised
companies” such as public
utilities and transport
Yes
1/3 of supervisory body
consists of employees’
representatives, 1/3 of
consumer groups and local
authorities, 1/3 of
government representatives.
1/3 of board of directors
consists of members elected
among workforce
Employees’ vote
Hungary D Yes/Legislation Companies with more than200 employees No 1/3 of supervisory boards
Works councils nominate
representatives (must
consult first with union
representatives)
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State
System of
corporate
governance
Is there statutory
provisions/ Type
of regulation for
BLR
Companies Onlypublic
Proportion of employees
representatives and
structures where
employees are
represented
Selection method of
employees
representatives
Ireland M Yes/Legislation State-owned companies Yes
In some companies 1/3 of
the seats in the board of
directors
Employees’ vote among
candidates who are
appointed by the
recognised organisation
of collective bargaining
Italy
No (some
company-level
agreements)
Latvia D No
Lithuania D No
Luxembourg M Yes/Legislation
Companies that are more
than 25% state-owned;
Companies that receive state
aid;
Companies with more than
1000 employees
No
In state-owned and state-
aided companies one
employees’ representative
per 100 employees. Min. 3
employees’ representatives
and max. 1/3 of the board of
directors;
Companies with over 1000
employees: 1/3 of the board
of directors
Works council
representatives appoint
members from the
workforce. In iron and
steel industry most
representative national
trade unions appoint the
board representatives,
who may be outside the
company’s workforce
Malta M Yes/Legislation State-owned companies Yes 1 member in the board ofdirector Employees’ vote
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State
System of
corporate
governance
Is there statutory
provisions/ Type
of regulation for
BLR
Companies Onlypublic
Proportion of employees
representatives and
structures where
employees are
represented
Selection method of
employees
representatives
Netherlands D Yes/Legislation Companies with more than100 employees No
The proportion of
employees’ representatives
is not defined. The
representation is in
supervisory board
Supervisory board elects
its own members.
General meeting of
shareholders, works
council and executive
board recommend new
members in the case of
vacancy. Employees of
the company and union
officials engaged in
collective bargaining may
not be members of
supervisory board.
Norway Mixed Yes/Legislationmainly
Most private companies;
Agreements or public sector
decision-based
representation in public
sector companies and
companies that are not
covered by legislative
framework
No
Up to 1/3 of seats on the
board of directors and not
less than three members. If
there is a similar body to
supervisory board,
employees are represented
in both boards
Employees’ vote among
workforce (it is common
that trade unions
nominate the candidates)
Poland D Yes/Legislation
Privatised companies with
more than 500 employees;
State-owned companies
No/Yes
In state-owned companies
2/5 of supervisory board;
In partly state-owned
companies (<50%) 2-4
members of supervisory
board;
In privatised companies 1
member of management
board.
Employees’ vote
Portugal D
Yes/Legislation
(not implemented
in practice)
State-owned companies Yes Board of directors,supervisory board Employees’ vote
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State
System of
corporate
governance
Is there statutory
provisions/ Type
of regulation for
BLR
Companies Onlypublic
Proportion of employees
representatives and
structures where
employees are
represented
Selection method of
employees
representatives
Slovakia D Yes/Legislation
State-owned companies and
companies with supervisory
board, where there are more
than 50 employees
No
Private companies: 1/3 of
members in supervisory
board;
State-owned companies ½
of supervisory board
Employees’ vote, in state-
owned companies one
board member is directly
appointed by trade union
Slovenia D Yes/Legislation
Joint stock companies with
supervisory board (obligatory
if, e.g. there are more than
500 employees)
No
1/3-1/2 of supervisory board
(defined in the statutes of
company) and 1 member in
management board, if there
are more than 500 employee
Supervisory board
members are directly
appointed by works
councils;
Proposal for
management board
member is made by
works council and
appointed by
shareholders
Spain M
Yes/Tripartite
collective
agreements
Largest public sector
companies, institutions with
special legal status (e.g.
savings banks)
Yes Board of directors
Sweden M Yes/Legislation Companies with more than 25employees No
In companies employing 25-
1000: two members;
Over 1000 employees: three
members;
Employees cannot be in
majority
Appointed by local trade
unions
UK M No
Notations: D – dual system of company management, M – one tier system of company management
Sources: Old EU Member States – Schulten, Zagelmeyer 1998; new EU Member States – Kluge, Stollt 2004
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APPENDIX 3. Interview Structure with Heads of Companies and 
Employees' Representatives 
 
1. What forms of employee representation exist in your company and how well do they 
work in your opinion? 
2. What is the role (function) of each form of representation in your company? How do 
they relate to each other (rights, division of responsibilities, proportion of members)? 
3. In what form, how often and on what purpose are information and opinions exchanged 
between management and employee representation? 
4. How was the trade union/non-unionised representative created in your company (if not 
created, then why)? 
5. How many employees in your company belong to the trade union? What employee 
groups does the trade union/non-unionised representative represent? 
6. What could be the ideal role of the trade union/non-unionised representative in your 
company?  
7. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the trade union/non-unionised 
representation to the employer and employees in your company? 
8. How satisfied are you with the work of the trade union/non-unionised representative in 
the company? 
9. What other employees' representatives do you have in the company and how satisfied 
are you with their work? What form of employee representation do you/would you 
prefer (considering also those that do not exist in your company) as an information and 
consultation channel and why? 
10. Whether there are and what are the opportunities for the employees in your company 
to personally get information about the company’s activities and give opinions or make 
suggestions? 
11. In as far as your company uses direct employee participation, what are/would be the 
advantages and disadvantages of direct participation as compared to participation 
through a representative? 
12. What documents regulate employee participation in your company (internal procedure 
rules, collective agreement, any other document) and what are the employee 
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participation customs? 
13. If there is a collective agreement concluded in your company, please describe the 
negotiation process. 
14. Has/have the collective agreement/internal procedure rules defined information and 
consultation process? What is it like? 
15. What does the collective agreement give, if anything, to the company/management 
and employees? 
16. Does your company have any other documents (besides the collective agreement and 
internal procedure rules) that provide for employees’ information and consultation? 
What process does the document provide and what is the process like? 
17. How well do you think are the employees in your company informed of the named 
documents on average? 
18. What influence do employees have on different decisions (working hours, wages, 
health and safety, training plans, etc.)? 
19. Whether and how employees’ suggestions and problems reach management? 
Whether and how feedback is given to suggestions? Whether and what kind of role 
does employee representation play in this process? 
20. What information, how often and how is given to employees? 
21. On what issues and how are employees consulted? How much time is usually given to 
employees for formulating and presenting their opinion? 
22. How important do you think is employees’ information and consultation? What are the 
advantages and disadvantages to the company and employees? 
23. How old are you? How long have you worked in the company and what speciality have 
you studied? 
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APPENDIX 4. Employees’ Questionnaire 
 
EMPLOYEES’ PARTICIPATION SURVEY 
 
Company 
No. 
Questionnaire 
No. 
Dear Respondent 
Please read first the few instructions below on how to fulfil the questionnaire. 
Once you have chosen your answer, please circle the number in front of it. 
Please give ONLY ONE ANSWER to majority of questions. For example, Q1. 
Some questions can also have several answers, but in this case the question text reads ‘CAN HAVE 
SEVERAL ANSWERS’. 
In some cases answers should be written in a gap or text field (on the line). For example, Q2. 
Good luck! 
 
PART 1: GENERAL WORK RELATED INFORMATION 
First of all we would like to ask you a few general questions about your work in this company. 
Q1. Which of the below variants describe best your work in this company? PLEASE CIRCLE 
ONLY ONE NUMBER  
1. Head or subdivision manager  
2. Top specialist (e.g. lawyer, accountant, engineer) 
3. Technician or middle specialist (e.g. foreman, programmer, supplier) 
4. Clerk (e.g. office clerk, cashier, warehouse clerk, dispatcher) 
5. Service or sales staff (e.g. customer service assistant, sales person, security guard) 
6. Skilled worker or craftsman (e.g. locksmith, motor vehicle mechanic, builder) 
7. Equipment or machinery operator, vehicle or non-road vehicle driver (e.g. boiler operator, 
sewing machine operator, bus driver, road roller driver) 
8. Unskilled worker (e.g. guard, cleaner, construction aid staff, loader) 
 
Q2. If you have subordinates, how many direct subordinates do you have? If you have no 
subordinates, please write ‘0’. 
Please write the number of direct subordinates: ________ 
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Q3. How many years have you worked in this company? 
Please write the number of years: ________ 
 
Q4. Which of the below variants describe best your working hours? 
1. Regular day-time working hours (clock to clock work) 
2. Flexible duty roster, choose yourself when you want to work 
3. Shift-work 
4. Work only evenings or nights 
 
Q5. What is your highest level of education?  
1. Basic education or less 
2. Upper secondary education 
3. Vocational secondary education or vocational education 
4. Higher education 
 
Q6. How do you think you cope with your work? 
1. Very well 
2. Well 
3. Badly 
4. Very badly 
 
Q7. How much do your colleagues depend on your work?  
1. Many colleagues depend on your work 
2. A few colleagues depend on your work 
3. No colleagues depend on your work 
 
Q8. Do you have an opportunity to use the Internet or intranet (internal information network) 
at your workplace? 
1. Yes, all the time 
2. Yes, from time to time 
3. None at all 
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PART 2: EMPLOYEES’ REPRESENTATION 
In this part of the questionnaire we would like to find out how the employees communicate with the 
management in your company. 
 
Q9. Which of the following employee representation forms exist in your company?  
CAN HAVE SEVERAL ANSWERS  
1. Trade union representative  
2. Representative who is not elected by trade union 
3. Working environment representative  
4. Working environment council 
5. Other employees' representative/representation (specify) _______________________ 
6. None exist 
7. Don’t know, I am not aware 
TRADE UNION REPRESENTATIVE 
ANSWER QUESTIONS Q10-Q15 ONLY IF YOUR COMPANY HAS A TRADE UNION 
REPRESENTATIVE. IF THERE IS NO UNION REPRESENTATIVE, PLEASE CONTINUE WITH THE 
TEXT BEFORE QUESTION Q15. 
 
Q10. Are you a member of the trade union? 
1. Yes  -» CONTINUE WITH QUESTION Q11 
2. No  -» CONTINUE WITH QUESTION Q12 
 
Q11. Did you participate in the last elections of the trade union representative? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
Q12. What are the current main roles of the union representative in your company? CIRCLE 
UP TO TWO ANSWERS IN COLUMN Q12. 
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Q13. What should ideally be the main roles of the union representative in your opinion? 
CIRCLE UP TO TWO ANSWERS IN COLUMN Q13.  
 Q12. 
TU 
representative’s 
roles currently
CIRCLE UP TO 
TWO ANSWERS 
Q13. 
TU 
representative’s 
roles ideally
CIRCLE UP TO 
TWO ANSWERS 
Mediates information and opinions in both directions: from 
employees to management and from management to employees 1 1
Mediates mainly information and opinions from employees to 
management 2 2
Mediates mainly information and decisions from management to 
employees  3 3
Represents employees at collective bargaining 4 4 
Solves employees’ work-related problems 5 5 
Union representative does not fulfil any of the above roles 6 6 
Other role, please specify _____________________________ 7 7 
Q14. How satisfied are you with the work of the trade union representative? 
1. Very satisfied 
2. Satisfied  
3. Dissatisfied 
4. Very dissatisfied 
 
Q15. If you turn to the union representative with an issue that presupposes management 
decision, does the union representative pass your information on to management? 
1. Yes, always 
2. Yes, in most cases 
3. Rarely 
4. Never does 
5. Have not turned to the union representative 
REPRESENTATIVE WHO HAS NOT BEEN ELECTED BY THE TRADE UNION
ANSWER QUESTIONS Q16-Q20 ONLY IF YOUR COMPANY HAS A REPRESENTATIVE WHO HAS 
NOT BEEN ELECTED BY THE TRADE UNION. IF THERE IS NO SUCH REPRESENTATIVE, 
CONTINUE WITH QUESTION Q21. 
 
Q16. Did you participate in the last representative elections? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
Q17. What are the current main roles of such representative in your company? CIRCLE UP TO 
TWO ANSWERS IN COLUMN Q17. 
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Q18. What should ideally be the main roles of such representative in your opinion? CIRCLE 
UP TO TWO ANSWERS IN COLUMN Q18. 
 Q17. 
Representative’s 
roles currently
CIRCLE UP TO 
TWO 
ANSWERS 
Q18. 
Representative’s 
roles ideally
CIRCLE UP TO 
TWO 
ANSWERS 
Mediates information and opinions in both directions: from 
employees to management and from management to employees 1 1
Mediates mainly information and opinions from employees to 
management 2 2
Mediates mainly information and decisions from management to 
employees  3 3
Represents employees at collective bargaining 4 4 
Solves employees’ work-related problems 5 5 
The representative does not fulfil any of the above roles 6 6 
Other role, please specify ____________________________ 7 7 
Q19. How satisfied are you with the work of such representative? 
1. Very satisfied 
2. Satisfied  
3. Dissatisfied 
4. Very dissatisfied 
Q20. If you turn to such representative with an issue that presupposes management decision, 
does the representative pass your information on to management? 
1. Yes, always 
2. Yes, in most cases 
3. Rarely 
4. Never does 
5. Have not turned to the union representative 
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PART 3: EMPLOYEES’ PARTICIPATION 
TO BE ANSWERED BY EVERYBODY 
COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT
Q21. Has you company concluded a collective agreement? 
1. Yes -» CONTINUE WITH QUESTION Q22 
2. No -» CONTINUE WITH QUESTION Q25 
Q22. How well do you know the content of the collective agreement? 
1. Know well, aware of almost all the content 
2. Know to some extent, aware of half the things in the agreement 
3. Know little, don’t know much of the agreement 
Q23. Does the named collective agreement concern specifically your post? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Don’t know, hard to say  
Q24. Does the named collective agreement determine the procedures for employees’ 
information and consultation? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Don’t know, hard to say  
INTERNAL PROCEDURE RULES 
Q25. Does your company have internal work procedure rules? 
1. Yes     -» CONTINUE WITH QUESTION Q26 
2. No    -» CONTINUE WITH QUESTION Q28 
3. Don’t know, hard to say   -» CONTINUE WITH QUESTION Q28 
Q26. How well do you know the internal procedure rules? 
1. Know well, aware of almost all the rules 
2. Know to some extent, aware of half the things in the rules 
3. Know little, don’t know much of the rules 
Q27. Do the internal procedure rules determine the procedures for employees’ information 
and consultation? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Don’t know, hard to say  
TO BE ANSWERED BY EVERYBODY 
Q28. Does your company have any other document (besides the collective agreement and 
internal procedure rules) that provides for giving information and feedback to employees? 
1. Yes, please specify ____________________________ -» CONTINUE Q29 
2. No    -» CONTINUE WITH QUESTION Q30 
3. Don’t know, hard to say  -» CONTINUE WITH QUESTION Q30 
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Q29. How well do you know the content of the document mentioned in the previous question? 
1. Know well, aware of almost all the content 
2. Know to some extent, aware of half the things in the document 
3. Know little, don’t know much of the document 
TO BE ANSWERED BY EVERYBODY 
Q30. If you have a problem or a concern about your work or work organisation, who do you 
usually turn to? CIRCLE ONLY ONE ANSWER IN COLUMN Q30 
Q31. If you wish to get information about your company’s activities, who do you usually turn 
to? CIRCLE ONLY ONE ANSWER IN COLUMN Q31 
Q32. If you wish to pass on your ideas about the development of the company, who do you 
usually turn to? CIRCLE ONLY ONE ANSWER IN COLUMN Q32 
 Q30. 
In case of a 
problem or a 
concern you turn to 
…
ONLY ONE 
ANSWER 
Q31. 
To get information 
about the company 
you turn to … 
ONLY ONE 
ANSWER 
Q32. 
About the 
development of the 
company you turn 
to … ONLY ONE 
ANSWER 
Don’t turn to anybody 1 1 1 
Direct superior 2 2 2 
Higher level manager 3 3 3 
Company’s union representative  4 4 4 
Non-unionised representative 5 5 5 
Working environment representative  6 6 6 
Work colleagues 7 7 7 
Personnel manager 8 8 8 
Speak up on a meeting 9 9 9 
Look for help outside the company 10 10 10 
Don’t know, hard to say 11 11 11 
Q33. Have you made suggestions for changing the work organisation? 
1. Yes, often 
2. Yes, sometimes 
3. No 
Q.34. How was your suggestion received (if you have made many, please answer bearing in 
mind the last one you made)?  
1. Your suggestion was taken into account and work organisation was changed 
2. Your suggestion was not taken into account, but it was explained why 
3. Your suggestion was not taken into account and it was not explained either  
4. Have not made suggestions for changing work organisation  
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Q35. In this question we would like to find out how information and consultation take place in 
your company (regardless of whether it is direct with yourself or through an employees’ 
representative). The following table contains a number of decisions. We would like to know how 
each of these decisions is dealt with in your company. CIRCLE ONE ANSWER IN EACH ROW 
Decisions 
Decision is 
passed if 
you or 
employees' 
repre-
sentative 
have 
approved it 
You/ 
employees' 
repre-
sentative is 
asked for 
opinions 
before the 
decision 
Information 
is given 
prior to 
decision, 
but there is 
no 
opportunit
y to give 
opinions 
Will 
learn 
about 
the 
decision 
after it is 
made 
You are 
not 
informed 
of the 
decision 
at all 
Have not 
come 
across 
such 
situation 
A Changes in working hours 1 2 3 4 5 6 
B Changes in wages 1 2 3 4 5 6 
C Changes in health and 
safety conditions 1 2 3 4 5 6
D Holiday schedules 1 2 3 4 5 6 
E Training plans  1 2 3 4 5 6 
F Company’s bigger 
investments 1 2 3 4 5 6
G Changes in economic 
activity 1 2 3 4 5 6
H Introduction of new 
technologies 1 2 3 4 5 6
I Changes in company’s 
bonuses (canteen, grants, 
etc.) 
1 2 3 4 5 6
J Changes in internal 
procedure rules 1 2 3 4 5 6
K Collective redundancies 1 2 3 4 5 6 
L Any other decisions, please 
specify_________________ 1 2 3 4 5 6
Q36. Which are your most frequent channels for receiving information about decisions made 
by management? CIRCLE UP TO THREE ANSWERS IN COLUMN Q36 
 
Q37. Which channels are used most often to ask for your opinion on the decisions planned by 
management? CIRCLE UP TO THREE ANSWERS IN COLUMN Q37 
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Q38. Which channels can you use most frequently for passing on your opinion about the 
management decisions? CIRCLE UP TO THREE ANSWERS IN COLUMN Q38  
 Q36. 
Receive information 
most frequently … 
UP TO THREE 
ANSWERS 
Q37. 
You are asked for 
opinion most 
frequently … 
UP TO THREE 
ANSWERS 
Q38. 
Can pass on your 
opinion most 
frequently … 
UP TO THREE 
ANSWERS 
ORALLY 
Through direct superior 1 1 1 
Through any other management rep. 2 2 2 
Through union representative  3 3 3 
Through non-unionised representative 4 4 4 
Through work colleagues 5 5 5 
Through meetings 6 6 6 
THROUGH AN INFORMATION MEDIUM 
Through electronic means (intranet, e-
mail)  7 7 7
Through notice board 8 8 8 
Through internal news letter 9 9 9 
Through internal post box 10 10 10 
Through any other channel, please 
specify 
_____________________ 
11 11 11 
Don’t receive at all / can’t ask for 
information / give opinions 12 12 12 
Q39. If management asks for employees’ opinion about their decisions, do they give 
you/employees' representative sufficient time for formulating and presenting such opinion? 
1. Yes, always 
2. Yes, sometimes 
3. No, never 
4. In your company they don’t ask for employees’ or employees' representative’s opinion 
 
Q40. If management does not take into account the opinion employees formulated, do they 
explain their actions?  
1. Yes, always 
2. Yes, sometimes 
3. No, never 
4. In your company they don’t ask for employees’ or employees' representative’s opinion 
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Q41. How well are you informed about the company’s activities and work organisation? 
1. Very well 
2. Well  
3. Not well informed 
4. Uninformed 
Q42. To what extent can you have a say in decisions on the organisation of your work? 
1. To a very great extent 
2. To a great extent 
3. To a small extent 
4. To a very small extent 
Q43. To what extent can you have a say in issues related to company’s economic activities or 
in making financial decisions? 
1. To a very great extent 
2. To a great extent 
3. To a small extent 
4. To a very small extent 
Q44. What are your suggestions in regards to employees’ information in your company? But 
in regards to consultation? What should be done differently in this respect in the future? WRITE 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Q45. How important do you think is employees’ information and consultation? 
1. Very important 
2. Important  
3. Unimportant 
4. Very unimportant 
Q46. What does company get out of employees’ information and consultation in your opinion? 
WRITE 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Q47. But what do employees get out of employees’ information and consultation? WRITE 
_________________________________________________________________ 
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PART 4: EMPLOYEES’ SATISFACTION 
Now a few questions about how satisfied you are with different aspects of your company. 
Q48. How satisfied are you with the following aspects at your workplace? Are you very 
satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied? CIRCLE ONLY ONE ANSWER IN EACH ROW 
Very 
satisfied 
Satisfied Dissatisfied Very 
dissatisfied 
A Health and safety 4 3 2 1 
B Work load 4 3 2 1 
C Work place design / furnishings 4 3 2 1 
D Welfare conditions (changing rooms, toilets, eating 
areas) 4 3 2 1
E Prevailing atmosphere at work 4 3 2 1 
F Direct superior 4 3 2 1 
G Work collective 4 3 2 1 
H Work organisation 4 3 2 1 
I Work content 4 3 2 1 
J Working hours 4 3 2 1 
K Flexibility of working hours 4 3 2 1 
L Wage 4 3 2 1 
M Additional benefits 4 3 2 1 
N Recognition / feedback about work 4 3 2 1 
O Stability of employment  4 3 2 1 
P Form of employment (type of contract) 4 3 2 1 
Q Professional development opportunities 4 3 2 1 
R Career opportunities 4 3 2 1 
S Work in general 4 3 2 1 
T Other, please specify 
_____________________________ 
__________________________________ 
4 3 2 1
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PART 5: Finally a few questions about yourself 
D1. How old are you? 
Please write your age in numbers: ________ 
D2. What is your current marital status? 
1. Single, never been married 
2. Married 
3. Live with partner, but not officially married 
4. Separated/divorced 
5. Widow/widower 
D3. How many people, you included, live in your household currently (those who live with 
you and share your income)? Please write the number of household members in figures. 
A. Total of household members:  ________ people 
B. Among them how many pre-school children: ________ pre-school children 
D4. What was your net income from the job in regards to which you filled in this 
questionnaire last week, i.e. money that you actually received (excluding taxes), taking account 
both your wage and possible additional remunerations? 
1. Up to 1,500 kroons 
2. 1,501 – 3,000 kroons 
3. 3,001 – 4,500 kroons 
4. 4,501 – 6,000 kroons 
5. 6,001 – 7,500 kroons 
6. 7,501 – 10,000 kroons 
7. Over 10,000 kroons 
 
Thank you for your time! 

